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INTRODUCTION 
 
The “turn to culture” in academic theology has been much documented and 
discussed.1 Whether this turn has sought to analyze church cultures, correlate the spheres 
associated with ecclesial, academic and everyday life, or engage the practices of 
marginalized peoples in an effort to disrupt and reshape the normative assumptions of 
mainstream theology, this turn to culture has comprised a simultaneous turn to 
anthropological or sociological theories and, at times, methods. Liberation, liturgical, 
feminist, womanist and mujerista theologies, for example, have all employed 
ethnographic methods in order to study the beliefs and practices of concrete communities. 
And in so doing, they have demonstrated the rich resources to be mined in the practices 
of everyday Christian faith for the doing of academic theology. 
Turning to culture both as a source for theological reflection and as an analytic 
category for interpreting the field and methods of our study gives rise to a number of 
important questions. What voices in culture have and have not, and might need to be 
heard? What best practices enable such hearing, and how then do we interpret what we 
have heard? Which other academic disciplines might prove most helpful to our 
                                                 
1 For two comprehensive, collaborative studies of this turn to culture in academic 
theology, see Sheila Davaney & Dwight N. Hopkins, Changing Conversations: Cultural 
Analysis and Religious Reflection (New York: Routledge, 1996) and Delwin Brown, 
Sheila Greeve Davaney, and Kathryn Tanner ed., Converging on Culture: Theologians in 
Dialogue with Cultural Analysis and Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001). See also, David Kamitsuka, Theology and Contemporary Culture: Liberation, 
Postliberal and Revisionary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
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endeavors? And how does the way we frame culture as an analytic category impact our 
modes of engagement with cultural practices, particularly our theological modes?   
Kathryn Tanner addresses this final question in particular as she outlines a scheme 
for understanding theology as a cultural practice that gives rise to both ad hoc, context 
specific forms (everyday theologies) and more specialized, historically consistent, 
systematic forms (academic theologies).2 As Tanner rightly assumes, the academic 
theologian is often already socially positioned somewhere within the field of practice that 
creates everyday theologies. In both competition and cooperation with everyday 
theologies, then, the academic theologian uses her specialized set of academic gifts and 
skills to address the concrete problems arising from Christian life.  
Tanner therefore sets up a theoretical structure for understanding the practice of 
doing academic theology as transcending divisions of church and academy, theoretical 
reflection and practical engagement, or abstraction and concretion. She provides 
academic theologians with a framework for understanding Christian social practices as 
already integrating – to varying degrees – the discourses of church, academy and 
everyday life. Tanner’s framework thus describes systematically, and most accurately, 
the terrain for a theological engagement of Christian social practices and discourses.  
Mapping a terrain of practice in ways that ring true and help make sense of it, 
Tanner’s framework both guides this study and receives correction from it. In this 
dissertation I attempt to use Tanner’s map to move through my own terrain. At times I 
find her map to be helpful; other times I find that I need to draw an alternative, less-
beaten path onto the picture in order to make sense of my own journey. These rugged 
                                                 
2 Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997). 
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paths might be more difficult to walk, or even to plot and integrate with the larger map, 
but as we will see, they become necessary when the charted freeway rushes too quickly 
by a site of interest. In less metaphorical language, while I use Tanner’s theoretical 
structure in this dissertation both to guide and to interpret a set of practices, I endeavor 
also to use those practices to disrupt and re-configure the theory through which I make 
sense of them. The movement between theory and practice here is rapid; at times the two 
might even seem to integrate.  
And in this integration, what I hope we end up with is a number of dense, rich 
stories that make sense in light of, but which also complicate and, at times, elude any 
categories of theological thinking that any one of us – myself, my research partners, or 
any reader of this text – might already be putting to use. I hope that these dense, rich 
stories – and the processes of their construction, which will be outlined further 
throughout this text – teach us all something new about how to understand, but also how 
to live, the theologies that give rise to Christian faith.  
But how can we simultaneously use, disrupt, and re-configure Tanner’s scheme 
for understanding theology as a cultural practice performed with varying levels and types 
of specialization or fluency? Concurrent with this academic theological turn to culture 
and theories of culture has been a rising interest in various forms of ethnography as a 
partner for theological reflection. Practical Theologians have long described the first task 
of academic theology as careful description of a theological situation.3 Liberation 
                                                 
3 Don S. Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic 
Proposals (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1991) 8, 15ff. 
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theologians have suggested likewise.4 And in recent years, Mary McClintock Fulkerson 
in particular has sought explicitly to bring Tanner’s scheme for understanding the 
relationship between everyday and academic theologies to life with her own ethnographic 
study of a congregation, Good Samaritan Church.5  
This project functions as a complementary alternative to Fulkerson’s. Whereas 
Fulkerson’s study primarily employs ethnographic methods of participant observation, 
my study here is grounded more in what Pierre Bourdieu calls, “participant 
objectification” or “participant objectivation.” In other words, it is grounded less in 
straightforward observation of a field of study, and more in my conscious construction of 
a field of study. Let me explain.   
Simply put, the difference between participant observation and objectification 
comes down to the difference between the ways in which the researcher’s own subject 
position is theorized. As forms of ethnographic, anthropological, sociological and other 
qualitative methods have developed, the role that the researcher plays within the field of 
the other, or of the one or community that she studies, has attracted increased attention. 
And such attention has both practical and theoretical implications.  
In practical terms, the presence of an American researcher at a Balinese cockfight, 
to use the famous example from Clifford Geertz’s work, surely has an impact on how at 
least some of the events of the day play out.6 Balinese forms of hospitality to the other 
                                                 
4 See for example, Clodovis Boff, Theology and Praxis: Epistemological Foundations 
(Maryknoll: Orbis,1987) and Stacey Floyd-Thomas, Mining the Motherlode: Method in 
Womanist Ethics (Pilgrim, 2006). 
5 Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
6 See Clifford Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight” in The 
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 412-453. 
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become a part of a story that would not otherwise have occurred without the 
anthropologist’s presence, for example. One cannot be hospitable to the other if the other 
is not present.  
Alternatively, in terms of the theoretical structures he uses to reflect on his field 
of study, this same anthropologist could – and inevitably always does – inadvertently 
allow some of his own particular, deeply engrained cultural dispositions to shape his 
lenses of interpretation. These dispositions, in fact, shape what the anthropologist even 
looks at in his study. In other words, they shape the object he constructs for study. 
We must account for these forms of practical and theoretical proximity and 
distance, which amount, essentially, to the researcher’s own subjective positioning if we 
are to hope for any objectivity to the analysis. In other words, if we do not account for 
them, it is difficult for a reader to trust that we are offering anything more than a simple 
journal entry or memoir narrative. Such concerns have given rise to, among other 
theoretical trajectories, the particular trajectory of Reflexive Ethnography. To use the 
language from above as shorthand, this accounting of the researcher’s own subject 
position – that is, an accounting of the practices and theories by which the researcher 
turns a set of messy, somewhat incoherent, practices into an object to be studied – is what 
Bourdieu calls “participant objectification,” and it is the particular process that interests 
the ethnographic components of this dissertation. 
In these pages, I develop a form of self-implicated ethnography, grounded in the 
reflexive ethnographic methods of Bourdieu and his student, Loïc Wacquant.7 By 
changing the methods and practices by which Tanner’s scheme is brought to life – from 
                                                 
7 See in particular, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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Fulkerson’s participant observation to this particularly Bourdieuian form of participant 
objectification – I simultaneously change the types of theological knowledge that can be 
produced. And in so doing, I endeavor to furrow out some of those uncharted paths on 
Tanner’s map in a way that might change the overall cartographic picture.  
In particular, I do not only report the beliefs and practices at play in my field of 
study, First Baptist Church, Nashville (FBC), although these certainly make up part of 
my theological reflections. More so, I report the process by which I – as a minister and 
trained theologian within the community – guided those beliefs and practices in a small 
sub-section of the congregation. Observation gives way to objectification as, with 
conscious intentionality, I not only outline the borders and focus of my study, but also, 
again with conscious intentionality, shape what happens within and among those borders 
and foci.  
Therefore, this is less a study about how everyday Christians might think and feel 
about particular topics, or how they might grapple with them, and how an academic 
theologian can make normative theological claims based on them. It is, in fact, much 
more about what happens when academic theologies intervene in a particular community 
of everyday theological discourse (itself, a complicated category, as we will see), 
disrupting that discourse and contributing to its ongoing relationship to Christian practice.  
It is also a study of how that same, particular everyday theological discourse can disrupt 
and contribute to an academic theologian’s own discourse and practice. As much as the 
academic theologian seeks to convince everyday Christians to some of her views, we will 
see here that she must also be willing to be convinced by theirs, even at time converted 
by them.  
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This study is therefore less about the ways in which everyday and academic 
theologies compete with each other to influence Christian practice, and more about what 
can happen when they tackle such problems together in practice. It is less about what an 
academic theologian might wish to communicate to everyday Christians, and more about 
how she might communicate it. 
My opening up, complicating and revising of Tanner’s theoretical structure with a 
form of ethnography different than that used by Fulkerson is thus guided by a couple of 
goals. First, I endeavor to reveal some of the problems with Tanner’s framing of the 
relationship between everyday and academic theology. At times, her description of the 
messiness that can arise in the clash between everyday and academic theology remains 
too neat. It misses out on the emotional, bodily dimensions of real people talking about 
God. And in so doing, it tends to idealize the process by which theological construction 
happens. One of my goals here is to show that messiness and to demonstrate the types of 
theological construction that happen throughout such processes. Theology happens in 
fragments as well as systems, in broken conversations as well as polished monologues. 
This dissertation is an attempt to bring to light these fragments and snippets of speech as 
alternative, yet important, insights into Divine and ecclesial life.  
My second goal is related more closely with the ways in which this ethnographic 
theology differs from Fulkerson’s. Theologians are not ethnographers. At best, we can 
borrow the tools and insights of ethnography and use them in imperfect ways but 
nevertheless ways helpful for our purposes. My second goal, then, is to offer a set of 
methodological warnings, guides, hints and advice for the academic theologian interested 
in using qualitative methods for her theological reflection. It is a call for theologians to 
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think carefully through what ethnographic methods and practices they will borrow in 
their research, as it is also a call for theologians to consider how their choice of methods 
and practices impacts what the theologies we construct will look like.  
Reflections in this order will reveal how borrowing from reflexive ethnography 
helps the theologian avoid unconsciously imagining herself to be external to the field of 
study. By extension, it helps her avoid incorrectly imagining herself as able to impose a 
totalizing interpretive model onto the field of practice in her description of it. Reflexive 
ethnography, therefore, helps the theologian describe more accurately how the spatial 
incongruities and temporal processes can cause flux and difference within, across and 
outside of a particular demarcated field of study. In addition to accounting for the 
theologian’s subject position within the field of study, in this dissertation, following 
Wacquant, I am particularly interested in using that position – in deploying it from within 
the field – for the purpose of creating fresh theological insight. 
The form of self-implicated, reflexive ethnography I develop here thus deploys 
my own particular competing and cohering roles as both minister and academic 
theologian into a loose, performative integration with each other within my community of 
study. Specifically, I teach adult education theology courses through the education 
programs of the church. And in so doing, I endeavor to bring everyday and academic 
theologies into a shared practice of pursuing the wisdom of Christian life together.  
Before I begin introducing the field of my study, or the methods by which I 
integrated my ecclesial and academic roles as a research tool in this way, I should answer 
a question that permeates these pages, the question of “Why?” Why this church, and why 
this desire for a loose integration of these roles? 
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Faith in My Bones… 
This dissertation begins in two simultaneous convictions and a fraught and 
complex love. First, it begins in the conviction that we carry faith not only in our minds, 
in our articulations of conscious thought, but also in our bodies, in our bones. Second, it 
begins in the conviction that deep in that marrow resides resources for pursuing wisdom, 
a pursuit by which we might embody our faith again and again and ever anew. And third, 
this dissertation begins in the fraught and complex love I have for both the church and the 
academy; it begins in my hope that I might be able to nurture the ways these two can 
pursue wisdom together. 
I think I remember the moment when I decided to become an academic 
theologian. Naming one’s origins is a tricky task; I have inevitably forgotten more about 
this process than I remember. But I think some form of its beginning happened here: I 
was in my second year of divinity school, sitting in my liturgical theology classroom, and 
two of my friends were giving a presentation on a set of feminist and womanist texts. The 
two had paired up for the assignment for a particular reason. As I remember it, they saw 
themselves as socio-political-theological opposites, self-describing as one conservative, 
one liberal. And they perceived the ground between them as one that could be mapped by 
a conversation about something they had experienced differently than each other but, 
nevertheless, together.  
As each had tried to integrate the stuff of her study with her religious life, each 
had found a fruitful spiritual discipline in the practice of struggling consciously against 
and within the structures of Christian worship. These two women sunk into real 
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concretion with their descriptions. They narrated and re-narrated their paths of struggle 
within particular divinity school community worship services that the majority of our 
class members had also attended. Their stories overlapped each other, as they intersected 
with each of ours. These two women were – still are – brilliant, creative theologians, and 
their insights stirred us all as we each found ourselves relating with both of them in 
different ways. Their willingness to be vulnerable with each other and with us opened up 
the classroom to new forms of risky conversation in which the personal, the political and 
the theological converged.  
My two friends closed their presentation by turning analysis back onto the rest of 
us. By this point, we – or at least, I – felt so implicated in the story they were telling, that 
their question, “Why stay? Why stay in congregations that appear to have no room for us 
as we are, let alone as we are becoming?” caught me up and demanded my response. 
Their journeys had intersected with mine. I too was at a crossroads, as might, in fact, be 
one of the goals to the design of divinity school curriculum: first year dismantle the 
religious self, second year flounder, third year, hopefully, get put back together. By this 
point in my education, I had moved through feeling liberated from the evangelical 
religion that had brought me to divinity school on little more than a whim, a prayer, and 
some sense of God’s calling, into feeling alienated instead.  
Alienated from my faith formation, however, my grasping toward new religious 
forms felt equally unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there was a particular shape to my 
yearning from home for home’s transcendence that could not be fulfilled by a journey to 
elsewhere. I could assent intellectually to more so-called “liberal” or “progressive” 
Christian practices, but they felt unnatural to my own particular faith constitution; they 
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could not stir me. I wonder now if I would have grown into them over time. But doing so 
felt pointless at the time, as on the other hand, I found no matter how “progressive” the 
congregation or set of Christian practices I tried to engage, they remained also unable to 
fulfill the yearnings my academic study was now creating in me. Sexism, shallow 
thinking, homophobia, racism, closed-mindedness, fear of the body, and just plain 
meanness are able to traverse the whole spectrum of Christian and, indeed, all social 
practices. And so I became less interested in the struggle’s matters of degree, and more 
interested in the struggle itself. 
Looking back on my moment of decision to stay, I sometimes wonder now if I 
simply should have admitted my growing sense that Christianity might be a bust. Perhaps 
my decision to stay was caused by a failure of imagination; I simply could not conceive 
of any other place to go. Such possibilities haunt the fringes of the life I have chosen. 
Even so, I remain convinced that my decision to stay with Christianity in general, and 
with the types of churches where Christianity had become my home in particular, in fact 
grew out of some nascent realization that no matter who we become, we can never escape 
who we are.  
And so stay, I did, and stay with a renewed sense of commitment to the life of 
faith as a spiritual discipline of struggle. Let’s take this commitment to the belly of the 
beast, I remember thinking. One decision thus forged two distinct, yet intersecting paths: 
I began discerning a call to ordination that culminated in the Southern Baptist 
congregation where I conducted this dissertation’s study, and I began discerning a 
vocation in the theological academy. 
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This question of struggle remains at the heart of this dissertation, however. I 
might have settled in FBC simply because I have a scrappy personality that likes to find 
admission to clubs from which I otherwise feel excluded. FBC offered a rare path into 
ordination in a denomination that on the larger scale, outside of the autonomy of rare, 
local congregations, is fundamentally opposed to women in such roles. But framing my 
belonging in this way allows me an ironic detachment from it that exposes only the most 
fragmented version of the truth. I settled in FBC because in the fullest sense of what it 
means to claim a place as home – a place to which we can never really return once we 
have left, but which surprises us with moments of belonging that sink deeper that we 
knew possible – FBC felt like home. Not intellectually, not theologically, certainly not 
politically: FBC connected with some form of the faith so deep in my bones that I can 
hardly articulate it when I try. It was a community that could help me hold on to my faith 
and, in this way, FBC provided the anchor for a few years of struggle to understand that 
faith, to go as deep into it as I could, to reclaim it again and anew for myself. 
The marks of this struggle are evident throughout this text. It is, in many ways, an 
exercise in understanding why I might call this community home. The anxiety and 
ambivalence I feel at my own, indeed, pleasurable sense of belonging leave traces in each 
story I tell about the community. These traces threaten to disrupt not only my insistence 
that I belong, but also my insistence that I do not. They risk undermining the reader’s 
trust in me, precisely because they mark the places where I do not entirely trust myself. 
The question, “why this community, and not another?” therefore also haunts the text. And 
perhaps the most honest answer I can give is simply the text itself, my desire to write it, 
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and an enduring conviction that of all the locations in which theology needs to find itself, 
a place some might call the beast’s belly, but which I call home, remains one. 
 
First Baptist Church, Nashville 
 FBC was founded in 1820 when thirty-five members of Mill Creek Baptist 
Church split off to form their own congregation. Less than ten years later, doctrinal 
differences led a group that maintained the First Baptist name to leave its building and 
pastor to found a new – or, depending on one’s perspective, to preserve the original – 
community. In 1844, FBC’s African-American members, a mix of freed and enslaved 
persons, began the slow process of moving to independence, which culminated in their 
founding their own self-governing body in 1865, now First Baptist Church Capitol Hill.8 
In the interim, when the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) split from northern Baptists 
in 1845, largely over the issue of slavery, FBC became a founding member.  
The marks of these origins still remain; the church is racially homogenous, 
comprised of mostly middle to upper-middle class, white, educated professionals. In the 
1950s and ‘60s, when other wealthy, white churches were moving their campuses out of 
the downtown, into the suburbs, FBC stayed. Even so, most of its members commute in 
from those more affluent neighboring suburbs for church activities.9 Any racial and class 
diversity can therefore be observed primarily through the church’s outreach programs for 
                                                 
8 This process involved, sequentially: worshipping as a separate community in FBC’s 
building, then being led in worship in a separate building by a white pastor as an FBC 
mission church, and finally worshipping with an African-American pastor in an FBC 
governed mission church before founding their own congregation. 
9 On Sunday mornings, there are usually approximately 700 people present in adult 
Sunday school and 700 present in the single worship service. Of course, there is 
considerable overlap between the two groups, but on any given Sunday, many just dip in 
for either one or the other. 
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the more socially disadvantaged people living on the streets of Nashville’s downtown 
core.  
As an original member of the convention, and with the SBC denominational 
offices and publishing company stationed just a few blocks away (many of the church’s 
members work at the latter), FBC is so thoroughly proximate to and rooted in SBC life 
that it can forge an identity both in distinction from and in relation to the larger 
communion. Such a balance between affiliation and autonomy is not atypical in Baptist 
life, however. As Stephen Warner puts it, despite the “conservative ascendancy” in the 
SBC, which indicates a strong overarching denominational presence, local church 
autonomy is “not just a symbol.”10 Indeed, Arthur E. Farnsley points out that Southern 
Baptists tend to be “fiercely loyal Congregationalists, preferring to think of themselves 
first as members of particular local churches who co-operate – to whatever degree – with 
others under the auspices of the SBC.”11 Whether or not this claim can be made across 
the board for Southern Baptist congregations, it does seem to be true at FBC. Everyone I 
                                                 
10 R. Stephen Warner, “The Place of the Congregation in the Contemporary American 
Religious Configuration,” in vol. 2 of American Congregations: New Perspectives in the 
Study of Congregations, ed. James P. Wind & James W. Lewis (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), 76.  
11 Arthur E. Farnsley II, “‘Judicious Concentration’: Decision Making in the Southern 
Baptist Convention,” in Southern Baptists Observed: Multiple Perspectives on a 
Changing Denomination, ed. Nancy Tatom Ammerman (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1993), 47. A single Baptist church has an autonomous, democratic 
governance structure. That church can choose to affiliate with other organizations, such 
as local (the Nashville association), state (the Tennessee Baptist Convention), and/or 
national (SBC). A local body can disfellowship an individual church (in recent years, this 
has usually happened in more conservative local bodies over of female ordination). 
Because local bodies have no formal ties with state and national bodies, however, 
disfellowship from them does not immediately imply disfellowship elsewhere. Likewise, 
membership in the local body does not immediately imply membership with state and 
national bodies. For a fuller explication of this structure, see Nancy Ammerman, “After 
the Battles: Emerging Organizational Forms” in Southern Baptists Observed, 305. 
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interviewed said that they joined the congregation because of its kind, welcoming 
atmosphere; no one mentioned joining because of doctrinal reasons, or because they were 
looking for a specifically Southern Baptist congregation. In fact, a number mentioned 
joining “in spite” of the fact that it was Southern Baptist, noting how important its 
moderate nature in relation to the larger communion was to them. 
People join because of this sense of welcoming love, a core mark of how the 
church frames its identity. FBC’s motto, “Loving God, Loving People,” puts the 
congregants’ desire for emotional bonds with God and with each other front and center in 
their life together. As with any community, FBC exhibits implicit and explicit 
exclusionary practices. And these exclusionary practices tend to define the borders on 
who gains entry to the shared emotional bonds. Even so, cultural objects like posters and 
worship bulletins emblazon this motto all over the church’s campus, reminding everyone 
who enters that their love for one another grows out of their love for God.  
Indeed, as Nancy Ammerman argues, people tend to join a particular 
congregation because its ministries can put their “moral energies” to work, and this seems 
to be the case at FBC.12 “Loving God and Loving People” manifests in a vast array of 
mission activities, through which members who understand the concept and goals of 
“mission” in an equally vast array of ways are able to direct their moral energies. On one 
side of the spectrum, FBC participates in the types of evangelistic practices that are 
common to American evangelicalism: witnessing to friends, street evangelism at public 
events, inviting friends and co-workers to church events that are subtly – and not so 
                                                 
12 Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Pillars of Faith: American Congregations and Their 
Partners (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 268. See also, Ammerman, 
Congregation and Community (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,  
1997), 355. 
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subtly – designed to guide the conversion of non-Christians to Christianity. At the other 
end of the spectrum are the social programs I mentioned above: ministries for Nashville’s 
homeless populations and for women who are in transition out of prison and rehab, 
conversational English classes for immigrants, and more. As Ammerman argues, most 
American Christians have “not learned the ideological lesson that if they believe in 
promoting social justice, they should place less emphasis on witnessing; or – at the other 
pole – that if they believe in witnessing, they should be wary of calls for social justice.”13 
In lived practice one tends to imply the other, and at FBC most members are involved in 
some way with both. In sum, the community is one that thrives in its warm, friendly and, 
indeed, loving life together.  
 
Life Change University 
 The chief component of my fieldwork at FBC entailed teaching Sunday night 
adult education theology classes as a component of the church’s “Life Change 
University” (LCU) program. I will go into more detail on these classes’ nature in 
subsequent chapters. But for now, a brief introduction to the two LCU semesters in which 
I taught will be helpful for situating the broader religious education landscape within 
which this fieldwork occurred. While we see throughout this dissertation that there was 
room for courses like mine to flourish, as also becomes clear, they nevertheless 
functioned in a somewhat atypical way within FBC’s broader education practices.  
Sunday nights at FBC hop with all the LCU activity. Adult education classes are 
offered in both a fall and spring semester program, each running for about thirteen weeks. 
                                                 
13 Ammerman, Congregation and Community, 358. 
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In the semester that I taught “Topics in Theology: Jesus Christ and Salvation,”14 other 
offerings included: “Griefshare,” a seminar and support group for people who have lost 
someone; two women-only classes using material by Beth Moore, on “Christian 
Freedom” and the book of Revelation;15 Ken Hemphill’s The Prayer of Jesus, focused on 
living “a kingdom adventure every day”;16 “The Truth Project,” which followed a DVD-
based curriculum focused on living life with a “Biblical worldview”;17 and “The Family 
Life Cycle,” which dealt with negotiating standard types of transition in family.18  
In the semester when I taught “Topics in Theology: God as Trinity,” other course 
offerings included: “Bridges: Christians Connecting with Muslims,” a class that used the 
“Crescent Project” curriculum;19 “5 Conversations You Must Have with Your Daughter,” 
                                                 
14 See appendix A & B for the syllabi of both classes: “Topics in Theology: Jesus Christ 
and Salvation” and “Topics in Theology: God as Trinity.” Both syllabi were used for 
publicity prior to each course’s beginning, and students used it as a guide throughout. 
Both classes engaged an historical survey of Christian theologians. I guided reflection on 
the ways in which these particular doctrines had changed shape throughout time, as well 
as how they related to the beliefs and practices shared by FBC’s community. 
15 At least four people I interviewed referred explicitly to my theology classes as a 
welcome alternative to the “Beth Moore style theology” always on offer on Sunday 
nights. Moore is a popular Christian writer who writes curriculum primarily for women. 
For more on her, see http://www.lproof.org/aboutus/bethmoore. 
16 Hemphill currently serves as an SBC strategist for “Empowering Kingdom Growth”. 
He previously served as president of Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. For 
more on him, see http://www.empoweringkingdomgrowth.net. 
17 For more on The Truth Project see http://www.thetruthproject.org. The Truth Project, 
as the name suggests, offers an authoritative view of what truth is which, by extension, is 
a particularly conservative – and as with many contemporary fundamentalisms, a 
surprisingly Modernist – view of truth. 
18 Like mine, this final course did not follow a purchasable curriculum, but was a 
discussion based learning module designed by the pastoral counselor who taught it. 
19 While the main goal of The Crescent Project is evangelism, it has a significant sub-
concern for fostering healthy and civil inter-religious dialogue between Muslims and 
Christians. While I question the possibility for genuine inter-religious dialogue alongside 
proselytizing, this series was taught during the time when feverous national attention was 
directed toward the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque,” Qur’an burnings, and other forms 
of American anti-Islam sentiment. It therefore offered an Evangelical alternative to this 
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based on a book by Vicki Courtney that affirms traditional gender roles;20 and “Praying 
to Make a Difference,” which seeks to establish “a meaningful and consistent prayer 
life.” Beth Moore’s study of Revelation was also repeated, and Pastor Frank taught 
“Servant Warriors” followed by “The Man God Uses,” which is a men’s Bible study 
course that he runs every few semesters.21 Courses therefore covered various topics, 
meeting the needs and desires of a cross-section of the community’s theological, practical 
and lifestyle interests. At the same time, they mostly followed Southern Baptist and more 
broadly evangelical curricula and themes. As we see throughout, the courses I taught 
departed from this model. That they were offered thus begins to reveal one of the ways 
that academic theologians might be able to impact Christian social practices, specifically 
ecclesial ones, a core theme of this dissertation. 
 
An Exercise in Ethnographic Theology… 
 The subtitle of this dissertation indicates that it is an exercise in “ethnographic 
theology.” My intention with linking the terms ethnography and theology with each other 
in this way is to make the two dependent on each other. I am not an ethnographer. It is 
unlikely that this project would pass muster with sociologists or ethnographers, and to 
imagine that it could – when I do not have advanced degree studies in either field – 
would be an insult to those who do receive such intense, formal intellectual and practical 
training. My endeavors here are theological; they borrow from the tools, guidelines and 
                                                                                                                                                 
anti-Islam fervor. For more on the Crescent Project DVDs used in this course, see 
https://www.crescentproject.org/bridgesdvd. 
20 For more on Courtney, see http://vickicourtney.com/. 
21 In the first hour of each class, he leads a martial arts-based exercise routine, and in the 
second half the men do Bible study together. 
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tactics of ethnography without actually become ethnography proper. Decisions for what 
tools and tactics might be most helpful are grounded in theological criteria, for example: 
“what methods best contribute to theological construction?” is a more pressing question 
than, “what particular social/political/economic/etc. trend gives rise to or is a result of 
this particular Christian belief and/or practice?” even as the latter question matters also.  
 At the same time, the qualifier “ethnographic” is nevertheless important; the 
practice of doing theology is changed by doing it in an ethnographic way. Normative 
statements are not easily made. Theology becomes more descriptive than prescriptive. In 
fact, this project in many ways challenges the notion that theology must, by definition, be 
normative and prescriptive. It seeks to carve out greater space for the descriptive 
moments of theological reflection, claiming that if stories contribute to the shaping of 
who we are, then the telling of complex theological stories is a good in itself.  
 In the first chapter I locate my project within a set of particular academic 
theological trajectories. These trajectories understand theology to be a cultural activity 
that rises out of the practices associated with church, academy and everyday life. In 
particular, I draw on the way in which Kathryn Tanner frames this cultural activity, as 
she outlines a continuum of theological activity ranging from everyday, context specific 
theologies to more specialized, institutional forms. Attempting to bring this continuum to 
life in practice, I guide an ecclesial practice of theological conversation across theological 
fluencies that I shape by deploying a loose, performative integration of the roles 
associated with both my ecclesial and academic formative practices. This conversation 
brings together the theological discourses associated with church, academy and everyday 
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life into their own loose, performative integration, such that what Tanner calls everyday 
and academic theologies are able to tackle the problems of Christian practice together. 
 Having laid the theological foundations for my ethnographic project, in the 
second chapter I critically appropriate Pierre Bourdieu’s way of construing the concept, 
habitus, which can be preliminarily understood as a knot of dispositions, instincts, 
perceptions and apperceptions, inculcated into agents at a bodily, unconscious, level 
through their participation in practices. I use this concept, habitus, in order to begin 
mapping how particular forms of theological activity and, by extension, discourse, can 
flow out of the spaces where everyday and academic Christian social practices 
consistently overlap through time. Here I argue that an ecclesial conversational practice 
can be one such activity, and that such activity can be framed as an ongoing pursuit of 
wisdom. And I argue that this pursuit of wisdom is continually marked by each 
participant’s own loose, performative integrations of the various competing and cohering 
habitus and roles that shape the people we are, and the people we are becoming. 
 This second chapter employs the concept habitus as a theoretical descriptor for 
understanding the habitus of pursuing wisdom as this dissertation’s topic. In the third 
chapter, I deploy the concept habitus as a tool; put simply, my own habitus of pursuing 
wisdom becomes the mode of inquiry by which this dissertation’s method is performed.22 
Here I unpack how the roles associated with the distinct spheres of ecclesial and 
academic life can be loosely integrated in the bodily wisdom of the academic theologian-
as-minister, and the activity made possible by that bodily wisdom can be deployed as a 
                                                 
22 The notion of habitus deployed as both a topic and a tool is developed in Loïc 
Wacquant, “Habitus as topic and tool: reflections on becoming a prizefighter,” in 
Ethnographies Revisited: constructing theory in the field, ed. Antony J. Puddephatt, 
William Shaffir and Steven W. Kleinknecht (New York: Routledge, 2009), 137-151. 
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research tool for doing ethnographic theology. Expanding Bourdieu’s work with the 
writings of his student, Loïc Wacquant, I thus construct the foundations of my own self-
implicated mode of theological ethnographic research. I offer this mode as a companion 
or complementary alternative to the theological ethnographic methods outlined by Mary 
McClintock Fulkerson, and claim that either could be used to bring Tanner’s mode to life 
in concrete practice. 
In the fourth chapter I construct an ethnographic ecclesiology, demonstrating that 
while our conversational pursuit of wisdom constituted our class as an atypical space 
within FBC’s life, it nevertheless participated in maintaining the equilibrium of the wider 
ecclesial system. Here, my attempts to put Tanner’s model into practice challenge notions 
that an academic theologian’s intentional desire for social change necessarily has the 
power to bring about such change. In practice, social change happens very slowly, I 
argue. Revolution is rare. But I suggest that the goods of everyday and academic 
theologies pursuing wisdom together are contained as much – if not more – in the process 
itself than in the products it creates. 
Taking its cue from this emphasis on process over product, chapter five traces the 
process of pursuing wisdom through an ongoing doctrinal conversation that one of the 
classes I taught had about sanctification. Here I do not create a constructive doctrine of 
sanctification so much as I reveal the inner workings of an internally diverse, 
conversationally created communal view of it. By engaging process more than product in 
practice, I reveal that the messiness ascribed by Tanner to concrete Christian social 
practices might actually be more complex than she thematizes. Using a metaphor from 
performance art to expand Tanner’s image of the theologian as bricoleur, I describe the 
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practice of cultivating theological conversation in and with “found objects” (the faith in 
our bones): “found objects” that always already are a mix of theological concepts and 
their emotional, bodily, and personal contexts of practice.23 
Therefore, as each chapter seeks to bring to life the model that Tanner constructs 
for the relationship between everyday and academic theologies, they also reveal some of 
the possibilities and limitations inherent to this model. In so doing, each chapter, to a  
different degree, takes on questions of power, agency, and embodiment, while revealing 
the struggles of interpersonal interaction and the messiness of the practice of the pursuit 
of wisdom where everyday and academic theologies meet.  
                                                 
23 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 166ff. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THEOLOGICAL PRACTICES OF CONVERSATION 
 
A Dinner Party 
 “My grandmother had dementia,” Miriam24 says, her eyes fluttering upwards as 
she tries to access her own memory correctly. “She hugged me once, and then asked me 
who I was. She knew I could be trusted…[pause] even though she didn’t know who I 
was. And I remember thinking, ‘How Divine! To see everyone as someone who is in 
your family!’” We all pause to take her image in. This is not church. It is not a classroom. 
We are a group of friends, three couples – Miriam and Gary, Elaine and Jake, Tyler and 
Natalie – out for dinner, and our conversation has turned to theology. 
A week prior, Elaine had emailed around a notice for an upcoming wine tasting at 
a local restaurant: “I’ve taken the liberty of booking us a table!” And so it is Thursday 
night, and the six of us are ringing in the weekend early at a funky Nashville restaurant, 
housed in a converted cottage-style home. The event – for which about forty people have 
registered – is set up “family style,” with tables squished in two long lines across what 
was probably once this house’s dining room.  
My husband Tyler and I arrive first and grab the end of one of the tables in the 
hopes that doing so will give our group a little privacy. Miriam and Gary arrive next. 
                                                 
24 A pseudonym, as are all the names in this dissertation. Only the pastor of the church I 
studied for my fieldwork, my husband and myself are named with our actual names. 
Pastor Frank’s name is used because of his official, public role in the church. Tyler’s 
name is used because the fact that he is my husband matters for this story, and giving him 
an alternative name would do little to disguise his identity in light of that. Both Frank and 
Tyler gave me permission to use their real names. 
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Excited to see each other, we maneuver our way awkwardly around the tables to give 
hugs before rearranging our seating. I compliment Miriam’s new blouse and we all 
express some disappointment that we will not have our own separate table. The seats 
begin to fill up, and after a few minutes Elaine rushes into the room, her long coat and her 
boyfriend Jake both fanning out behind her trying to keep up. Apologies for lateness are 
offered, but not needed, and we all rearrange our seats once again so that Jake, who has 
difficulty hearing in one ear, will be able to hear the rapidly moving conversation—he is 
not a member of our church, and so the rest of us, who have spent hours getting to know 
each other in and out of church, are eager to make him feel welcome in the group. 
Miriam and Gary teach the Sunday School class where the five of us have become 
friends. Miriam and Elaine are both on faculty together at a local university. Gary and 
Tyler both work in the Christian non-profit sector. Jake is a lawyer. And I am a 
theologian. Conversations erupt.  
We finally get to hear about Jake’s winning stint on the game show, Jeopardy. 
We help Miriam think through the pros and cons of a potential promotion at her work. 
We all probe Gary with questions about a documentary he is filming on immigration 
issues and the church. And Tyler and I try to convince the group to come on a hiking trip 
we do each spring with some old seminary friends. The end of the night leaves us feeling 
far from done, even as the waitress clears away our final glasses in a fashion that hints 
strongly, “it is time to go!” Elaine, ignoring the nudge, asks me how the dissertation 
fieldwork is coming along. 
“It’s fine,” I say – “actually, I’m captivated by this image that came up in one of 
my conversations. It was of a God who has Alzheimer’s disease. I just can’t get it out of 
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my head.” The group perks up. We usually lapse into some sort of theological 
conversation towards the end of our evenings together. I recall asking myself in the 
moment something like, “why do we only get to theological conversation after we’ve first 
dealt with all the laughter, stuff, and news of our lives? Only once we’ve gone through all 
that, can we turn our attention to God.” Tyler leans back in his chair and I plunk my 
cheek into my hand, propping it up with my elbow on the table: “I don’t know, what do 
you guys think of that image?” Miriam exhales as she ponders it and Jake leans in, 
curious. The waitress senses she has lost the hinting game, and refills our water glasses.  
Elaine begins by noting that as Christians “we strive to forgive, but forgetting is 
beyond us.” In that way, then, God’s forgetting might indicate a perfecting over human 
forgiveness. I sense that we might stick with this topic and fish for a pen to start taking 
notes on unused napkins. Jake wonders, though, if forgetting can cheapen forgiveness. 
“Alzheimer’s,” he notes, “isn’t a purposeful or intentional forgetting. If a Holocaust 
survivor now has Alzheimer’s and is cared for by Germans,” he continues, “is that 
healing or is it cheapened?” Gary seeks clarification by asking if forgetting would be 
permanent for God. “We can forget something and then remember it,” he points out. 
“What type of forgetting are we talking about?” “Yeah,” responds Jake, leaning in a little 
more, “if you got a lobotomy, you might forget who has hurt you, but you haven’t 
forgiven them.” “Sequence, then, seems to matter,” adds Tyler. 
“I don’t know,” Elaine continues. “It feels like we’d lose God’s omnipotence. 
Alzheimer’s patients still have all the mechanisms; they just don’t work. How would it be 
for God? Doesn’t the power feel different?” “It makes me think about all the levels of 
consciousness we just don’t understand,” adds Miriam, as she stares off into the distance 
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a little contemplatively. Something is on her mind, but it seems she is not ready to share 
it yet. “Yeah, I guess I wouldn’t want to use the image to say that God actually has 
Alzheimer’s disease,” I clarify. 
I realize in that moment that I am clarifying this position for myself as much as I 
am for them. I have been thinking about the image metaphorically and through the 
doctrinal loci of theological anthropology and revelation, not the doctrine of God. Mine is 
a question about the fragmented ways our lives help us understand something about God, 
not about the nature of God in Godself. But here I realize that the question, “what would 
it mean to imagine God has Alzheimer’s disease?” functions differently in different 
contexts. To some, the question is taken plainly: God in Godself begins to be imagined in 
a degenerative state. However, to others, particularly those who have specialized 
academic theological training, the question could leap almost automatically across 
different systematic theological categories, changing shape slightly each time it moved.  
I quickly translate my systematic theological terms before continuing: “But I 
would want to say that someone who has Alzheimer’s disease is still made in God’s 
image or, simply, still is in God’s image…” I trail off, and pause. I need to find my 
thoughts and make them communicable. “I’ve been reading different theologians who 
write about disability lately. They write about how the brokenness of bodies can reveal 
something about the brokenness of Christ’s body on the cross.”25 I can feel something 
                                                 
25 In particular, I have Nancy L. Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory 
Theology of Disability (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994) in mind, especially her constructive 
chapter on “The Disabled God” (chapter 5) and Sarah Coakley’s image of Christ’s 
wounds enduring through the resurrection as scars in, “The Eschatological Body: Gender, 
Transformation, and God,” in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and 
Gender (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 153-167. 
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getting lost as I try to communicate these theologies to my friends: “…so I guess I 
wonder how someone who has Alzheimer’s disease reveals God too?”  
Jake takes the floor, beginning his point slowly. He seems still to be figuring it 
out, but perhaps he, too, is searching for the communicable translation: “With the disease, 
it’s not just about them forgetting, but about how you react to being forgotten.” I feel 
myself light up, intrigued by this new idea. My pen is moving furiously. I am now 
writing on a letter from Elaine’s son’s teacher that she dug out of her large purse for me 
when my napkins ran out. Jake pauses. I nod emphatically in an effort to encourage him 
to keep going. “Can I still care about someone who has it?” he continues. “It’s a 
challenge to your memory as much as theirs.” We all sit with that for a moment quietly. I 
can feel the excitement of possibility bubbling up inside me – for theological 
constructions around imago Dei, the Doctrine of God, salvation, and much, much more. I 
begin wondering if there is a thread through theological history of God as forgetful that I 
could find and trace. 
And then Miriam’s mouth curls in an expression of trying to find the right words. 
Moving into a place where vulnerability overlaps with the ability to trust one’s friends, 
and where the intensity of personal experience creates the rich insight of the most 
contextual of theologies, she tells us about her grandmother’s dementia. As Miriam’s 
image of her grandmother’s inability to remember her connects with an image for God, 
my chest feels struck at its center. I experience an involuntary rush of recollection of 
various times I have felt forgotten and, in some strange, connected way, times I have felt 
forsaken by God. And I think we all feel that bittersweet hurt for a moment.  
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Perhaps it is too much for Elaine. At least, the feeling brings it home for her: “I 
want God to know who I am. That’s the whole point…we’ve been together for thirty-
seven years.” She pauses and continues, “I can start praying at any point, God knows who 
I am, knows the people I pray for by their first names. I love the idea of him forgetting 
the bad things about me, but even those are part of who I am!” And I feel myself aching 
for a theology that can do justice to both a God who loves us, even when we are 
forgotten, and a God who knows everyone’s name. 
Shortly after that, the image petered out and lost its power. But for half an hour or 
so, we suspended that final judgment of whether or not is was even an option to talk 
about God in this way and, as a result, the image gave us much to discuss. We all – 
church and non-church member, theologically trained and not alike – brought snippets of 
theology and narrative to the table, the two blending in to each other so as to be 
indistinguishable. We experimented and played with our stories and beliefs, diving 
deeper into them and into each other, the conversation contributing to the ongoing 
formation of our relationships with each other and, in that, I hope, with God.  
These are the types of conversations my friends have come to expect with 
someone whose days are spent working as an “academic theologian” as their dinner 
partner. I will describe more fully what it might mean to call someone an “academic 
theologian” below, but for now, more pointedly, these are the conversations my friends 
expect to have when they go out for dinner with me. Sometimes they come to me with the 
questions and thoughts that bubble up in their faith, not expecting answers, but simply for 
the pleasure of pursuing something together in the midst of our shared unknowing. I help 
them see various cultural connections – like with the construction of disability – to the 
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beliefs they hold. In addition, as I will show later, I can also help them see the historical 
roots of the beliefs and questions they hold. And because this relationship is not one-
sided, I also take my projects to them, as I do in this story. Like Miriam, my friends 
connect my abstractions to their grandmothers. They show me the concretion I am 
missing. They give me fresh insight and a rejuvenated sense that theology might matter.  
Why begin a dissertation by describing a dinner party? Because, though all 
theology grows out of (often unstated) contexts, this dissertation is an explicit 
engagement with my experiences in numerous communities of friendship just like this 
one. These are the types of experiences through which I have come to believe that 
theology can be a conversation in and across all the kinds of intersecting communities 
that make us who we are. And so, the first reason I begin this dissertation around a table 
drinking wine is because that is where some of the best conversation happens.  
In particular, I will argue here that if theology is, as Kathryn Tanner contends, a 
cultural activity ranging in styles from the ad hoc, context-specific reasoning of 
“everyday Christians” to the specialized, systematic discourses of academic institutions, 
then one fruitful way to do this activity is as a conversation that brings together these 
various styles of theology in practice, into a shared pursuit of wisdom.26 Taking the 
dinner table as my inspiration, I endeavor in these pages to construct a more formal 
practice of guiding everyday and academic theologies, as Tanner names these styles, into 
this shared pursuit. In so doing, I seek to make evident the hidden possibilities of her 
                                                 
26 Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology, (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997). I explore what it means to pursue wisdom through the conversation 
between everyday and academic theology more fully in the second chapter, but for now it 
is worth noting that the pursuit looks something like what happened around that 
restaurant table. As Gary put it in my interview with him, it is “an intellectual pursuit to 
know God more deeply so that we can love God more deeply.”  
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vision for the relationship between everyday and academic theologies, as well as its 
hidden limitations. Tanner’s model, we will see, makes room for, but does not actually 
thematize this conversation towards which she gestures.  
In order to open up the possibilities and limitations of this model, then, I argue 
throughout this dissertation that conversation requires that all partners be able both to 
speak to and listen to the others.27 Thus, ecclesial and everyday realms cannot simply be 
treated as repositories to be mined for academic theological reflection in the conversation 
I am seeking to create and describe here. In the other direction, neither can academic 
theologians simply hope that members of churches and participants in broader public life 
will read our academic texts. The divisions between church, academy and public life 
cannot be bridged this way because both of these models remains much too uni-
directional in communication. Rather, good conversation benefits from each partner’s 
ability to reflect on and understand the factors contributing to the creation of her own 
perspective, as well as the perspectives of those with whom she converses, back and forth 
repeatedly through time. Understanding the relationship between various everyday and 
academic theologies as conversational, then, requires that we create a space for that 
conversation to occur. A dinner table is as good a space as any to begin.  
Second, I begin with conversation around a dinner table as a reminder that neither 
the institution of church nor the institution of academy owns theology. The bulk of my 
ethnographic research for this project took place within a particular ecclesial practice and 
it employed various specialized academic methods and skills. I describe this 
                                                 
27 This definition is not meant to exclude those who are unable to speak or hear due to 
variances in linguistic or sensory dis/ability. Rather, activities of speaking and listening in 
this definition include diverse forms of communication, including oral, written, and 
bodily. 
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simultaneously ecclesial and academic practice more fully below. But for now, this image 
of a dinner party is a reminder that while churches comprise one (diverse) type of 
institutional location for everyday theologies, and while universities, colleges and 
seminaries are primary institutional locations for academic theology, both types of 
discourse are produced across and outside of those institutional borders as well.  
In addition to the location of the dinner table outside of the church, Jake’s 
presence at it particularly affirms this point. While he was baptized Catholic as an infant, 
he chose not to be confirmed, does not attend church, and describes himself as an 
“immediate skeptic” of the religion he inherited from his devout mother. Neither church 
nor academy can fully account for the internal multiplicity of everyday and academic 
theologies or, even more so, the places where these complex discourses overlap. The 
image of the dinner table can be held in tension with the images of ecclesial 
conversational practice I explicate more fully below as a reminder that the practices 
associated with Christian life extend far beyond the church’s walls, even as they 
constantly pull what is beyond those walls back into them. 
 Third, I open this dissertation around a dinner table conversation with friends 
because, while theology is not owned by church or academy, it is nevertheless always 
located. Sometimes it is located in a slow march to freedom, sometimes in the alternative 
worshipping communities of feminist liturgy groups. Sometimes it is located in the love 
letters written between a medieval nun and monk, and sometimes it can be found where a 
lemon vendor in Buenos Aires confuses her own “musky smell…with that of her basket 
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of lemons.”28 Whenever we are writing from the institutional academy, whatever 
struggles we have overcome, or even with which we still struggle, we are always already 
writing from a location of privilege, one that always also bears the possibility of being 
compounded with others. And often theology – academic or everyday -- grows out of 
sites of such extreme privilege that admitting the privilege might feel embarrassing 
enough for the theologian to consider leaving it unsaid – like a meal built around tasting 
new wines. 
This dissertation also explores various themes of self-reflexivity related to the 
conversations in which academic theologians might engage to produce their academic 
texts. I begin around this particularly privileged dinner table because despite the complex 
and inter-related ways all my identity markers constitute me as both an insider and an 
outsider to various systems of power, this dinner table offers a concrete acknowledgment 
of one complexly constructed, privileged place from which I write. Indeed, as we shift 
the conversation from the restaurant to the ecclesial classroom, this question of privilege 
will remain. Because our conversational interaction of everyday and academic theologies 
does not reveal a clash of discourses but, rather, reveals a host of interpersonal 
connections between real people, the power that constellates between such relationships 
becomes increasingly evident in light of the different types of privilege we all have.  
Fourth, and finally, I open this dissertation around a dinner table with friends 
because I believe that theology is deeply personal. Theology begins and ends around 
dinner tables – those lavish and those simple – with the people we love (and even 
sometimes with those we don’t); whether we acknowledge it or not, it begins and ends in 
                                                 
28 Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender 
and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1. 
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all the “laughter, stuff, and news of our lives” that is shared in and around our 
conversations about God.  
We carry faith in our bones. The title of this dissertation is a poetic allusion to the 
concept of habitus, in which this work is grounded, with its corresponding understanding 
that faith and theological knowledge are produced and carried, not simply in the mind, 
but in the whole, embodied, mindful, communally constituted self. This faith that we 
carry in our bones – academic and non-academic bones alike – is not naïve and simple. It 
comes loaded up with a chaotic panoply of Christian thought and action, access to which 
might only be granted to many of us at this level of pre-cognitive, embodied knowing. 
But this spiritual family tree resides there nonetheless. Our bodies are like reliquaries, 
housing communities of saints therein, bone to our bone, flesh to our flesh, buried within 
us all in messy, often inaccessible ways.29 The practices we perform now always bear 
traces of their prior performances. 
 And so – on rare occasions, with the right circumstances aligned, careful 
historical study, and help from the Spirit’s divine wisdom – traces of these traditions 
inculcated into us might be able to be brought to conscious articulation. This articulation 
does not happen simply when someone speaks it from a pulpit or whispers it in a pew, or 
when an academic theologian sits at her desk to interpret it. Knowledge, power and 
insight work in much more complex, multivalent ways than that. And as we will see as 
this dissertation unfolds, conversations at the intersection of everyday and academic 
theological discourses do not always go smoothly. For every time all pistons fire, like 
with the conversation above, there are moments when they sputter and fail. Sometimes 
                                                 
29 I am indebted to Ted Smith for suggesting the image of a reliquary. 
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one of us refuses to hear what another is saying in the fullness of its beauty. Or what is 
being said might not be beautiful, causing frustration and anger in its hearers. Sometimes 
tension gives way to theological construction; sometimes tension is just tense. And yet, of 
all the forms that a conscious articulation of hidden wisdom might take, this dissertation 
seeks to nurture one: speakers who speak everyday and academic theological discourse 
with varying fluencies coming together to pursue the wisdom of the faith that is already 
in our bones. 
Therefore, the particular research questions that give shape to this dissertation, 
which I unpack below, converge in one core question: what particular fruits can be 
produced by a conversation that incorporates various fluencies of theological language 
into a shared pursuit of wisdom?  
The question of how to relate what happens in ecclesial and broader public life 
with the normative claims of academic theological reflection has received renewed 
attention in the past forty or so years. Postliberal theologies, for example, have 
concentrated on the doctrinal shaping of ecclesial life, distinguishing appropriate 
Christian belief from broader culture.30 Revisionist or correlationist theologies have 
sought to make academic theology intelligible to the multiple arenas of ecclesial, broader 
academic and public life.31 And Liberation theologies constructed along the cultural 
identity markers of ethnicity and race, gender and sexuality, dis/ability and economy, for 
example, have all at one time or another centralized the category of ecclesial experience 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1980) and 
George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Louisville: WJKP, 1984). See especially Lindbeck,120-124. 
31 See, for example, David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and 
the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), especially chapter 1.  
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in order to destabilize traditional theology’s supposedly neutral core.32 Each of these 
theological perspectives has, in turn, given rise to a strategic use of anthropological 
theory or methods in order to enflesh abstract theological claims with the descriptive 
analysis of concrete locations of religious practice and belief. 
This dissertation both argues for and performs an extension of these methods. To 
do so, it deploys a form of reflexive ethnography from my own particular subject 
position. My particular subject position is located within the formational practices of both 
church and academy, both of which remain ever open to the multiple, complex 
intersecting spheres of everyday life.33 The moves I just made with our dinner party 
conversation offer a foretaste of that fuller method and content. But before we can turn to 
this constructive methodological project, we must first introduce the church classroom 
conversations that are at the center of this dissertation’s study.  
After briefly introducing how these conversations functioned in practice, I engage 
Kathryn Tanner’s use of “culture” as an analytic category in order to understand more 
deeply the ways in which the discourses associated with church, academy and everyday 
                                                 
32 For a pivotal work in white feminist theology see Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: 
Towards a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973). For pivotal 
works in womanist and mujerista theologies see Jacquelyn Grant’s groundbreaking 
dissertation, White Women’s Christ and Black Women’s Jesus: Feminist Christology and 
Womanist Response (Atlanta: AAR, 1989) and Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, En la Lucha (In the 
Struggle): A Hispanic Woman’s Liberation Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1993). For a Latin American Liberation theology, see Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of 
Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation (Orbis, 1973). For a study that brings together 
gender, race, sexuality, class and economic critiques in relation to theology, see Marcella 
Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology. 
33 Of course, not all academic theologians locate themselves also within the church, nor 
do they need to. This method is explored as a suggestion for those whose identities are 
already constructed in this hybrid way and, more particularly, as the most appropriate 
method for my own distinct subject location. This will be addressed more fully in the 
third chapter. 
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life rise out of cultural practices to shape us as speakers of those same discourses. Having 
situated these discourses in various cultural practices, I look at how Tanner maps 
theological activity along a continuum from the everyday to the academic. Seeking to 
understand this continuum gives rise to the research questions that guide this dissertation, 
as I seek to fill content in to some of the methodological areas Tanner chooses not to 
develop. After introducing these research questions and offering preliminary outlines for 
how they will be pursued in these pages, I offer also a brief introduction into the 
ethnographic field in which they were pursued.   
 
Life Change University 
 While the fourth chapter of this dissertation will offer a fuller ethnographic 
explication of the church that I studied for my research, a brief introduction is necessary 
here for situating the project. First Baptist Church, Nashville (FBC) is my church. It is 
where I was ordained in May of 2009 after two years of being a member, about eight 
months before my theological ethnographic project began. One of the many valuable 
lessons I have learned at FBC is that just as I often fail to recognize my privilege as an 
academic theologian, I also often fail to recognize the theological richness of the more 
everyday locations in which I live.  
I entered my doctoral program with a desire to do theology from an ethnographic 
perspective, expecting my focus to be on some alternative form of Christian community. 
My academic instincts had me searching for the one thing no one else had written about 
yet. I toyed with studying an underground Christian community I had heard about that 
participated together in both worship and BDSM practices, or maybe another community 
 37 
I had visited whose worship life was explicitly shaped according to the philosophical 
movement known as deconstruction.34  
It had therefore not occurred to me that I might study my own Southern Baptist 
congregation, which I perceived as exceedingly normal and mainstream. But the deeper I 
got into First Baptist’s life, the more I felt the lure to make it the focus of my study. I 
began to see what Mary McClintock Fulkerson calls “the fascinating grain of the 
ordinary” and, like her, I began to wonder if studying such a fascinating grain could 
“bring something fresh to theological reflection on ordinary Christian community.”35 At 
the same time, I was reading various theorists in reflexive ethnography as part of my 
coursework, and these theorists were complicating my understanding of ethnographic 
participant observation. As a result, particularly while reading Loïc Wacquant, I began to 
wonder how I might deploy my own ministerial vocation within the FBC community as 
my primary research tool. At FBC, one of the chief deployments of my ministerial 
vocation occurs in the capacity of Christian education. In this way, my vocation loosely 
integrates my ecclesial and academic roles as I teach Sunday night adult education 
classes to groups of twenty to twenty-five participants at a time. 
                                                 
34 BDSM refers to erotic practices associated with bondage and discipline, domination 
and submission, and sadism and masochism. For more on the connection between BDSM 
and religious life, see Julianne Buenting, “Rehearsing Vulnerability: BDSM as 
transformative ritual,” in Chicago Theological Seminary Register, 93 no 1 (Spr 2003), 
39-49. For information on liturgical and ritual practices associated with IKON, the 
second community I considered studying, see Peter Rollins, How (Not) To Speak of God 
(Brewster, MA: Paraclete, 2006). My inclinations toward these two potential projects in 
fact come together in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Therein, the relationship 
between bodily regimes of discipline and transcendence that characterized my academic 
interest in BDSM as a religious, specifically Christian, practice connects with articulating 
a theoretical structure for understanding religious practices, as was characteristic of the 
IKON community.  
35 Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3. 
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 Each year, our church offers a spring and fall semester of a whole roster of 
Sunday night adult education classes in what we call our “Life Change University” 
(LCU). I have found a home in this program for sharing both my ministerial and 
academic gifts with the church. It is also where I have learned as much, if not more, about 
the theologies constructed in church life than any other ecclesial activity with which I 
have been involved. Prior to the fieldwork conducted for this dissertation, I co-taught a 
class called “Citizens in the Kingdom of God” at LCU. This led me to develop a series 
titled “Topics in Theology,” wherein I taught “Topics in Theology: Jesus Christ and 
Salvation” in the spring of 2010 and “Topics in Theology: God as Trinity” in the fall of 
2010. Both courses functioned as the chief components of my theological ethnographic 
research. With my fieldwork now closed, my work continued at LCU with the course I 
taught as I finished this dissertation, “Topics in Theology: Worship.” 
 In the two courses I taught as part of this research, we studied historical surveys 
of each doctrinal focus. Across both we engaged the Gospels, Paul, Justin Martyr, 
Origen, Arius and Athanasius, Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas, 
Beatrice of Nazareth, Marguerite Porete, Luther, Calvin, Descartes, Pascal, Kierkegaard, 
Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, Gustavo Gutierrez, James Cone, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Elizabeth Johnson. I situated each theologian within 
their cultural context and lectured briefly on their writings, but the bulk of the class 
would be taken up with discussion. The theologians we studied provided stimulus for our 
own theological reflection. They opened up theological questions, revealing how 
doctrines had shifted and changed across time. In this way, everyday and academic 
theological discourses came together in a shared practice of conversation.  
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The Turn to Culture in Academic Theology 
This path into the particular practices of my study is best understood when 
situated within the broader turn to culture that has taken place in academic theological 
discourse. While my theological ethnographic study grounds this dissertation’s endeavors 
in everyday Christian social practices, this turn to culture grounds them also in the 
theologies created in academic theological institutions. Indeed, part of my argument 
entails this claim: theology is always already grounded in some loose integration of the 
church, academy and everyday life. Theology, as a pursuit of wisdom, grows out of the 
conversational space between the inter-permeating and interlocking practices that make 
up the multiple spheres of life. My research attempts to make this relationship explicit 
and intentional. 
Each of the perspectives in contemporary Christian academic theology that I 
mention above has made its turn to culture differently, each one framing its engagement – 
or disengagement – with its own particular spin. I noted how postliberal, revisionist and 
liberation theologies each relate themselves to ecclesial and broader public life.36 Part and 
parcel for each of these relationships is their simultaneous interest in the relationship 
between the activity of theology and culture as an analytic category, even if this interest 
is sometimes only implicitly present in the texts. For postliberals theology constructs a 
                                                 
36 It might seem strange to ground a theological project in these seemingly competing 
theological perspectives. As theologian David Kamitsuka has effectively argued, 
however, all three share similar goods and goals; each just directs their focus differently 
within those goals. Put simply, he argues that all three genres share postliberalism’s 
desire for biblical fidelity, the revisionist desire for intellectual credibility, and the 
liberationist desire for ideology critique. See David Kamitsuka, Theology and 
Contemporary Culture: Liberation, Postliberal and Revisionary Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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border between Christian and non-Christian, secular cultures; for revisionists and 
correlationists, theology correlates the beliefs of distinctly Christian culture to distinctly 
public and academic cultures; liberation theologies understand theological reflection to be 
situated within a cultural matrix of power relations that construct identity and difference 
according to bodily markers of class, race, gender, and sexuality, for example.  
Whichever way the theological engagement of culture is framed, however, there 
is a shared belief that the cultures we perpetuate simply by living in them also have some 
bearing on the people we are and the people we are becoming. As theology’s foundations 
in reason, revelation or notions of the self have all been shaken by the critiques extending 
throughout modernity, culture becomes the omnipresent factor that has bearing on the 
content and form of what and how we know. Cultural Studies – the mode of inquiry that 
help us analyze culture – thus becomes the crucial companion discipline to theologies 
created in academic institutions.37 
Kathryn Tanner brings these concerns together in her work, Theories of Culture: 
A New Agenda for Theology. Arguing that specialized academic theology has already 
been using the category “culture” in “implicit” and “unself-conscious ways,” Tanner 
seeks to historicize the term, thus revealing the shifts between its modern and postmodern 
usage.38 I engage her usage of “modern” and “postmodern” below, but for now it is worth 
situating her project within these approaches to the theological cultural turn. 
                                                 
37 For a comprehensive study of different theological perspectives on engaging culture, 
see Converging on Culture: Theologians in Dialogue with Cultural Analysis and 
Criticism, ed. Delwin Brown, Sheila Greeve Davaney, and Kathryn Tanner (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
38 Tanner, x. 
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Concerned with grounding academic theology in Christian social practices, 
Tanner reflects postliberal sensibilities, even as she criticizes their failure to communicate 
appropriately from Christian cultures to broader public life and their dubious over-
policing of the borders of Christian identity.39 Like revisionist and correlationist 
theologians, Tanner is concerned with the relationship between ecclesial, academic and 
everyday realms of public life. But she also criticizes these methods for engaging broader 
public life “simply for the evaluation of a distinctively Christian way of being in the 
world.”40 Her critique of revisionists thus parallels her critique of postliberals, as she 
argues again, but this time with regards to revisionist theology, that “a kind of apologetics 
or polemics with other cultures is internal, then, to the very construction of Christian 
sense.”41 Instead of distinct cultures, Tanner argues that “culture” can function as an 
analytic tool for understanding the Christian social practices out of which theology arises. 
Finally, Tanner’s interest in the relationship between power and culture for making 
audible the voices of oppressed or marginalized peoples reflects liberationist sensibilities. 
While Tanner does not explicitly situate her own theological identity within liberation 
approaches, she remains less critical of them and, perhaps for this reason, seems to 
ground her particular approach to interpreting culture in their methodological trajectory. 
Drawing on liberation theologian Gustavo Gutierrez and mujerista theologian 
Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz, Tanner argues that “specialized theological investigation should be 
placed on a continuum with theological activity elsewhere as something that arises in an 
                                                 
39 Tanner, 115. 
40 Ibid, 116. 
41 Ibid. 
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‘organic’ way out of Christian practice.”42 Positing Christian practice as a distinct sphere 
with its own internal differences that gives rise to more specialized Christian theological 
reflection, Tanner’s view of culture will not only help us to understand the particular 
classroom culture of the LCU class I taught. It will also provide us with a model with 
which we can critically engage in order to understand how everyday and academic 
theologies both rise out of and are related to each other. In particular, it will help us 
understand how these discourses can be more fruitfully related to each other in a shared 
practice of conversation. 
 
Cultural Practices and the Theological Continuum 
Tanner argues that theological discourse – which is embedded within, shaped by, 
and arises from internally and externally diverse sets of cultural practices – is performed 
in similarly diverse modes. Theology is both an everyday, context-specific activity 
engaged in by those who practice the Christian faith, and it is a specialized, academic 
activity. There is continuity between these two activities, however, as academic theology 
seeks to systematize or make consistent the messiness of the everyday theology out of 
which it rises.43 Both types of discourse share the goal of making sense of their shared 
Christian social practices.44  
Tanner is not, in essence, describing a new way of doing theology. She is, 
arguably, calling our attention to a nuanced version of one of the ways theology has 
historically been done. Consider Augustine’s Confessions or Calvin’s Institutes, Barth’s 
                                                 
42 Ibid, 71. In her note to this statement Tanner explicitly relates this approach to 
Gutierrez’s Theology of Liberation and Isasi-Diaz’s En la Lucha (pg. 183). 
43 Tanner, 69-71. 
44 Ibid. 
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Church Dogmatics or Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology: all these texts abstract from the 
particular religious, cultural practices in which their authors participated. They 
systematize and thematize what people were doing, thinking and saying in the concrete 
communities where they lived. In each situation, the texts are simultaneously authorized 
by their continuity with other similar Christian intellectual traditions. And yet they speak 
back to the context out of which their concerns initially arose. Tanner’s model begins to 
create a structure – both temporal and spatial – for interpreting and traversing these 
moves back and forth.  
Augustine, Calvin, Barth and Althaus-Reid all produced specialized texts that 
performed this speaking back to their particular contexts (the Institutes were written as a 
catechetical source for new Reformed Christians, for example). But as I will argue 
throughout this dissertation, this speaking back can also happen through the theologian’s 
own return to the context of practice as a more fully reflective participant, as one might 
imagine was also the case for these four theologians and others. Tanner thus helps us to 
see that through historical and contemporary theological methods, the situation of 
practice cannot be treated merely as a coherent, closed source for distinct theological 
reflection. Rather, it should be encountered as the place out of and into which reflection 
bubbles and disperses. 
Indeed, the danger in theology turning to practices as its subject matter, Tanner 
warns, is that it can begin to make too sharp a distinction between practice and theoretical 
reflection on practice, without acknowledging how the latter might have shaped the 
perception of the former.45 In this way, theology risks “projecting onto the object studied 
                                                 
45 Ibid, 72. 
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what its own procedures of investigation requires – a coherent whole,” thus eclipsing the 
internal messiness of the practice studied.46 Postliberal theologians, for example, imagine 
that they have managed to “dig underneath the messy surface of Christian practice” to 
unearth “some underlying body of rules or patterned order to which the theology of 
practice conforms despite its messiness.”47 By positioning themselves as second-order 
reflectors, external to the supposedly first-order practices, they impose a logic that 
“validates the conclusions of the theologian while disqualifying the people and practices 
it studies from posing a challenge to those conclusions.”48  
Alternatively, for Tanner, the academic theologian cannot understand her subject 
position as being external to the practices she engages in this way. Instead, she must 
recognize that she is implicated in them. Like any everyday and ecclesial practice, 
academic theology always bears the potential that it is or, at least, could become, one 
among many Christian social practices, albeit one shaped also by a distinct set of 
academic social practices. Understanding academic theology as specialized reflection on 
the Christian social practices in which it participates, then, the academic theologian seeks 
to engage the messiness of inconsistent forms of practice, both for questions to be 
resolved and fruitful possibilities for social change to be explored.49  
This is not to say, however, that Tanner sees everyday theologies necessarily 
failing to address and answer their own problems. The difference between everyday and 
academic theologies is not whether or not they tackle the problems that rise out of the 
Christian social practices in which each is implicated, but rather how they do so. And this 
                                                 
46 Ibid, 76. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, 80. 
 45 
difference matters. “Everyday theological investigation,” argues Tanner, tackles 
problems by employing “something like a sense for the game, a feel for the possibilities 
of Christian living.”50 Everyday theology functions more by instinct, a culturally 
ingrained understanding of how to respond to a particular situation. Everyday theological 
questions are bound to concrete situations, back into which their answers directly feed, 
almost as if by instinct.51  
Similarly, argues Tanner, academic theology is also a form of “social practice in 
its own right, with goals and standards specifically suited to it.”52 The academic 
theologian therefore participates in and is responsible to a broad spectrum of Christian 
social practices with which a distinct set of academic social practices – in which she also 
participates and to which she is also responsible – intersects. Growing out of Theories of 
Culture, the intellectual trajectory of her model that Tanner primarily explores centers on 
the permeable border at which broad social practices are made Christian.53  For Tanner, 
the question primarily guiding her inquiry seems to be related to how Christian identity is 
continually negotiated in relation to the broader social practices of public life, both 
everyday and academic. The permeable border between theological difference outlined 
by her model that interests me here, however, is this one between everyday theology and 
academic theology: between the everyday Christian and the academic theologian. 
                                                 
50 Ibid, 81. 
51 Ibid, 80. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See, for example, Kathryn Tanner, “Theological Reflection and Christian Practices,” in 
Practicing Theology: Beliefs and Practices in Christian Life, ed. Miroslav Volf and 
Dorothy C. Bass (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002), 228-244; 
“Shifts in Theology in the Last Quarter Century,” in Modern Theology, 26:1 (January 
2010), 39-44; and “How My Mind Has Changed: Christian Claims,” in Christian Century 
(February 23rd, 2010). 
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Particularly, I am interested in how the academic theologian who is shaped by both 
ecclesial and academic social practices negotiates the powers, privileges and 
responsibilities with which both inculcate her, and how one so positioned can effectively 
foster conversation between academic theology and everyday theology. 
Because everyday Christians do not need “detailed understanding” of their 
practices in order to participate fully in them, everyday Christians can run into crises of 
practical coherence, argues Tanner. In these crises, the internal logic of Christian social 
practices, as well as the relationship between their Christian and broader social practices, 
cease to make sense.54 In such moments, “the processes of specialized theological 
investigation,” which are “less episodic” and “more cumulative” than everyday 
theologies, are able to draw on a “wider range of materials” to make possible moves of 
abstraction beyond these concrete situations. From that move of intellectual abstraction, 
academic theologians are able to create and offer solutions to the crises that erupt within 
the field of practice.55 Far from falling into false caricatures of academic theology as a 
de-contextualized, “ivory tower,” mode of discourse, however, the academic theologian’s 
ability to turn “practical answers to practical problems” into “intellectual answers to 
intellectual problems” is precisely what enables her to be of service when practical 
circumstances feel conflicted.56 With what she characterizes as a “division of labor,” 
Tanner argues that academic theologians possess the necessary skills for helping 
everyday Christians negotiate their re-investment in broken practices with a fresh sense 
                                                 
54 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 75. 
55 Ibid, 81, 89. 
56 Ibid, 80. 
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for Christian living. Historical, systematic and concrete forms of wisdom are all 
necessary for the tasks set before academic theology. 
My description of Tanner’s model thus far describes only how academic theology 
is responsible to a broad spectrum of Christian social practices, however. Tanner goes on 
further to argue that the academic theologian’s ability to abstract from these social 
practices also allows the continuance of academic social practices.57 These are the moves 
of abstraction by which academic theologians create products like books and other 
writings that have “a relative autonomy from processes of theological investigation in 
everyday life.” Even when academic theology’s questions rise out of practice, then, its 
critical response seeks to abstract from the particular everyday situation in order to make 
claims that are evaluated according to “their own field-specific values, interests, and 
investments.”58 In this way, academic theology rises from and seeks to serve both the 
broadly Christian and distinctly academic social practices in which it participates 
simultaneously.  
The reason everyday and academic theologies need each other, then, in Tanner’s 
model, is because while everyday theology’s concretion suffers from a loss of broad, 
systematic, historical perspective, academic theology’s broad, systematic, historical 
perspective suffers from a lack of concretion. These different styles of theology therefore 
need each other if they are to perform their shared goal of influencing Christian practice, 
even as their primary mode of relating for that need might be in their competition with 
each other.59  
                                                 
57 Ibid, 81. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, 82-86. 
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Without everyday theology, academic theology not only has no reason for 
existing; but without listening to everyday theology, academic theology also has no 
structure for engagement.60 Tanner emphasizes that if academic theology wants to 
influence “everyday Christian life,” it is “dependent on the consent of regular rank-and-
file Christians” and, indeed, must make sense “in great part on those theologies’ own 
terms.”61 Even so, it remains unclear how the academic theologian either gains that 
consent, or speaks back to the everyday context in communicable ways. Thus, while 
Tanner does not outline how the move from everyday to academic theologies happens, 
neither does she describe how to make the move in the reverse direction. The next logical 
step of her method would therefore be to articulate these moves, as I endeavor to do in 
this dissertation.  
 
Research Questions 
The desire to take this next logical step thus forms the foundation for my research 
questions in this dissertation project: first, as academic theology listens to everyday 
theologies in order to hear the crises that need guidance, how can academic theology also 
hear and learn from the context-specific wisdom that is present in everyday theology 
alongside these crises? Second, how could the context-specific wisdom of everyday 
theologies be best communicated to an academic theological audience and how could the 
context-specific wisdom of academic theologies be communicated to the everyday? And 
finally, when crises erupt in academic theology – when academic theologians lose their 
                                                 
60 This very point is made by one of my research partners as he shares his own 
understanding of what the tasks of academic theology should be. This story is told more 
fully in chapter three. 
61Tanner, Theories of Culture, 85. 
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“sense for the game” – can everyday theology compete to be heard and to correct in the 
academic environment as well? In this section, I take each of these questions in turn in 
order to introduce how they will be developed throughout the dissertation. 
In response to the first question, I argue that the listening practices of ethnography 
are best suited for hearing the crises of everyday theologies. Ethnographic methods can 
provide the academic theologian with theoretical and methodological structures that 
guide her modes of listening towards the possibility of a greater objectivity. Of course, as 
most contemporary ethnographers would agree, complete objectivity is impossible. 
Nevertheless, most would also agree that the drive towards accurate descriptions of the 
contexts being studied should also always remain a goal of ethnographic work.  
Therefore, whereas Tanner argues that academic theologians have been using the 
analytic category of culture in “implicit” and “un-self conscious ways,” academic 
theologians also tend to perform their modes of listening to concrete contexts in similarly 
“implicit” and “un-self conscious ways” This is the precise problem I am endeavoring 
here to correct.62 Mary McClintock Fulkerson and others have recognized how helpful 
ethnography can be for performing these more objective modes of listening. My methods 
here will serve as a complement to theirs.  
Second, taking seriously Tanner’s desire for academic theology to avoid thinking 
of itself as second order reflection on first order events, I endeavor in these first three 
                                                 
62 Ibid, x. For examples critiquing academic theology’s tendency to gloss over the 
complexity of the concrete contexts on which their work supposedly draws, see Ted A. 
Smith’s critique of Stanley Hauerwas and Delores S. Williams in “Redeeming Critique: 
Resignations to the Cultural Turn in Christian Theology and Ethics,” in Journal of the 
Society of Christian Ethics, 24, 2 (2004): 89-113. See also Christian Batalden Scharen’s 
critique of John Milbank and Stanley Hauerwas in “‘Judicious narratives’, or 
ethnography as ecclesiology,” in Scottish Journal of Theology. 58(2): 125-142 (2005). 
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chapters to unpack my self-implicated ethnographic method by which my own embodied 
practices enabled everyday and academic theologies to communicate with each other. 
This intentional deploying of my own self-implication – as both minister and academic 
theologian – within the field of study, marks my primary methodological difference from 
Fulkerson’s more traditional ethnographic methods of participant observation.63  
Throughout this dissertation, I draw on trajectories in reflexive ethnography in 
order to account for the ways in which I am implicated in my field of study as both 
minister and academic theologian. Using these methods, which seek a balance between 
modes of objective and subjective knowing, I demonstrate that as both insider and 
outsider to the field of study, I am able to both shape it and study it. Following the two 
key modes of academic theological work that Tanner outlines, then, my self-implicated 
ethnographic practice undergirds both how I taught ecclesial classes in which a 
conversation that incorporated various theological fluencies took place, and how I created 
a text out of that teaching practice – this dissertation – that is appropriate primarily in the 
realm of academic theological discourse. 
By seeking to perform Tanner’s model in this way, however, my own practices 
reveal some of her model’s more idealizing tendencies. I already noted that Tanner’s 
                                                 
63 For other examples of more traditional uses of participant observation based 
ethnography in theological practice see, John Swinton and Harriet Mowatt, Practical 
Theology and Qualitative Research (SCM Press, 2006) and Ethnography as Christian 
Theology and Ethics, ed. Christian Scharen & Aana Marie Vigen (New York: 
Continuum, forthcoming 2011). For examples of theologies that endeavor to use some of 
the tools of ethnography from a ministerial subject-position see Thomas Edward Frank, 
The Soul of the Congregation: An Invitation to Congregational Reflection (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 2000) and Mary Clark Moschella, Ethnography as Pastoral Practice: 
An Introduction (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2008). My self-implicated methods 
depart from these two projects in that while they focus primarily on the ministerial 
subject-position, I endeavor also to highlight the significance of my academic theological 
subject-position as well. 
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main concern, as an inquiry into theology as a cultural practice, focuses on the permeable 
border between Christian and other social practices. She therefore pays less attention to 
the border between Christian social practices more broadly construed, and the ways in 
which these practices intersect with academic social practices in order to give rise to 
academic theologies: a border that, at least as is true in my case, can constitute the heart 
of an academic theological identity. I endeavor here to open up understanding of this 
academic theological identity in a more complex way. As a result, my self-implicated 
method, as I outline particularly in chapters three and four, is revealed as intentionally 
drawing on my commitments both to the ecclesial realm in which my study occurred, and 
to the academic realm by which the ecclesial practice became simultaneously a form of 
study. These forms of commitment, therefore, are not taken for granted. I instead argue 
for their importance to theological method. 
It should be noted, moreover, that this academic realm is constituted by practices 
that are, unlike Tanner’s emphasis, not only intellectual. A flailing job market, increase in 
what is required for tenure reviews and, even, increase in what is required to find a stable 
job within the field, as well as a general anxiety about the future of theological education, 
all contribute to the shape that academic research, discourse and knowledge takes. 
Academic theology does not just seek its own continuance; academic theologians, in the 
most interested, haphazard and context specific ways, also seek the continuance of their 
own place within academic theological discourse. Indeed, our own tactics of self-
preservation integrally shape the theological academy’s continuance. Therefore, the 
already existing set of academic discipline-based criteria that Tanner mentions is itself 
hotly contested, internally diverse, and politically and personally charged. The discourses 
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of the academic theologian who is committed to both church and academy are therefore 
always competing and cohering in ways that are marked by both ambivalence and loose 
moments of performative integration, as I will argue throughout this dissertation.  
In fact, it is precisely because of this competition and coherence that I intend to 
outline how specialized, academic theology is composed of practices that are more 
complexly intersectional than Tanner’s image of a continuum indicates. Academic 
theology does not merely comprise the furthest point along the line of Christian social 
practices, as Tanner tends to describe it. If everyday and academic theological discourses, 
regardless of their institutional home, range in concretion and abstraction as they rise out 
of Christian practices, then something distinct happens when this second theologically 
particular institutional home is added, especially when it is added to the degree that it is 
for those who go through the formation of a theological doctoral program and, then, 
subsequent career in academia. This dissertation, among other things, functions as an 
exercise in understanding the particular tasks and potential gifts such a theologian has to 
offer to both church and academy concurrently.  
Shaped by at least two distinct sets of practices, then, my self-implicating method 
also endeavors to shed light on my final research question: when academic theologians 
lose their “sense for the game,” can everyday theologies impact, help, guide and shape 
their academic practices too? Throughout my reports of the conversations we had in our 
ecclesial practice, I will demonstrate moments of my own failures, moments of my own 
pedagogical shortsightedness, and moments when my own understanding of Christian 
intellectual traditions required expansion and revision; in essence, I will continually 
reference my own need to be corrected. And throughout, we will see how the everyday 
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Christians did that correcting. Not only did my research partners press me to figure out 
modes of communication that were relevant in their context, but they also guided me into 
deeper understanding of the texts and figures I was teaching them. Their work thus 
shaped mine, a fact to which I hope this text bears proof.  
That all of us in my ethnographic field were capable of correcting, guiding and 
shaping the practices and intellectual insights of each other, then, indicates that Tanner’s 
vision of how everyday and academic theologies compete and cooperate with each other 
to solve everyday theological problems might be too restricted. 64 This competition and 
cooperation produces more than answers to problems. As our class conversed in fluencies 
that could be mapped all along Tanner’s theological continuum, what we were doing is 
perhaps best not described as “theology” as simply a type of discourse – either everyday 
or academic – or theology for theology’s sake but, rather, as a pursuit of wisdom by 
which we all gained practical and intellectual know-how. I will develop this definition 
much more fully in the next chapter, but for now we can note that what we engaged 
together was a spiritual discipline, one that the class members described – with my 
agreement – in terms of “seeking to love God with all our heart, mind, and soul.”  
 
                                                 
64 Indeed, while the members of the classes I taught spoke in haphazard ways, certainly, 
as did I, when asked why they took these classes, they answered that they wanted to learn 
something “bigger,” “deeper,” or “broader” than the beliefs they had inherited. And they 
wanted to do so in order to gain a new and larger perspective on their own faith. In other 
words, they wanted to learn some of the more specialized discourses that could help them 
transcend the particularity of their concrete contexts. But to interpret such desires as 
“more academic,” according to Tanner’s way of framing the theological continuum 
would be to wrongly interpret them, I would argue, through an alternative institution’s 
discourse. Everyday theologies have their own methods of abstraction and systematizing 
that they relate with intellectual forms of worship: “Knowing God more deeply in order 
to love God more deeply,” as a number of my research partners put it. 
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Conversations Across the Theological Continuum 
 I noted above that Tanner historicizes the term “culture” by revealing shifts 
between its modern and postmodern usage. Bringing these shifts to the light of explicit 
reflection, Tanner seeks to show what academic theology can learn from the theologies 
created across all the spheres of church, academy and everyday life as it rises out of 
concrete Christian social practices. Her description of these shifts is helpful for 
understanding how our own classroom conversation practice gave rise to an integration of 
diverse theological fluencies in a sort of hybrid conversation. 
Yet, at the same time, because Tanner’s model deals with an abstracted notion of 
discourses, rather than actual speeches made by real people, her turn to concretion 
actually comprises more of a turn toward what Ted Smith calls “invisible church 
cultures.”65 In their turn to culture, Smith argues, theologians have tended to turn their 
attention less to an analysis of concrete practices in all their complexity, and more toward 
a vision of the church interpreted through the lens of an idealized version of what they 
want the church to be. In other words, they performed the same sorts of secondary 
reflection on supposedly first order events that Tanner criticizes, as outlined above, but to 
which she also falls prey. Whereas Smith’s examples of the ways Stanley Hauerwas and 
Delores Williams eclipse concrete church practices with, respectively, sanctified visions 
of gospel proclamation and romanticized visions of black women’s experience, Tanner 
names a messiness in church culture that remains surprisingly neat.  
                                                 
65 Smith, Redeeming Critique. For a more compact version of this argument, see Smith, 
The New Measures: A Theological History of Democratic Practice (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 17-22. 
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Throughout this dissertation, and in the fourth and fifth chapters in particular, we 
see that flesh and blood practices of theological conversation produce disagreements that 
are never only theological. Questions like “What is God’s wrath in light of God’s 
mercy?”66 cannot be easily disentangled from the death of a friend, a sense of injustice, or 
the pleasures of finding belonging in a community, for example. By engaging a 
conversation in which such questions become concretely situated, we gain deeper insight 
into how wisdom can be pursued across various theological fluencies.  
 When we view culture through a modern lens, Tanner rightly avers, we tend to 
ascribe certainty or authority to particular, supposedly “characteristic beliefs, values and 
so forth” which we seek to understand in distinction from their locations of social 
practice.67 But postmodern views do not destroy, or even wholly replace, this modern 
sense of authority. Instead they destabilize it through fresh understandings of space and 
time and of identity and difference. Therefore, whereas a modern view of culture tends to 
see culture as bound by geographical space, presuming uniformity and agreement on 
cultural elements within that space, a postmodern view disrupts that stability of space by 
also accounting for the contingencies of time.68 This means that a postmodern view takes 
account of the historical processes by which some or even most members of a particular 
geographically defined group might come to share affirmation of a particular cultural 
element, and in so doing, it undermines the abiding, universal authority of it. 
 This postmodern view of culture helps us understand some of the dynamics at 
play in the classes I taught for this theological ethnographic research. First, it presses us 
                                                 
66 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 88. 
67 Ibid, 44. 
68 Ibid, 41. 
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to reflect on the diverse historical trajectories that contributed to the shape of the 
conversation we had. As one whose discourse is shaped by the institutional practices of 
academy as well as church, the trajectory to which I returned again and again for 
interpreting our shared conversation was that of the historical Christian intellectual 
traditions. Indeed, I was curious to see how articulating these intellectual traditions 
explicitly in conversation might help class members better understand and bring to 
cognition the faith that was in their bones. The class members, however, brought an 
entirely different historical trajectory to bear on our conversation, one that was more 
local, related both to our particular church and the Southern Baptist Convention.  
My historical focus was demonstrated first in what I chose to teach to the group 
and, second, in how I taught it. My immediate instinct was to plot a course that followed 
a traditional, historically based survey of key theological thinkers. In fact, I often 
surprised myself by how traditional I could be. Despite my own personal academic 
pleasure at exploring thinkers situated closer to the fringes of Christian traditions, not to 
mention my usual hermeneutic desire to disrupt any notion of a “core tradition” to begin 
with, when designing these classes I found myself drawn to the Augustines, Luthers and 
Kants of Christian history, with a female mystic – any one would do – thrown in for good 
measure and a feminist tacked on at the end. In other words, I found myself performing 
the very pedagogical practice I usually strongly criticize.  
While topics I taught felt surprisingly traditional, however, how I taught them felt 
less so. I found that I tended to deploy those historically foundational figures for 
destabilizing purposes. While I did not seek to destroy or even replace traditional views, 
neither did I seek to conform the class members’ beliefs to the authority of an orthodox 
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tradition. Rather, in a way that makes more sense in light of what Tanner calls the 
postmodern view of culture, I sought to destabilize the presumed authority of certain 
traditional Christian claims and, perhaps, especially, of traditional Baptist claims, by 
putting them into dialogue with one another.  
The theological crises that erupted became fertile ground for conversational 
reflections not only on how we might solve such issues, but also on what we might find if 
we kept them open. I therefore found that any impulses I might have had to disrupt the 
status quo of our shared Christian beliefs – impulses usually associated with the 
vernacular understanding of postmodern – were parasitic on deeper understandings of 
those beliefs. I think I already believed in this destabilizing power that Christian 
traditions inherently possessed. And yet, I was consistently surprised by how fruitful it 
was revealed to be throughout the practice of theological conversation. 
Chapter five explores these themes more fully by analyzing our discussions on 
Beatrice of Nazareth, Martin Luther and the doctrine of sanctification. But for now, let 
me offer a hint of what is to come to ground my point. A concern that particular figures 
were trying to “earn their own salvation” consistently undermined class members’ 
abilities to engage those figures. To help them forge such engagement, then, I traced 
some of the historical trajectories that give rise to their certainty that salvation cannot be 
earned. I did not try to undo their belief or convince them to let go of it, but I did try to 
help them see that it was not the only rubric through which they could interpret every 
figure. There were other theological rubrics to be had, and we endeavored together to find 
and articulate them.  
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Subsequently studying my own pedagogical practices, brought to light while 
reviewing transcriptions of our classes,69 I realized just how much I relied upon 
explanations of the historical, cultural conditions of particular beliefs in order to aid class 
members’ critical reflection on their own personal views. In sum, later reflection on my 
instinctual pedagogy revealed just how central this notion of historical contingency as 
authorizing and de-authorizing particular ideas, summarized so succinctly by Tanner, is 
to my own ingrained understanding of culture. 
But this analysis only describes the historical contingencies brought into our 
classroom culture by me, as one shaped by the practices of both church and academy. It 
therefore risks either treating the other class members’ speeches as coherent, de-
temporalized wholes, or treating them as if their historical shaping only bears sub-
conscious traces of the types of the particular theological discourses I taught them. 
However, the class members were also speaking out of conscious knowledge of historical 
moments of which I had little to no knowledge.70  
                                                 
69 All classes were recorded with the permission of those in attendance, and were later 
transcribed by me. I tried two methodological approaches to these transcriptions. With 
the first course, I transcribed each Sunday class the Monday after, before I planned the 
next week’s class. That way, I had deeper insight into how classes were going, and could 
tailor my subsequent lessons to the needs I discerned in each particular discussion. 
Realizing that such immediate levels of reflexivity were impacting the very nature of my 
teaching, I experimented in the second course, “God as Trinity,” with saving all the 
recordings to transcribe until the entire course was over. The differences, losses and gains 
between these two approaches is beyond the scope of discussion here, although I intend 
to gather them into a future methodological piece. 
70 While numerous cultural trajectories were brought in to our classroom discussions, it is 
worth also noting what was missing. Aside from my own bi-raciality, the class was made 
up entirely of white participants, and no member was openly lesbian, gay, bi-sexual or 
trans-gendered. Class variances were minimal. Middle class people dominated, with only 
two people across both courses – one person in each – who spoke openly with me about 
their own struggles with both homelessness and joblessness. We had a couple of class 
members with visible physical and/or cognitive impairments. With regards to these 
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In a conversation about female deacons, for example, one older participant who 
had attended the church before its current pastor’s tenure was able to outline for us the 
processes by which women’s leadership had slowly come to be accepted in the church. 
And within that communal ecclesial history, he could also track his own personal history 
of change on that particular issue. In addition, those who had paid careful attention to the 
Southern Baptist culture wars that culminated in various versions of “The Baptist Faith 
and Message” – a document that, in its current form, is notoriously biased against female 
leadership – were able to outline the ways in which broader denominational politics had 
and had not contributed to our own church’s views. One class member even emailed me 
side-by-side copies of older and newer versions of this document, highlighting their 
differences, in order to help me understand the shifts in authorized denominational 
theology and polity. I made copies for the whole group so that we could all benefit from 
understanding how this particular historical event might contribute to our life together. 
Therefore, as I taught the class how a more specialized, abstracted, Christian 
theological perspective contributes to our historically constituted, embodied faith – the 
faith in our bones – they opened up for me its more local (also specialized, abstracted) 
version. My own theologies of ordination and ecclesiology became complicated as I grew 
to understand better the significance of this group accepting not only a woman, but a 
“Northerner” (a British girl from Canada who claims to be a feminist at that!) as their 
teacher and minister. They also pressed me to think pneumatologically. As the faith in my 
                                                                                                                                                 
unrepresented or under-represented communities, the issue of race was perhaps most 
frequently discussed but, of course, from white perspectives, particularly by those 
members who could recall the Civil Rights Movement. When stories were shared in this 
regard, they almost always entailed a “conversion moment” to the realization of racial 
injustice in the society in which we live, sometimes with dramatic consequences.  
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bones is expressed more often than not as doubt, they reminded me again and again that 
against all odds, the Spirit might still be moving among us in surprising ways.  
Tanner’s view of postmodern culture thus helps us see how the discursive 
hybridity of our conversations paired with my specialized academic interventions enabled 
us to unravel the cultural elements we had all inherited from participation in various 
Christian, academic, ecclesial, and other cultural practices in order to put them into rich 
conversation for fresh theological insight. What each of us took to be abiding and 
universal shifted somewhat as we each became able to understand it – and each other – in 
a more complex way. The conversational back and forth that enabled the class members 
to correct me as well, however, reveals a limit to Tanner’s model. Though she opens 
everyday theology up for specialized academic theological reflection, her project does not 
thematize the reverse, even as it invites it.  
Tanner’s second point about postmodern views of culture grows out of her first, 
as she argues that a postmodern account of culture brings to light the diversity existing 
within identity groups. Modern views of culture impose a vision of internal consistency 
onto geographically defined identity groups over and against external difference, Tanner 
argues. The effect is a distortion rather than a description of the realities of lived 
practice.71 As a result, voices that are discrepant from that dominant, consistent view are 
silenced.72 However, Tanner argues that postmodern views of geographically defined 
identity groups highlight internal difference. Attuned to post-structuralist understandings 
of power, the postmodern view listens to and brings to broader hearing marginalized 
voices as contributors to group identity. It is therefore better able to understand how 
                                                 
71 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 42. 
72 Ibid, 46. 
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shifts and changes in group identity can be generated from within rather than solely from 
beyond the group’s borders. Change is not encountered merely as threat or failure, but 
rather is able to be viewed as a location of possibility.73 Christian identity, for example, is 
not strictly defined against non-Christian identity because difference and change exist 
inside, outside, and across the boundaries of identity definition.  
This view of culture also helps us understand what happened in the conversation 
between everyday and academic theological discourses in our classroom space. It would 
be overly idealistic to say that we always made it to open, honest discussion of the 
differences between us. Indeed, more than one participant admitted in one-on-one 
interviews that they were sometimes scared to say what they were really thinking in class 
in case others viewed them as a “heretic” or worse, “not really saved.” In this way, some 
form of a border seemed to remain between what constituted Christian and non-Christian 
identities. And yet that border also seemed to be permeable as more confident class 
members would actually deploy the language of “heretic” as a self-description that 
permitted them to draw more controversial views into the discussion. The language of 
“heretic” complicated the difference between what was acceptable and unacceptable, 
insider and outsider, belief. 
One man in the class, Richard, in fact, was particularly fond of this tactic. Over 
the course of my ethnographic interviews, I asked everyone to name who they thought 
was the wisest class member.74 By a strong margin, Richard received the most votes. 
                                                 
73 Ibid, 51. 
74 I asked this question in large part because it opened insight into numerous classroom 
dynamics. I learned much about the relationships between class members outside of our 
time and space together, such as who taught whom in Sunday School, who had served on 
various service projects together, and the emotional responses certain class members had 
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Class members described him as humble, as someone who waits until he truly has 
something to say to speak, and as open-minded in ways toward which they strived. 
Whenever I was unable to come up with an answer to a question, the group would turn to 
Richard for an answer. And yet he never imposed his views on us or attempted to usurp 
my position as teacher. He always couched his comments carefully, framing them in 
ways that invited discussion rather than agreement.  
On numerous occasions, then, he would jokingly begin a point by stating, “y’all 
are going to think I’m a heretic, but…” Such naming thus allowed him to introduce ideas 
that seemed foreign into our particular location by using playful declarations of heretical 
speech. Other more quiet class members, bolstered by the place of authority Richard 
occupied within the room, could then respond that they too sometimes subscribed to such 
supposed heresy with safe cover. And still others felt authorized to disagree with such a 
vein because, at least in their view, “the tradition” was on their side.  As a consequence, 
voices typically marginalized were heard and affirmed, revealing the diversity internal to 
our group. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to others. The insight that intrigued me the most from answers to this question, however, 
was that responses were fairly evenly divided between male and female examples of the 
“wise person.” Richard received the most “votes,” but second and third place went to two 
women, whose cumulative “votes” far exceeded Richard’s. Whereas psychological data 
on the perception of wisdom highlights a general populace view toward perceiving 
wisdom more acutely in male examples, this group bucked the broader trend (see Susan 
Bluck and Judith Glück, “From the Inside Out: People’s Implicit Theories of Wisdom,” 
in A Handbook of Wisdom: Psychological Perspectives, ed. Robert J. Sternberg and 
Jennifer Jordan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 84-109). This research 
does show that, in general, people tend to associate “intellect-insight” more with men’s 
wisdom, and “social-compassionate” features with women’s wisdom (Ibid, 106). These 
qualities were evident in the reasons people gave for picking, alternately, Richard, Joan 
or Ann as their example. The conclusion I would draw from this, then, is that this 
particular group is perhaps more able to recognize “wisdom” in its social, emotive modes 
than is a general populace and, therefore, is also able to recognize it more in female 
examples. Reasons for why this might be the case would require further study, however. 
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Indeed, through the ongoing pursuit of wisdom, class members came to value 
such internal inconsistencies. In a one-on-one interview conducted after the first course 
was finished, a course participant, Gene, summed up well what quite a few others had 
also articulated. When asked to describe why he took the class and what his experience of 
it was, he answered: 
I think it’s good for people to get together and talk about things that are  
really on their minds, and in a lot of settings we don’t wanna do that,  
especially Southern Baptists. We’re afraid we might say something that 
would break tradition. People would be outcast or whatever. So I felt like 
it would be a good opportunity, first of all to learn some of the history… 
to learn what we believed across history. And second to try myself to ask 
some questions, some honest questions…. 
 
For Gene, there is a connection between the history of Christian traditions, asking himself 
honest questions, and overcoming his fear of saying the very thing that could supposedly 
get him cast out of the community.75 Engaging broader theological perspectives, and 
hearing other class members do the same, Richard, Gene, and others, myself included, 
were invited to play with the borders between acceptable and unacceptable belief and 
practice in order to come to a deeper, more complex understanding of their own place 
within our particular Baptist community, as well as within the ongoing nature of a 
broader understanding of Christian social practices.  
                                                 
75 It is worth noting that despite all the language people use of being “cast out of the 
community,” to my knowledge no one has ever been “cast out” for something they 
believe or fail to believe. Moreover, divergent views generally stimulated discussion 
rather than shut it down. Even when a class member backed me into a corner and asked 
me explicitly if I believed there was a Hell and I had to admit I did not, something I in 
fact believed would be a major, border-defining issue, three separate class members told 
me afterwards that I seemed more stressed out by the question than I needed to be. And, 
indeed, they showed me how I too have been inculcated with these fears of being cast 
out, even as I try to help the class members overcome them. Such instances reveal the 
power we believe the borders of our identity groups’ definition have, while they also 
reveal how easily those borders can be permeated – and, more accurately, reveal their 
status as already permeable – simply by naming them in conversation. 
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That said, these internal doctrinal differences were mostly slight. On the topic of 
salvation, for example, most professed something like, “Jesus is the only way to 
salvation,” but then in more private conversations, debated what such a statement might 
mean, how their own life experiences led to the way they held it, and what particular 
emotions they felt while considering it. For example, one woman, Maureen, whose story 
I engage more fully in the next chapter, claimed emphatically that she has no doubts that 
“Jesus is the only way to salvation” in one breath, and that she struggles with the idea that 
some people will be kept out of Heaven in another. When asked about this conflict, she 
noted that she did not want to deny that Jesus is necessary for salvation, even though 
various life experiences made such a restriction feel wrong to her. Having had a strict, 
conservative Christian upbringing, she described various aspects of her faith life with 
strong language of “fear” based in the image that “God was gonna getcha!” Moreover, 
she had “always been taught” that Jesus was the only way to salvation, by pastors, 
parents, Bible study teachers, and others. All these personal factors contributed less to 
whether or not Maureen holds this particular doctrinal belief, and more to the way in 
which she holds it: somewhat fearfully, marked with much doubt, and nevertheless, 
strongly affirmed in the midst of that doubt. 
Internal difference within our class was therefore evident, but it manifested in 
various, intersecting ways, many of which were not doctrinally based. Our concrete 
engagement of an internally diverse conversation practice thus nuances Tanner’s vision 
of internal difference, as it leads us into her third point about postmodern views of 
culture: culture produces a focus for engagement rather than the substance of agreement 
as difference contributes to the construction of cultural identity as a “hybrid, relational 
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affair.”76 The relationality of this affair matters, as Christian identity was negotiated by 
each member of class not only in light of Christian social practices and intellectual 
Christian traditions, but also by their own life experiences, personal relationships, 
emotional lives, and countless other factors that contribute to making them who they are.  
Difference, therefore, is less evident in the difference of opinions held, and more 
evident in the complexly constituted lives that hold them. In this way, then, Tanner’s 
postmodern view of culture helps us see how particular historical trajectories, moments 
of concretion and abstraction, and various debates over theological difference came 
together in our shared practice of conversation. It also helps us to see how such internally 
diverse conversations could in fact contribute to the ongoing cultural construction of 
Christian identity as a hybrid and relational affair. Yet at the same time, the nature of our 
conversation’s complexity begins to reveal just how messy the diverse forms that internal 
difference within a particular Christian social practice can be. Theological difference is 
always parasitic on other forms of difference. Playing with the relationship between 
numerous forms of this difference through the practice of conversation can produce rich 
insight that would otherwise be lost.  
 
Remembering Wine and Supper 
 This chapter opened with some analytic description of conversation around a 
dinner table with friends. As we leave this chapter, my description makes a definitive 
shift from the restaurant to the church classroom. Nevertheless, the dinner party chat 
should linger in the background of my descriptions of our classroom conversations as a 
                                                 
76 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 57. 
 66 
reminder that both everyday and academic theological discourses are created, shaped and 
spoken both inside and outside their primary institutional locations.  
 The description of both the dining table and the classroom conference table 
showed us conversations that integrated everyday with academic theologies while also 
requiring the interventions of a discourse shaped by both ecclesial and academic social 
practices. What matters most about both visions is not that any one person said something 
beautifully wise, or that I managed to ask good prompting questions (as well as a few 
stifling ones). What matters about both scenes is that they contained people using the 
various tools they had at their disposal to labor together in the pursuit of wisdom, and that 
in both contexts, there were moments where that wisdom seemed almost to be grasped. 
Maybe only one of us got to articulate it in those moments, but in each, we all contributed 
to it. Any insightful speech in a sense belonged to all of us and none of us. Any insightful 
speech was experienced communally as a gift from God. 
 In one way, the whole process was dependent on my academic expertise to 
construct the lessons, questions and comments that would help us get there. My academic 
reflection did not just come in at the end to report and interpret what I heard. Rather, the 
theological knowledge I have acquired through explicit and deep formation in the 
practices of theological academies shaped the content of my teaching and my ability to 
recognize historical theological trajectories that contribute to the make up of what the 
class members said.  
In addition to knowledge of a particular set of texts and intellectual traditions, my 
academic theological training, as well as my ministerial formation, have both equipped 
me with pedagogical instincts. Sometimes these instincts would compete, and sometimes 
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they would cooperate, both guiding my practical know-how for integrating the 
intellectual insights into the practice of classroom teaching by interpreting, hearing, 
echoing back and seeking to challenge the class members again and again until we 
created something new together. Much as these forms of knowledge and skill were 
necessary for shaping our classroom conversation, we will also see throughout this 
dissertation my moments of failure. In these moments, we will see, then, how the class 
members taught me something about my pedagogical skills, helping me refine my know-
how through consistent practice of them. 
But the class members did not only teach me know-how. They also taught me 
intellectual knowledge. At no point did the group simply submit to my articulation of the 
Christian intellectual traditions. In fact, I would be hard pressed to recall a moment in 
which anyone wholly submitted to anything. We all staked out our positions, allowing for 
their revising and refining, but not their complete undoing. In this way the class members 
helped me see the importance of local histories and denominational fights. They changed 
the way I read numerous theologians. They helped me bring my own difference within 
our church walls by staking claims I would not usually stake, such as the fact that I do not 
believe in the geographic existence of Hell. As I helped them abstract from their 
concretion, they helped me bury my abilities for specialized abstraction deep into the 
immanence of the concrete life we live together.  
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Anything that fits on the back of a Frisbee, it’s just not complicated enough to build a life 
around. 
 
I think that was a funny moment…when you essentially made us all be theologians for a 
moment saying, “What do you really think?” 
 
We all know the rules, but no one picks apart the rules. 
 
Miriam, First Baptist Church Member 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
THEOLOGICAL PRACTICES OF PURSUING WISDOM 
  
 
Making Theologians 
 When Miriam expresses frustration at our church’s evangelistic practice of 
printing “the plan of salvation” on a Frisbee to be handed out during Fourth of July 
parades, she is revealing a desire many members at First Baptist Church Nashville (FBC) 
share: the desire for something complex enough to “build a life around [it].” Yes, there 
are many in our community who want a graspable set of rules to order their existence – 
something that fits on the back of a Frisbee. We find that desire, or one like it, in all 
churches, all organizations and institutions, and even the academy. But then there is this 
group of thirty plus church members at FBC who, by attending these Sunday night 
theology classes, demonstrate that they want more than the Frisbee’s list (which is, of 
course, itself a particular theology). Or, better put, they want to keep wrestling with what 
the Frisbee says, acknowledging the rules on it, but then picking those rules apart. By 
spending two to two-and-a-half hours each Sunday night studying historical and 
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systematic theologies together – by wrestling with the Frisbee – this group demonstrates 
a desire to connect consciously with the processes by which we all together are 
continually made and remade as theologians.  
Indeed, Miriam’s language of being made into theologians is intriguing. The idea 
that a teacher could “make” someone into a theologian, simply by asking a question, 
seems almost ludicrous. And yet something special did happen in those moments of 
inquiry and conversation. By asking what they really thought, I was asking them to be 
honest, not only to parrot the rules we all knew, but to pick those rules apart, as Miriam 
tells it, and in so doing reveal how malleable they really are. But at the same time, they 
questioned me and, thus, participated also in the process by which my own theological 
identity is constructed. As each of us asked our own questions and responded to each 
other, we were all challenged to face the edges of our knowing in order to risk the 
discomforting state of unknowing and, in that, come to know something new or, at least, 
know something in a new way. Our conversations therefore took us all deeper into our 
mutual making of each other into theologians.  
In this chapter, I interpret this process of making and remaking using the concept 
of habitus. As we will see, habitus describes, among other things, the processes by which 
agents are continually constituted over the course of a lifetime through their participation 
in all different kinds of social practices. My language of “making and remaking” to 
describe this process is intentional, so as to describe a never-complete process, rather 
than the illusion that we could be “made” once and for all into a static identity. I therefore 
define habitus here as a site of both stability and flux, demonstrating how practices give 
rise to forms of agency and discourse in ways that both reproduce and transform social 
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structures. This definition requires engaging the sociological works primarily of Pierre 
Bourdieu, but also Sherry Ortner and Ann Swidler, in order to demonstrate how the 
conversational practices our class engaged guided the making and remaking of us all as 
theologians. In the next chapter, I focus on my methodological deployment of my own 
plural habitus77 as a set of tools for research. In particular, I deploy the various competing 
and cohering habitus that give rise to my theological identity and modes of theological 
speech. Gaining a sense of the plurality of habitus, and their ways of competing and 
cohering will thus be crucial in this chapter for undergirding the next. 
Theological conversation can have many goals: the thrill of debate, the desire to 
convince another to one’s point of view, the construction of a particular fresh insight, the 
desire to live more faithfully, and so on. Indeed, such goals were likely all operative at 
different moments throughout our shared classroom conversation practice. Moreover, 
each of these goals can be associated with the theologies located in church and academy, 
and in broader, everyday life. In this chapter I endeavor to interpret a conversation that 
incorporates and transcends these theologies that rise out of ecclesial, academic and 
everyday life through the lens of the ongoing nature of habitus construction. Some 
additional term is therefore required to describe the particular habitus that is born out of 
the intersection of the ecclesial, academic, and everyday fields.  
I argue that this additional term is best captured by the concept of the “pursuit of 
wisdom.” Habitus, after all, describes a type of constituted bodily wisdom, the 
constitutive practices for which I sought to open up and refine using the practice of 
                                                 
77 It might be worth noting that the singular and plural forms of habitus are identical. This 
inevitably causes some confusion. I endeavor throughout here to situate the word in ways 
that make its number clear. 
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conversation. Wisdom’s pursuit brings together the class members’ desire to “know God 
more deeply” in order to “love God more deeply,” as I mentioned in the previous chapter. 
It also transcends dichotomies that concerned both class members and myself, like 
practice and theory, everyday and academic, thought and action, and concretion and 
abstraction. Finally, framing the goal of our conversation as the pursuit of wisdom 
according to the ongoing making and remaking of us all into theologians undermines any 
vision that everyday Christians need to become academic or academic theologians need 
to become everyday if we are all to participate in this activity together. Instead, each of us 
draws on the goods of interaction with the other in the ongoing pursuit of wisdom. 
I explore the nature of wisdom’s pursuit in this chapter by unpacking a particular 
conversation that was a part of my fieldwork. Because this particular fieldwork interview 
– with a married couple, Maureen and Joe – is more intimate than the conversations that 
took place in our classroom, it offers a more focused analysis of some of the personal 
trajectories that contributed to the larger group dynamics. Through this conversation, 
Maureen and I in particular engage each other in a way that opens up our bodily wisdom 
for concrete reflection. In so doing, each of us pursues the wisdom of our already 
embodied faith – the faith in our bones – for deeper, more reflective understanding of 
who each of us is and who we are becoming. This particular conversation thus serves as a 
model for understanding the larger group conversations also as a pursuit of wisdom in 
this way.  
As I unpack our conversation, I endeavor to bring to light aspects of the ways in 
which the constellation of habitus that give rise to how Maureen and I act and who we 
are both compete and cohere with each other. The pursuit of wisdom entails finding some 
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sort of loose, performative integration of these habitus such that our sense for the game 
(to use Tanner’s language, which is itself an echo of Bourdieu’s) of living is deepened. 
To be clear, this sense for the game does not entail a hierarchical ordering of habitus or 
the construction of some consistent meta-habitus that imposes an impossible vision of 
uniform authenticity or regularity onto all our actions. Rather, this loose, performative 
integration – which develops the foundation for my own theological ethnographic 
methods – entails finding strategies for context-specific action among the ways in which 
the different facets of our lives that make us who we are connect with each other. 
 
Habitus: A Definition 
The concept habitus is, of course, not new. Its genesis can be traced to Aristotle, 
through Thomas Aquinas, and into contemporary theory. At its core, it describes a type of 
practical bodily wisdom, the way an agent gains that wisdom over time, and the ways she 
does what she does with it. Let me explain what I mean by this by beginning my 
definition with some exposition of the way Pierre Bourdieu frames the concept.  
Pierre Bourdieu describes habitus as the “schemes of perception, conception, and 
action common to all members of the same group or class.”78 It thus limns a theoretical 
structure for mapping the site where the “objective structures” that make up particular 
sets of practices meet with and constitute a subject’s knowledgeable agency. But it also 
describes the way that constituted agency simultaneously shapes and reshapes those same 
objective structures. It therefore demonstrates how subjective modes of knowing and 
acting have objective basis, even as objectivity is shaped by those same subjective modes 
                                                 
78 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972), 86. 
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of knowing and acting. It is the wisdom we gain by doing; it is what our gut has us do by 
habit and instinct or a certain sort of “feel for the game.”79 Moreover, because habitus 
describes actions, motivations and dispositions, it describes not only what we do, but why 
we do it and how we feel when doing it.  
In this way, habitus accounts for a type of agency that is less than fully conscious 
of its act or intention, but which nevertheless is still active and knowledgeable. It is the 
bodily wisdom one feels when one’s heart automatically quiets to pray because one’s 
knees have begun to bend. Indeed, because action and knowledge are only possible 
because of, within, and from one’s habitus, Bourdieu can maintain that all knowledge 
associated with action “presupposes a work of construction.” But, as he continues, this 
work of construction “has nothing in common with intellectual work,” and rather, it 
“consists of an activity of practical construction, even of practical reflection, that ordinary 
notions of thought, consciousness, knowledge prevent us from adequately thinking.”80   
Indeed, in a particularly lovely turn of (albeit translated) phrase, Bourdieu argues, 
“it is because agents never know completely what they are doing that what they do has 
more sense than they know.”81 The habitus is an “embodied history, internalized as 
second nature and so forgotten as history” such that it is, for the one it possesses, “the 
active presence of the whole past of which it is the product.”82 Our bodies carry the 
wisdom (and folly) of a whole history we no longer recall. We are cognitively unaware of 
                                                 
79 See especially Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1980), 66-68. 
80 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, “The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology (The 
Chicago Workshop),” in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, ed. Pierre Bourdieu and 
Loïc J. D. Wacquant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 121. 
81 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 69. 
82 Ibid, 56. 
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this wisdom that is in our bones, and so the ways in which we live, move and have our 
being are teeming with an ongoing production of bodily knowledge that can be opened up 
to be shaped and reshaped.  
At the same time, because habitus can be divorced from their original conditions 
of creation, the concept also describes how these knots of perceptions and dispositions 
are transposable across different fields of space and time. There are, therefore, visible 
homologies in habitus across diverse fields. For example, the habitus of a desire for the 
new, shaped through all the ways a family’s life is enriched by emigration to a new 
country, might be passed down through the unfolding of generations all living within that 
same new country. Likewise, a downturn in family fortunes initiated by a negative 
immigration experience could create a fear of the unknown, also passed down through 
generations who are happily transient but unwilling to experiment with eating foreign 
food or trying a new laundry detergent. And all these perceptions, dispositions and 
apperceptions can be passed on without the agents who embody them ever knowing of 
their genesis.  
To summarize our reflections on the habitus thus far: on the one hand it is a site in 
flux, shifting changing and affecting change in relation to the stimuli to which it responds 
and the practices that it generates. On the other hand, it can mark a site of stability, 
describing similar ways of processing varieties of stimuli and practice with a sense of 
continuity. This tension between habitus as a site of flux and as a site of stability – that is, 
the tension between the supposed changeability of the objective structures embedded in 
practices and the ways our activity nevertheless seems to reproduce those structures 
automatically – should give us pause. Where in this dialectic of flux and stability should 
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we focus our attention? Here, anthropologist Sherry Ortner’s critique of the language of 
construction with the language of making can help us, especially as, following Miriam, 
this is the same language I use in this chapter to describe the process by which we all are 
made and remade as theologians.  
In her essay, “Making Gender,” Ortner points out how various French theorists, 
like Bourdieu, have, each in their own way, “directed us to see subjects as constructed 
by, and subjected to, the cultural and historical discourses within which they must 
operate.”83 Arguing that much is at stake in this language choice, Ortner notes how 
construction is a metaphor from industry. It connotes the weight of immovable structures, 
made of iron, steel, or some other tough, unbendable product that keeps the building from 
falling down. “Construction” emphasizes the structures themselves, not those who make 
them. Departing from this heavy industry metaphor, then, Ortner instead lifts up the 
lighter language of “making.” Derived from the less weighty materials of crafts rather 
than industry, “making” is better suited for focusing attention on the activity of the agents 
themselves who make the structures that simultaneously make them. This allows for a 
more malleable vision of the structures that make and are made – one that, by extension, 
proliferates the possibility for creating new practices of justice, for example, within them, 
as well as new practices and new ways of knowing. This language is better tooled to 
ethnographic tasks that are “descriptive and analytic rather than interpretive or 
deconstructionist,” and which are capable of “looking at and listening to real people 
                                                 
83 Sherry Ortner, “Making Gender,” in The Politics and Erotics of Culture (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1996), 1 (italics mine). 
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doing real things in a given historical moment…to figure out how what they are doing or 
have done will or will not reconfigure the world they live in.”84 
As Ortner points out, then, while Bourdieu makes room for flux and change, he 
nevertheless tends to “emphasize the role of practice in social reproduction rather than 
change.”85 Of course, she adds, “social reproduction and social transformation can never, 
and should never, be wholly separated.”86 But, she goes on to say, there are different 
ways that we can approach the data in our field of study. We could, like Bourdieu, “do 
practice analysis as a loop, in which ‘structures’ construct subjects and practices, but 
subjects and practices reproduce ‘structures’.”87 While allowing for the possibility that 
reproduction entails slippage, by focusing on the reproductive loop, Bourdieu 
nevertheless tends to eclipse those slips. Or we could, like Ortner, choose to “avoid the 
loop, to look for the slippages in reproduction and the erosions of long-standing patterns, 
the moments of disorder and of outright ‘resistance’.”88 Focusing on the slippages of 
power and the disruptions of the status quo by actual agents, she argues, is more in line 
with feminist and other “subaltern” forms of analysis.89 This is not to deny that the loop 
exists. It is rather, to let it fall into the background, drawing on it only when it is helpful 
for illuminating something particular. 
                                                 
84 Ibid, 2. 
85 Ibid, 17. Italics mine. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. Italics mine. 
88 Ibid. 
89 “Subaltern” is the language Ortner uses to describe her methods, even as she tends to 
put it into quotation marks and question its appropriateness. For more on the critique of 
overusing the language of “subaltern” to refer to any marginalized people group, see 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak,” in Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271ff.  
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 In addition to this corrective to Bourdieu’s vision of habitus from Ortner, we 
might also consider one from the sociologist Ann Swidler. Like Ortner, Swidler stresses 
the agency produced by habitus. The dispositions, perceptions and apperceptions by 
which a habitus inculcates agents – or, as Swidler puts it, the “habits, skills, and styles” 
by which cultural practices give rise to action – assemble into what Swidler calls a 
“repertoire or ‘tool kit’.”90 “Both individuals and groups know how to do different kinds 
of things in different circumstances,” she argues, indicating that culture is less like “a 
unified system that pushes action in a consistent direction,” and more like “a ‘tool 
kit’…from which actors select differing pieces for constructing lines of action.”91 
Bourdieu would agree with the critique of culture as a unified system, as I will explore 
further below.92 But whereas Bourdieu understands the habitus as essentially possessing 
the agent and, moreover, in a way of which the agent is not fully conscious, Swidler 
reframes the agent as possessing the habitus such that she is able to draw consciously on 
the knowledge with which it equips her.93  
                                                 
90 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” in American Sociological 
Review, 1986, Vol. 51 (April: 273-286), 273. 
91 Ibid, 277. 
92 See especially Bourdieu, Outline, ch. 1. 
93 While Swidler does not explicitly use the concept habitus in the body of her article, 
throughout her footnotes she draws parallels between her understanding of a “tool-kit” 
and Bourdieu’s notion that I have outlined here. In particular, she gestures towards how 
Bourdieu’s view that “cultural patterns provide the structure against which individuals 
can develop particular strategies” fits within a whole subset of anthropological query. 
This subset of anthropological query reframes the more traditional, static understanding 
of “rules,” seen to govern a culture’s activity, as “strategies” that “unfold over time” (see 
note 9: Swidler, 276). “For me,” Swidler adds, extending Bourdieu’s understanding, 
“strategies are the larger ways of trying to organize a life…within which particular 
choices make sense, and for which particular culturally shaped skills and habits (what 
Bourdieu calls “habitus”) are useful” (Ibid). Swidler thus acknowledges that her “tool-
kit” is similar to Bourdieu’s habitus. Their different language choices seem primarily to 
indicate the amount of conscious, strategic agency each wants to ascribe to the cultural 
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Whether we focus our attention on moments of flux or stability, for Swidler, we 
can always see agents drawing on the tools at their disposal as strategies of action that 
shape the cultural practices within which they gain those same tools. While I follow 
Ortner in focusing on moments of habitus tension and slippage, then, we must also 
remember that even when it seems like cultural practices are merely reproducing 
particular beliefs, those who are implicated in the processes of reproduction still have 
agential roles within them. In other words, whether someone in the classes I taught 
accepts, rejects, reaffirms or renews a particular Baptist belief is less relevant to our 
discussion than how they do so. It is the process of pursuing wisdom – the cultivation of 
tools for our tool-kits and strategies of action for living – that interests us here. 
 
Theologia and the Pursuit of Wisdom 
If these strategies for faithful living are cultivated in the practice of theological 
conversation, then we need to draw the connection between the concept habitus and the 
pursuit of wisdom as a distinctly spiritual discipline. Most everyone cultivates strategies 
of action for living; wise people might manage to cultivate a loose integration between 
their competing and cohering habitus in order to give rise to these strategies of action. So 
how can a conversational practice that loosely integrates the competing and cohering 
habitus and discourses associated with ecclesial, academic and everyday life be 
understood as a spiritual discipline of pursuing wisdom?  
                                                                                                                                                 
actors whose narratives they are describing. Swidler, of course, like Ortner, seeks to 
ascribe more agency to the actors, even as, unlike Ortner, she also wants to describe those 
agents with a more conscious recognition of their own actions and motivations. 
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First, it should be noted that the members of the classes I taught, including me, 
viewed what we were doing as a religious – more specifically, Christian – practice. We 
saw it to be a form of intellectual worship: knowing God more deeply in order to love 
God more deeply. This was further confirmed not only by their statements to the fact, but 
also in the way in which prayer was integrated with our conversation practice. On the 
first night of class, I forgot to open us in prayer. Within minutes, I could feel my error. In 
essence, it felt like we had never really begun and, while I felt I could not interrupt the 
class in process to “open it in prayer” after the fact, I knew we at least needed to close it 
this way to somewhat make up for my forgetfulness. Classes like ours throughout FBC’s 
practice – whether Sunday night classes, Wednesday night meetings, or Sunday School in 
the mornings – always open with prayer.  
After that first night, I corrected my error, and throughout the rest of that semester 
and the one that followed, always opened class by inviting someone to pray for us. These 
prayers almost always combined a similar set of elements, no matter who was offering 
them: 1) an invitation for God to be present, 2) a request for God to “guide,” “be in,” or 
“direct” our “conversation” or “study,” and 3) either a note of thanksgiving for me as a 
teacher, a request that I would be “guided,” “helped,” or “blessed” in my teaching, or 
some combination of the two. The second a prayer was completed and people lifted their 
heads, it did not matter how energetic conversation had been prior to the prayer, all eyes 
turned immediately to me, expectant for the lesson to begin. Prayer marked the transition 
from social time to class time in a very particular way. It offered a conscious articulation 
of a shared belief that each discreet theological conversation was grounded in our 
openness to the presence of God among us.  
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Theologian Edward Farley argues that the pursuit of wisdom within religious 
communities not only maintains, but is grounded upon its openness to the Divine. 
Arguing for a new paradigm for theological work – one that bears significance for all the 
theologies rising from practices associated with ecclesial, academic and everyday life – 
Farley lifts up practices of theologia, modeled on the Greek notion of paideia. Paideia, 
explains Farley, is education understood as the “culturing of a human being in areté or 
virtue.”94 Resonating with the reasons named by the people who took my class for why 
they took it, paideia refers to the whole orientation of the wise, virtuous life. In this way, 
while it draws on intellectual knowledge, it is not to pursue knowledge for its own sake. 
Like paideia, theologia describes a culturing of the human being but, for Farley, in 
“sapiential knowledge engendered by grace and divine self-disclosure” rather than in a 
Greek notion of the virtues.95 Theology as the pursuit of wisdom, founded on a pre-
reflective awareness of God’s salvific work among us, is gained through the grace-full 
culturing of the human being through the presence of God’s Spirit in her life – including, 
the study of theological texts together.  
It is no accident how much Farley’s account of theologia as a cultural formation 
of wisdom sounds like the way I have described habitus here. His vision is grounded in 
reclaiming aspects of premodern understandings of “theology as a habitus, a cognitive 
disposition and orientation of the soul…”96 The historical activities of theology as a 
pursuit of wisdom that he wants to revive relates both to theology as a habitus and 
                                                 
94 Edward Farley, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education 
(Wipf & Stock, 2001), 153. 
95 Ibid, 153. 
96 Ibid, 35. 
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theology as the discipline that rises from that habitus.97 Indeed, the key problem with 
contemporary theological education, as Farley sees it, is that it no longer inculcates 
ministry students with a habitus of pursuing wisdom in this way. Falsely dividing out 
theory from practice, disparate academic theological disciplines are oriented to what 
Farley calls a “clerical paradigm,” finding their unity in the tasks of ministry, not the 
habitus of pursuing wisdom that, among other things, gives rise to those tasks as 
instincts.98 
Farley is using habitus in a slightly different way than I am here, grounded more 
firmly in Aristotelian thought and premodern understandings of it. Nevertheless, Farley’s 
vision resonates with the one I have developed in these pages. It is a form of bodily 
wisdom, related to “cognitive habit” and, he adds, it is a “state of the soul.”99 In this way, 
it is a form of wisdom that bridges body, mind and soul. Two things in particular matter 
about Farley’s framing: first, that the habitus of pursuing wisdom is shaped by a pre-
reflective (i.e., unconscious, embodied) awareness of God’s salvific work among us and, 
second, that the habitus of pursuing wisdom is made and remade in agents through their 
                                                 
97 Ibid, 31. 
98 Ibid, 85-88. Bonnie Miller-McLemore has argued that Farley’s notion of a “clerical 
paradigm” does not tell the whole story. It needs to be supplemented with a correlative 
understanding of the “academic paradigm,” she argues, if theological institutions are still 
to do the important work of training clergy with practical know-how. Accepting Miller-
McLemore’s idea that academic theology might be “too academic for the church,” my 
goal here is not to make academic theology ‘less academic,’ but rather to make particular 
aspects of it – i.e., not necessarily texts – more communicable in the ecclesial sphere.  
See Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “The ‘Clerical Paradigm’: A Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness?” in International Journal of Practical Theology (vol. 11), 19-38. 
99 Farley, 47. Note 15. In this way, Farley emphasizes the cognitive, conscious 
dimensions of habitus more than Bourdieu and Ortner and, to some degree, Swidler and 
myself. Even so, his argument is particularly helpful here as I endeavor to guide a 
practice in which we seek to connect consciously to the ongoing making and remaking of 
our habitus in a conversational pursuit of wisdom. 
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conscious, cognitive engagement of what we might call, a faith that is already in their 
bones. It is both habitus and the discipline to which that habitus continually gives rise in 
its own ongoing reshaping. It is embodied wisdom and the pursuit of a more reflective, 
embodied wisdom. In an echo of our class members’ prayers, God’s work among us is 
the thread running through practices of theologia – practices like theological 
conversations – by which we open ourselves up to study, and to testing, challenging and 
revising our Christian practices and beliefs through our pursuit of wisdom.  
Theologia, as this bodily, conversational pursuit of wisdom, thus rises from and 
gives rise to our lives of faith. In this way, also, Farley points toward the possibility that 
God’s Spirit is at work in our communities, participating also in the making of our 
particular competing and cohering habitus. Not bound by ecclesial borders, God’s Spirit 
thus moves in and through all the practices we engage across the multiple spheres of our 
lives. The competing and cohering sets of practices associated with church, academy and 
everyday life come together not as the distances between them are bridged by theory, but 
rather, in the embodied living – the embodied wisdom – of those who participate in them.  
 
Competition and Coherence Between Habitus in the Pursuit of Wisdom 
 Given the above, we can understand our competing and cohering collections of 
habitus as instinctual, dispositional, bodily forms of wisdom, inculcated through practices 
into our strategies for knowledgeable action, saturated with a pre-reflective awareness of 
God’s work in our lives. In other words, our various habitus can describe the dispositions 
of faith that are embedded in our bones through participation in Christian and other social 
practices. And habitus simultaneously describes how those dispositions of faith give rise 
 83 
to further faithful strategies for action and belief, for faithful living. Habitus give rise to 
the disciplines by which we pursue the very wisdom with which they inculcate us. As 
Tanner argues that theological discourse rises “organically” out of Christian social 
practices, habitus helps us understand how that organic process works, as well as the 
activity to which it gives rise.  
Furthermore, studying the moments of slippage and tension that rise from within 
and across the multiple spheres of practices that give shape to our cohering and 
competing collections of habitus helps us not only to see better, but also to interpret and 
perhaps even live better the complexity of lived faith. Given these points, in this section I 
focus on a particular narrative of tension that helps illuminate the complex processes by 
which conversations between people speaking various theological fluencies comprise a 
pursuit of wisdom wherein they – we – are made and remade as theologians.  
Perhaps because it tends to be a border-defining question for Baptists between 
who is Christian and who is not, the question of Jesus being the only way to salvation 
provided a fruitful focus for theological conversation among our class members. It is a 
question around which conflicts often arise between what feels true for someone or 
makes a certain sort of sense for their living in one context or another, and what they find 
themselves proclaiming to believe in these various contexts. Moreover, because this 
question tends to define the borders of Christian identity with such drastic soteriological 
ramifications, and because it thus creates these tensions that might feel difficult to 
engage, class members often felt more comfortable talking about it in the privacy of our 
one-on-one interviews. We already saw Gene admit that he could say things in the 
interview format that he did not feel comfortable saying in our more public classroom 
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forum. Numerous others echoed this sentiment as we sought to negotiate this traditional 
Baptist belief in the context of other practices associated with ecclesial and everyday life 
through conversation together. The further I pushed into this line of questioning, the more 
the tensions between competing and cohering habitus, but also the competing and 
cohering roles we play in life, not only for class members, but also for me, became 
apparent.  
One evening I ended up at Joe and Maureen’s house for an extended interview 
conversation. Joe and Maureen are an energetic, middle-aged couple, both of whom work 
in high school education. Their speech patterns tend to bounce off of each other, 
interrupting and talking over each other, helping each find the words to get at their 
particular points. I never feel that they are cutting each other off, but rather that they are 
finding ideas in sync. Indeed, the ways in which they have come to know each other 
deeply over time are evident in these speech patterns, as often one is able to find the 
words to describe what the other is trying to say better than the other can for him- or 
herself. I enjoy spending time with them, and I found myself looking forward to their 
interview like I would look forward to an evening dedicated to getting to know some new 
friends. 
Maureen and Joe seem relaxed as we talk, seated in their eat-in kitchen, munching 
on a light supper of sandwiches, veggies and cookies that they have provided. They are 
explaining how they think they view the Trinity differently than the other members of our 
class and church, and perhaps even Christians in general. We are finishing up our 
musings over how controversial is Joe’s statement that he thinks he is “more of a 
polytheist” when it comes to understanding God as three and one. Using this as a segue, I 
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ask, “so are you guys flexible on other doctrines too – like salvation? Do you have to 
believe in Jesus Christ to be saved?”  
“No, I’m not flexible on that,” answers Joe immediately, putting down his 
sandwich and shaking his head with a serious expression on his face. Maureen echoes 
over top of him, “no, no I’m not flexible on that – I believe you have to believe in Jesus 
Christ and that he died for our sins to be saved.” The relaxed friendliness of our 
conversation halts for a moment and the room feels tense. I have to work my way back 
into a comfortable feeling with them, asking questions about the cookies Maureen has 
baked and about how long they have lived in their home. Around this time, a screw 
actually falls out of my chair onto the floor, and Joe’s attempts to fix it provide us with a 
little breathing room. 
Their adamant insistence, at least for Maureen, it turns out, comes from a place of 
doubt, however, not conviction. Later in our conversation, distanced from this question 
about salvation both by time and the mix of other topics discussed, and with no explicit 
reference to the question of salvation in my framing, I ask them to reflect on what non-
church sources also shape how they think about God. Maureen answers,  
“well I think literature, literature effects the way I think… I read books 
where I learn something. They may be fictionalized accounts, but I learn 
something… and I see all these cultures and what they believe and you 
know, sometimes it does give me pause, you know – is this the only way?” 
 
Joe jumps in, “yeah, how could so many people be created to live a life where they don’t 
know?” as Maureen continues,  
They don’t know Jesus and does that mean they’re condemned, and you 
know, they just feel so right in their own faith, the way they were raised, 
and you know, I will say that I have to just, sometimes I think I have to 
make a conscious effort to come back and say, NO you know Jesus is the 
way, is the only way. 
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Of course, the question of Jesus as the “only way to salvation” might still have been 
hanging around in the background of their thoughts as they answered this different 
question. But when I pointed out the inconsistency between their answers, both appeared 
surprised and laughed. They paused reflectively, as their smiles and the way they shook 
their heads indicated that they had not realized the connection themselves.  
On the one hand, Maureen and Joe seem drawn to the idea that non-Christians can 
“be saved.” At times, they even find themselves feeling the dangerous feeling that 
Heaven might be open to everyone (as Maureen ponders later in our conversation, “You 
could say, well everybody’s going to a Heaven of sorts; there are just different paths.”). 
Conversely, they both feel a real need to make a “conscious” break from going down that 
particular path of belief: “I have to make a conscious effort and come back and say, no 
you know Jesus is the…only way.” Maureen feels natural inclinations – more accurately, 
dispositional inclinations inculcated into her by a lifetime of participation in particular 
ecclesial and other social practices – that compete with each other. Moving between these 
moments of competition seems to her to require a conscious affirmation of one over the 
other, a conscious affirmation that never entirely works.  
Moments of tension and slippage between different habitus provide space for 
reflection on why these tensions arise. They open up what feels natural because of a 
particular faith formation in particular cultural practices. And they create room for 
questioning some presuppositions in light of other ones held. The tension allows a 
moment wherein these different forms of bodily wisdom that find themselves in vague 
arrangements of competition and coherence can be opened up for a new way of being 
grasped. In the midst of this conversational practice that opens up these forms of bodily 
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wisdom for a pursuit of deeper understanding of them, discernment is required for 
seeking God in the midst of the confusion. New strategies of faithful action must be 
cultivated such that when the competition between habitus leads to a suppression of 
various forms of bodily wisdom in ways that undermine faithful living, a loose, 
performative integration of these habitus can instead be negotiated. 
  These tensions do not grow out of simple, enclosed sets of practices, as if a 
coherent ecclesial habitus is combating a habitus associated with reading literature or 
other sources that are not explicitly Christian. Maureen and Joe’s theological grappling is 
shaped not only by their current church affiliation, but also by their church upbringings, 
as well as by the various competing and cohering collections of habitus associated with 
their education, class, and leisure activities, for example. Indeed, both Joe and Maureen 
particularly value education – and not in a purely academic institutional sense – 
especially with regards to how they understand their faith. Having grown up in Christian 
traditions more conservative and strict than the one they have together chosen for their 
adult lives, they value thinking more broadly than the ideas they have inherited.  
At the same time, this familial heritage has shaped them with a bodily knowledge 
of the risk associated with stepping out into such broadness. Maureen experienced 
tension with her birth family when she ventured out from their form of Christianity 
(which, as I mentioned in the first chapter, she describes with a dramatic flair to her tone 
and gesturing as the kind where “God was not a friendly God. God was gonna getcha!”). 
Moving into Baptist churches which, unlike the church of her upbringing, used musical 
instruments in worship, did not condemn drinking alcohol and allowed women to be in 
positions of leadership left her family critical of her religious choices. Theological risk is 
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not purely intellectual for her. Hence her initial desire to shut down the conversation 
about salvation with a definite, over-confidently stated, awkward answer. 
And so when I ask her why she feels she needs to remind herself consciously to 
believe something that is failing to work with her growing view of the world she answers, 
“I think I’m afraid not to.” “Why?” I continue. “I think it’s because this is what I’ve 
always been taught, that the only way you’ll get to Heaven is through Jesus,” she says, 
pauses, and continues, picking up a little speed, “…and then all of a sudden if I say no, 
what if it is – what if it is only through Jesus and then I don’t go to Heaven because I’m 
saying it’s not through Jesus?” As soon as she says it, she starts laughing at herself. All 
three of us actually laugh together, and the moment relaxes us all. It is difficult to let go 
of something that one has “always been taught.”  
This question of “being taught” is an interesting one. On the one hand, as 
Maureen puts it, she was certainly taught explicitly and discursively, “Jesus Christ is the 
only way to salvation.” But on the other hand, she was “taught” this through the practices 
she engaged at her childhood church. She describes her participation in baptism rituals 
that were understood to be necessary for salvation, a close guarding of the Lord’s Supper 
table, and a general theology grounded more in God’s wrath than God’s love. In this way, 
what she was taught echoes Bourdieu’s description of habitus as having an “implicit 
pedagogy.” He writes, “One could endlessly enumerate the values given body, made 
body, by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which can instill a whole 
cosmology.” And this cosmology is made body “through injunctions as insignificant as 
‘sit up straight’ or ‘don’t hold your knife in your left hand’…”100 In this way, what 
                                                 
100 Pierre Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 69. 
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Maureen has been “taught’ through participation in various practices grips her as strongly 
– if not, more strongly – than what she was taught in more verbal, cognitive, conscious 
modes of education. 
But this power of habituation also shapes Maureen’s alternative view, the very 
one that presses on her professed belief that Jesus is “the only way to salvation.” It is 
because Maureen feels the power of what she has “always been taught” that it is difficult 
to “condemn” anyone who also “just feel[s] so right in their own faith, the way they were 
raised…” The very power that affirms her belief is the same one that undermines it, and 
this is perhaps why the language of fear characterizes her description of why she believes 
in this way. If we all feel equally sure of conflicting accounts of salvation, how can we 
know who is right? Entertaining such a thought is scary for Maureen because it impinges 
on her sense of her own eternal fate.  
In general, there is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with holding conflicting 
beliefs, or even with the inability to cohere the faith in one’s bones with the profession of 
one’s beliefs. Such conflicts might even be necessary in some situations for being able to 
participate in day-to-day life. In this particular situation, however, Maureen’s marking of 
her experience by fear and a negative understanding of doubt indicated that for her, there 
was something wrong with this incoherence. It indicated that she needed, for herself, to 
articulate some of her different forms of embodied wisdom in order to find strategies for 
faithfully living some loose, performative integration of them.   
Maureen in fact affirmed this need by explicitly connecting her experiences of 
tension around questions of salvation to her fear that she might be missing out on some of 
the aspects of faithful living. Later in the conversation Maureen admitted her concern that 
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it is her doubts, her inability to hold to a belief as firmly as she thinks she should, that 
block her ability to live her faith more fully:  
You wouldn’t believe Natalie how many times I’ve prayed that the Holy 
Spirit come into me. I don’t know that I’ve ever felt the Holy Spirit, you 
know? And I look at all these people I admire and they just seem to have it 
together and I’m thinking, is there something wrong with me, that I don’t 
have that wash over me? 
 
FBC is not a church where we pray for the Spirit to fill us very often. There are pockets 
of resistance to such charismatic versions of Christian faith, even as there are also 
pockets that promote it.101 But the vast majority of members reside between these two 
poles, exhibiting the friendly reserve common in middle to upper-middle class, 
predominantly white churches. For Maureen to frame her fear as missing out on the full 
power of the “Holy Spirit com[ing] into [her],” thus grows out of her prior, childhood 
ecclesial formation in a church that in its discursive and other practices emphasized the 
relationship between purity, certainty and faith. This formation, it seems, still holds her 
tightly even years later.  
As Maureen discloses these fears and doubts, she begins to speak more rapidly, a 
little anxiety creeping into her tone. I feel myself wanting to slip out of the ethnographic 
mode and into one of pastoral care. I instinctively drop my pencil and lean across the 
table toward her. My voice gets softer as I speak. And here is where the instability of my 
own competing and cohering habitus comes into play.  
                                                 
101 One time Pastor Frank used the word “revival” in a sermon, and I heard murmured 
complaints that he was sounding “too Pentecostal” as I walked out to my car after 
services. During particularly rousing moments of preaching, we might hear a single, 
misplaced, “Amen,” just as during a particularly rousing bout of singing, one woman out 
of an average 700 people in attendance, can be seen to raise her hands in the air. 
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I realize in the moment that I could push on Maureen’s own moment of instability 
to gain a deeper insight into what is going on. But the instability between the various 
competing and cohering habitus associated with my own ministerial role and the various 
competing and cohering habitus associated with my academic identity, not to mention the 
fact that I quite like Maureen as a friend, are confusing me. Numerous desires, 
dispositions, instincts and impulses battle each other in this moment. I want access to the 
interesting story being spun here because I think it might be helpful in my research, but I 
also want to help Maureen feel better. It is not yet clear to me if the two are in conflict 
and, worse, in the moment, while I know that I dropped my pencil and lowered my tone 
to communicate care, I am a little less clear on my motivations for such communication. 
Is this a pure desire to comfort a congregant, or am I communicating care because I know 
it will get Maureen to keep giving me the information that will help my project? Indeed, 
in the moment, it is likely both. And so I feel a twinge of guilt about the latter, and 
wonder if I should shut the whole thing down. Yet, while guilt is my dominant feeling, 
the logic of that guilt does not prevail, and so I continue the conversation. 
As we saw with Maureen, choosing consciously between my roles, or between the 
various competing, cohering and intersecting habitus constellating in this moment in a 
way that suppresses some while elevating others, does not feel like a satisfactory option. 
More significantly, choosing consciously in this way does not feel like an option that is 
faithful in the situation. Rather, both roles, and all the habitus remain in play in their own 
unstable, complex negotiation of each other. To be faithful in the moment to the duality 
of my roles, and to the desires I am experiencing, remembering that those desires are not 
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all self-serving, requires instead some loose, performative integration of the various 
competing and cohering habitus that are shaping my strategies of action in that moment.   
And so, I do not turn off my recording device. I allow my movement into a more 
explicit ministerial role to remain a part of the record. My conscious decision does not 
allow me simply to let go of the research to care for a congregant. Too many desires are 
competing here. Rather, I deploy my ministerial identity as a research tool, as I discuss in 
more detail in the next chapter. And in so doing, I also feel myself letting go of questions 
that could yield deeper insight, but which I sense might cause further pain for Maureen. 
Pastoral care becomes the mode of my inquiry. And so I begin to ask her, “Do 
you think they [these people you admire] believe without any…?” but she cuts me off 
quickly. The amount of prompting she needs is minimal. She has thought about this all 
much before: “I don’t know!! They seem to from what they say!” The anxiety building in 
her tone instinctually leads me to make mine calm. “Actually,” I share, “usually it takes a 
few questions, but most people end up here where you are in these interviews.” I wince a 
little as I realize this is not entirely true. I am overstating the case to help her feel better. 
Nevertheless, it is true that everyone I interviewed recounted doubts that they have with 
regards to orthodox Christian faith, so I emphasize this.102 Maureen remains 
unconvinced.  
What about the “ex-pastors or retired pastors” from our class, she asks. “When 
you ask them questions like this…do they have the same thoughts?” “Yes,” I respond, 
instinctively drawing my mouth into a sympathetic smile. “They do?” she asks 
                                                 
102 Indeed, whether consciously or unconsciously, I probably lead the interviews in this 
direction precisely because doing so helps us to open up the faith in our bones for a more 
conscious pursuit of wisdom. 
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incredulously, tipping her head to one side and narrowing her eyes a little. “Yeah,” I 
respond again, nodding my head slowly, but also clarifying that I am talking now more 
about “people I know training in the ministry” because I want to be careful not to disclose 
details from other interviews. “My sense is that we have the most doubts,” I share, 
because we “spend the most time thinking about it and discovering more and more of 
what [we] don’t know, and discovering that what we do know is such a small part of the 
puzzle.” I continue that I think those of us in positions of ministerial leadership and 
academic theological training tend to believe that doubt can be a productive part of faith. 
“But for some reason,” I add sadly, “people who are theologically trained think we’re the 
only ones who can handle it.” 
I present this idea that “we think we’re the only ones who can handle it” in the 
moment as something those other academics do. Afterwards, while reflecting on my 
transcription, however, I realize that I am not immune to this disposition. There are a 
whole host of tensions I experienced while teaching these Sunday night classes that I will 
discuss more fully throughout this dissertation’s more constructive chapters. And these 
tensions are marked by fear and anxiety, just like Maureen’s. For now, a couple of 
examples will suffice.  
For one, my language often faltered when I used gendered pronouns for God. 
While I use feminine language for God in my own personal and academic practice, I 
never managed to use such language comfortably with the class. Doing so felt strange, 
and every time I tried, my mouth would stutter and I would fall back on neutral or 
masculine language. Then, when I used masculine language, I always felt a twinge of 
guilt that I was betraying my own commitments in order to fit in, and I wondered if the 
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group could see my teeth clench slightly as words like “he” and “Father” slipped through 
them.  
I do not know if certain class members sensed this strain for me, but as we 
discussed gendered language for God during our engagement of feminist theologies, I felt 
a few of them open space for more expansive language. Richard shared that he 
sometimes prays to a “Mother God.” As the person in the room so many saw to be wise, 
this opened the possibility that others could do the same. Maureen and Gene both shared 
that they wanted to try praying to God in this way too, Gene noting that he wondered if 
the language of “Father” in the Lord’s Prayer was only there because Jesus was praying it 
in a “male-dominated culture.” Jerry, a gentle, soft-spoken, retired minister shared that 
his image of God has always had a female dimension to it because, as he put it, the “most 
loving figure in my childhood was my grandmother…she was the person who took time 
to sit with me and read and draw birds with me and so forth.” After articulating this point, 
Jerry started slipping female gendered pronouns into the conversation, trying them on for 
size. At first, he and we laughed as he did it, all sharing in how jarring the language 
sounded to us. But as he repeated them, in the context of the particular conversation on 
gender, they came to feel more natural. Finally on our last night, when I asked the group 
what they had learned and which ideas still lingered, Gene volunteered that he had 
continued to think about God’s gender and his own potential “idolatry” at imaging God 
only in the masculine. A few brought this same point up in interviews. 
Their willingness to play with new language helped me do the same. I joined with 
Richard to say that I also pray to a “Mother God,” and shared that I even change the 
words to hymns sometimes when we are singing them in church because I find the 
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onslaught of masculine language in those situations difficult to take. Like Jerry, I slipped 
some female gendered pronouns in for naming God in our conversation. And like Jerry, I 
did so awkwardly at first, but with growing comfort, at least within the context of the 
conversation about God’s gender. Their willingness to engage on this topic led me into 
loose, performative, always fragmented, never perfect, integrations of the various roles I 
play and the constellating habitus that give rise to my playing them. 
However, perhaps the most definitive example of me not sharing something with 
the group because “I thought they couldn’t handle it” occurred when I taught African-
American, Latin American and feminist Liberation Theologies from the 1970s and 1980s. 
In addition to being aware of my gendered body while teaching feminist theologies, I felt 
my own somewhat invisible racial difference from the group acutely in my flesh in ways 
they could not see. Perhaps because my white appearance tends to occlude the fact that I 
am bi-racial – my mother is black and my father is white – I felt particular discomfort 
presenting black theology. I did not hide my racial identity from them, but my appearance 
made it easy for them to forget my mixed racial heritage. If they had a negative response, 
I worried that I would become frustrated with them.103 But their response was wholly 
affirmative. And my own nerves around teaching what I thought would be pretty radical 
theologies for them kept me from questioning too deeply why the group seemed so 
comfortable with them.  
                                                 
103 This feeling was, in part, based on a prior experience teaching black theology to a 
group of white seminary students. This group heavily criticized the African-American 
author, and I struggled to help them read her more fairly and generously than they were. 
It never occurred to me that I should let them know I was bi-racial. When they found out 
my racial identity later in the semester, I was accused by one of intentionally hiding it 
from them. The implication of this comment, explained to me by another student, was 
that had they known my racial identity, they would not have criticized the African-
American author so freely.  
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I asked them if anything struck them as controversial about these liberation 
theologians (Cone, Gutierrez and Radford-Ruther) and Rickie responded quickly, “they 
strike me as very much of their time and place.” Gene added, “and in that sense, they are 
no more controversial than anyone else.” “When Christ said ‘I have come to give you life 
and life more abundantly’,” continued Elizabeth, “each one of these people has tried to do 
that in their own time and place. That’s part of what Jesus came for, to change this 
world.”  
On the one hand, I was pleased with their response. Perhaps my own prejudice 
cultivated in difficult, personal racially marked experiences had made me over-cautious 
with a fearful concern that the group would reject these thinkers. But on the other hand, 
their affirmation of black, Latin American and feminist theologians, each working in their 
own “time and place,” authorized our ways of seeking “life more abundant” according to 
the structures of our own “time and place.” Why question “our” homogeneity if “they” 
are happy with theirs? In a sense these theologians affirmed our informal practices of 
segregation. With hindsight, I should have taken this as a sign that further pressing was 
required, and that perhaps I should teach some more advanced theories (something 
written after the early ‘80s that might feel more disruptive to their racial status quo) in the 
second course.  
Not only did I avoid moving into more cutting edge theologies of race, gender and 
economics, however, I also never presented any Queer theologies. Indeed, I avoided 
bringing up theologies that dealt with contemporary questions about sexuality 
completely. Subsequently, in one-on-one interviews, I began admitting to those with 
whom I felt a sense of trust and friendship more of my own stances on gender and 
 97 
sexuality. In this way, I performed the exact same need for more intimate contexts in 
which to disclose matters I perceived as particularly threatening. In other words, the 
instability between my own ecclesial and academic theological roles, and the various 
competing and cohering habitus that give rise to them produced dispositions and beliefs I 
also failed to loosely integrate in this context.  
This single story thus reveals numerous tensions that exist among and between the 
overlapping habitus loosely associated with church, academy and everyday life. Each of 
us makes conscious and unconscious decisions to prioritize one habitus or social role 
over another depending on how we interpret the context in which we find ourselves. And 
based on insecurity, fear, and doubt, but also a sense of care, commitment, and fidelity, 
we take and avoid taking risks in the spaces between our competing and cohering 
habitus. Living faithfully entails trying to live in this tension in ways that make sense and 
which cohere as best they can to the multiple spheres of practice in which we find 
ourselves.  
The pursuit of wisdom enables these places of tension between our embodied 
ways of being to be brought to light, creating space for loose performative integrations of 
the aspects of our selves that make us who we are. Such performative integrations are 
“loose” because they are never wholly successful or, even, wholly failures. Each loose 
performative integration connects with the others as we perform them across time, each 
in its particular balance of success and failure contributing to the process by which we are 
made and remade as theologians.  
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Making (and Remaking…) Theologians 
As Miriam’s quotations state in the opening to this chapter, I helped those I taught 
to pick apart the rules they already knew so that they could more fully be made the 
theologians I would argue they already were, simply by asking, “what do you think?”  
But this process worked in reverse also. Those who took the classes I taught helped me to 
pick apart the rules of my primary theological discourse too. They made and remade me 
more fully into a theologian by leading me to ask myself, “Why does it matter what I 
think?” And as we have seen in this single instance of a theological conversation engaged 
here, these rules are never so simple as the rules outlined on a Frisbee.  
These rules are always alive, temporally bound, constantly in flux as they connect 
with all the other aspects of our lives that make us who we are. As much as Miriam, the 
group, and I asked each other to pick apart the rules of our discourse we all already knew, 
we also pressed each other to dig deeper, to discover the strategies for faithful action we 
did not know were buried already deep within our embodied ways of being. And as we 
sought to bring these strategies for faithful action into play, we found ourselves in 
moments of loose, performative integration of the roles and habitus that make us who we 
are.  
I have already discussed the ways in which habitus share homologous 
dispositions across different fields. For all the ways they might differ, the various 
competing and cohering habitus produced across church and academy, in particular, but 
both within the context of everyday life, bear the potential to share this disposition of 
desiring wisdom and this activity of pursuing it. And as Farley’s vision points toward the 
possibility of this disposition being cultivated and this activity being practiced in 
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communities of conversation that blur the lines between church and academy, my 
methods here can be interpreted as an attempt to perform and expand his understanding 
of wisdom’s pursuit.104 In this way, both the wisdom of everyday Christians and 
academic theologians comes together to guide us all into deeper engagement with the 
broadly historical and local traditions that make us who we are, deeper understanding of 
our personal trajectories, and contemporary commitments, and deeper awareness of the 
conflicts that arise between them all.  
There are convergences and divergences between the ways all of us who 
participated in the classes I taught live and think theologically, the goods and goals of 
these processes, and the intentions and normative moments inherent to them. Sharing in 
conversation together entails all kinds of slippage and failure, but it also can help spur 
each of us on to the pursuit of deeper wisdom within the contexts in which we find 
ourselves. It is in this mutual spurring on to the pursuit of deeper wisdom that together 
we are made and remade more fully into theologians. 
It should also be becoming clear by now that the particularity of my own 
theological identity in relation to those who took the classes I taught matters. As I 
outlined in the first chapter, while I speak discourses that could be plotted at various 
points along Tanner’s theological continuum – a continuum that she understands to be 
shaped by Christian social practices – I am also shaped by a distinct set of institutional 
academic social practices. There is this distinctly academic layer to my theological 
discourse that tends to take precedence over others. And this additional layer of academic 
                                                 
104 Farley, 131ff. 
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theological complexity in my own theological identity sets me apart from the other 
people in our class as their teacher.105 
Therefore, on the one hand, I am like any other speaker of theological discourse 
that rises out of Christian social practices. I live my faith close to my faith practices, and I 
have to negotiate the crises of those practices in light of that concretion. At the same 
time, however, like others trained in a theological institution, my theological discourses 
and instincts are very particular. I think and speak in ways that can be – and indeed 
should be – greatly abstracted from the concretion of everyday Christian social practices.  
To expand the tool kit metaphor, my workbench is teeming with gadgets that have 
such specialized functions that they seem useless for my more everyday tasks of living 
faith. In fact, the presence of so many gadgets often makes my everyday theological tasks 
feel more difficult. The appropriate tool becomes difficult to find when it is lost among 
the rubble of my over-stocked workshop area. It is therefore easy to feel alienated from 
                                                 
105 This language of being “set apart” echoes the language used for describing what it is 
that happens in ordination. In Baptist congregations, the whole community is able to vote 
on a candidate’s ordination. Because the final decision is not made by a committee or 
governing body, the theology of ordination entails the notion that a whole and particular 
congregation has raised up ‘one of their own’ to serve them as minister. The language 
and images of “raising up” and “setting apart” are used significantly in this process. 
Similar themes apply to my teaching practice at FBC (which is, of course, grounded in 
and in part authorized by my ordination there). I am “one of the community,” because I 
have also been raised out of the community and set apart by it in order to serve it with my 
teaching authority. Unlike many other Protestant denominations, people can be ordained 
in Baptist traditions without being “installed” in a church. Bi-vocational identities, like 
mine, are not uncommon. My primary work, as an academic theologian, allows me to 
maintain a role at FBC that functions as both congregant (I am not formally on staff and I 
participate in various church programs as a participant, not leader, like my Sunday school 
class) and as a minister (I lead a monthly Lord’s Supper service and I teach adult 
education classes). These levels of authority, power, and submission will be explored 
more fully in the fourth chapter. For now it is simply worth noting that the two ways in 
which I am set apart from being a congregant only at FBC – as academic theologian and 
as minister – converge in my dually constituted role of teacher. 
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living as an everyday Christian, an identity I also embody. Pursuing wisdom as we have 
seen it articulated by Farley and in the conversation between Maureen, Joe and I, 
however, requires both screwdrivers and task-specific gadgets, and the ability to use each 
in task-specific ways. It requires the types of tools helpful in a plethora of circumstances, 
as well as those for which the function is so specialized that they might only be helpful 
for the most particular of tasks. It also requires the know-how associated with each. If we 
want to avoid feeling alienated from our work, I want to argue that we need something 
like the division of labor that characterized our classroom conversations to help us.  
Despite my academic specialization, I maintain a particular role within my church 
community, one that allows me to deploy my insider status as congregant, but primarily 
as minister, in order to participate in everyday theological conversation, while also 
deploying my outsider status as an academic to share the tools and skills of my trade 
within the church walls. I therefore deploy both my insider and outsider status not simply 
to hear and report from everyday theology to academic or vice versa, as if one can be a 
source and the other a guide. Rather, I deploy this mixed status so that I can guide the 
process by which everyday and academic theological discourses can be blended together 
in the pursuit of wisdom. And then I report on those findings.  
While these methods might initially raise hackles of concern about objectivity and 
non-interference, they do also grow out of a trajectory in Reflexive Ethnography that 
authorizes them. In the next chapter, I continue to expand our understanding of the 
concept habitus – with both its objective and subjective modes of knowing – as an 
authorizing discourse for my particular mode of ethnographic theology. In so doing I 
build on the moments of slippage and instability among and between the competing and 
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cohering habitus associated with my ecclesial and academic roles – like the moment we 
witnessed above in my conversation with Maureen. And I do so in order to begin to 
outline a theology that arises not only from Christian social practices, but also from the 
multiple practices associated with the intersecting spheres of church and academy as both 
are situated within the practices of everyday life. 
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Someone could come along with a powerful sermon and they’d be like, ‘oof, wow!’ They 
weren’t rootless, but they had been removed from their roots. 
 
I think the crisis brought a strong emphasis on doctrine…Institutions began to 
grow…academia began to establish itself again. 
 
Peter, First Baptist Church Member 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
THEOLOGICAL PRACTICES OF TEACHING 
 
In the last chapter, I used the concept of habitus as a theoretical descriptor for 
negotiating the complex relationships between practices, identity, activity and discourse. 
In particular, I have outlined a specific habitus of pursuing wisdom as a topic of inquiry. 
In this chapter, I turn to an entirely different use of habitus: the way in which it can be 
used not only to describe and analyze a topic of inquiry, but also how it can be deployed 
as a tool in ethnographic research settings. I have already established that the pursuit of 
wisdom entails an ongoing process of loose, performative integrations – to varying 
degrees of success and failure – of the numerous competing and cohering habitus and 
roles that make us who we are. In addition, I have established that this pursuit of wisdom 
loosely integrates the theologies rising from the various competing and cohering habitus 
rising from Christian social practices. Here we explore more fully how it can also loosely 
integrate into such performances the competing and cohering habitus associated with 
another distinct set of institutionally defined academic theological practices.  
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Given that my own theological identity is comprised of this latter type of 
formation – both in church and academy, and the broader social practices within which 
each is situated – this chapter explores how this particular configuration of a habitus that 
pursues wisdom can be deployed as a tool for self-implicated theological ethnographic 
research. Here, my way of deploying this tool is, as we have seen throughout these pages, 
in the mode of teaching adult education classes in the context of my own church. 
Teaching the adult-education classes that comprised my theological ethnographic 
fieldwork, I pursued the wisdom of a loose, performative integration of my own 
numerous competing and cohering habitus and the competing and cohering ministerial 
and academic roles to which they gave rise. And I depended on my conversation partners 
to help me do so, just as I endeavored to help them perform similar loose integrations of 
their own competing and cohering habitus. In this way, our shared conversation became 
the practice by which we all pursued together the wisdom of the faith that was already in 
our bones. Moreover, this conversation entailed something like a division of labor, with 
different types of theological speakers employing different sets of skills – or, using Ann 
Swidler’s language, different kinds of tool-kits. 
I begin this chapter by grounding my distinct self-implicating method as a 
complementary alternative to Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s theological ethnographic 
work. I do this because I interpret Fulkerson’s ethnographic theology as one, but not the 
only, method by which we can probe the gesture Tanner makes toward concrete Christian 
practices in her proposal for understanding the relationship between everyday and 
academic theologies. In order to figure out what an alternative method might require, I 
engage the ways in which the people who took the classes I taught thought that an 
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academically trained theologian should engage with their own theological practices and 
discourses. Their implicit requests return me to the question of what it is I have to offer 
them.  
In order to develop these offerings, I expand Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus 
as a topic for inquiry by engaging the work of his student, Loïc Wacquant. Here I argue 
for this distinct theological ethnographic method growing out of my own various 
competing and cohering habitus that give rise to my own particular ministerial and 
academic roles. Shaped by both Christian and academic social practices, I argue that my 
dual formation in both a particular ecclesial location and in an academic institution 
enables me to deploy these habitus and roles together in a loose performative integration 
of a teaching practice as a research tool. In so arguing, I demonstrate how the Sunday 
night classes I taught in my church comprised the particular theological ethnographic 
method of this dissertation. 
 
A Role for Ethnography in Theological Reflection 
Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s work has been marked by, among other things, a 
continual turning to deeper and more careful attention to descriptive analysis of social 
and religious practices over the course of her career.106 All these modes of descriptive 
attention come together in her most recent work, Places of Redemption. Therein she 
                                                 
106 For example, her dissertation (Ecclesial Tradition and Social Praxis: A Study in 
Theological Method, Vanderbilt University, 1986) engages theories of praxis, without 
engaging practice itself. Her next major work (Changing the Subject: Women’s 
Discourses and Feminist Theology (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001)) engages 
ethnographies of practice as case studies or examples for a larger theological argument. 
Her most recent work (Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007)) comprises a larger, single ethnographic project 
paired with theological reflection. 
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describes how she trained as an ethnographer because she desired, as I mentioned in the 
first chapter, to see “the fascinating grain of the ordinary” in order to “bring something 
fresh to theological reflection on ordinary Christian community.”107 Fulkerson’s 
ethnographic project is therefore theological through and through, as mine also endeavors 
to be. Averring that “theological reflection is not something brought in after a situation 
has been described,” she notes that theology is in fact “a sensibility that initiates the 
inquiry at the outset.”108  
This thread of theological conviction that runs through Fulkerson’s ethnographic 
work thus involves interpreting the church she studies – Good Samaritan Church – 
according to the language of redemption. This does not mean that she ‘sees God’ in 
anything her own worldview encounters as positive within Good Samaritan’s communal 
practices, however.109 Rather, it means that she looks for the places where the community 
professes to be and seems to be “sustained by God.”110 Similar to how I seek to describe 
both the successes and failures of wisdom’s pursuit, Fulkerson takes seriously both the 
successes and failures of the church she studies. She recognizes moments of coherence 
                                                 
107 Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3. 
108 Ibid, 13. See Clodovis Boff, Theology and Praxis: Epistemological Foundations 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987) for an alternative to this approach. Boff argues that theological 
inquiry must be maintained as a distinct, second stage after ethnographic description is 
completed. For Boff, the mixing of the two leads to an ideological taint. 
109 Indeed, this is a common mistake perpetrated by theologians attempting to bring 
together descriptive and normative claims. Adams and Elliot, for example, link God’s 
action so inextricably with moments when the powerless are vindicated from the 
oppression of the powerful that they are forced to admit that they “do not yet have a 
strong enough hold on this idea [i.e. ethnography as dogmatics] to show how it might 
work out in situations of radical failure” (pg. 360). See Nicholas Adams and Charles 
Elliot, “Ethnography is Dogmatics: Making Description Central to Systematic 
Theology,” in Scottish Journal of Theology, 53 No. 3 (2000), 339-364. 
110 Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, 22. 
 107 
and slippage between the practices, discourses and, indeed, habitus of the church 
members whom she studies. Seeking redemption in the midst of broken practices, she 
therefore resists “letting the claims about the transcendent falsify the density of the 
worldly wounds.”111  
 In the first chapter, I argued that Tanner stops short of providing academic 
theologians with a method by which we can hear the concrete wisdom of everyday 
theologies at work. Fulkerson makes an important advance down that road. Agreeing 
with Tanner that, “theological reflection arises in an organic way out of Christian life in 
order to address real life problems,” Fulkerson first interprets everyday theologies to be 
reflecting on the meaning of their own practices and, second, she studies those everyday 
theologies using ethnographic methods.112 In so doing, ethnography enables her to 
perform the tasks that Tanner ascribes to the academic theologian of reflecting on, 
systematizing and even answering some of the questions and problems produced in the 
everyday theological location. Whereas Tanner’s method stops short of providing 
academic theologians with the tools and method required for engaging everyday 
theologies, Fulkerson locates that tool in the methods of ethnography.  
Using the concept, habitus, Fulkerson interprets the congregants at Good 
Samaritan as “socially informed bod[ies],” who are both shaped by practices and shaping 
those same practices in which they share. She seeks not only to describe these practices, 
however, but also to evaluate them. “In sum,” Fulkerson notes, “the ‘understanding’ of 
habitus is, first a competence, one that is productive and creative.” It is, in essence, a type 
of “‘everyday’ knowledge” that has the “capacity to respond improvisationally to a 
                                                 
111 Ibid, 22. 
112 Ibid, 233. Here Fulkerson explicitly references and cites Tanner’s work.  
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situation” and to “do or say something well for a circumstance.”113 In a way that 
resonates with how I have outlined the habitus of pursuing wisdom, Fulkerson evaluates 
this competence according to some loose, performative integration of competing and 
cohering habitus.  
For example, Fulkerson’s study reveals that the members at Good Samaritan 
Church place values of multi-culturalism and racial reconciliation as central to their 
understanding of their church’s identity. In order to evaluate these claims, Fulkerson 
endeavors to understand what precisely the church members mean by these concepts. 
And then she evaluates their practices according to their own criteria before bringing in 
more wider reaching modes of analysis. She finds that congregants do raise up leaders 
from multiple races, but that there remain some implicit limits on what types of 
difference the community is able to incorporate.  
Subsequently, these tensions between what the congregants say they do, what 
they want to do, and what they actually do become the growing edges from which 
Fulkerson sees the possibility for performing ecclesial and other practices of multi-
culturalism and racial reconciliation in more faithful ways. As a result, the reader is able 
to envision the texture of the concrete place that has given rise to a community’s 
everyday theology and Fulkerson’s academic theology. The insights that Fulkerson has 
for contributing to the ongoing shaping of Christian practice – for example, advice on 
how to improve programs of racial reconciliation – thus incorporate the concrete wisdom 
of the everyday theologies that have already tackled the problems and questions rising 
from that practice. Moreover, by bringing academic theology to bear on a particular 
                                                 
113 Ibid, 47-48. Italics Fulkerson’s. 
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problem in Christian social practice, like racial reconciliation, Fulkerson’s insights are 
potentially able to shape similar practices related to this problem far beyond the particular 
context in which her study took place. 
 In addition to arguing in the first chapter that Tanner does not offer a method for 
how to engage everyday theologies, I also argued that she stops short of outlining how 
everyday Christians can hear the concrete wisdom that rises out of distinctly academic 
theological practices. Fulkerson offers some insight here as well. First, at the local level, 
even though she never states it as an explicit goal of her work, the questions she asked in 
her interviews likely helped the particular everyday Christians of her study engage deeper 
reflection on their own practices.114 On a more broad-ranging level, her formally 
developed constructive theological work was subsequently available in the book she 
published. As Fulkerson notes, when academic theology intervenes in everyday theology, 
it seeks to “normatively assess a situation for purposes of transcending that situation.”115 
Texts are produced primarily not for the local community that was studied, but so that 
others can learn from that local community. Moreover, while everyday Christians might 
engage Fulkerson’s text, the primary audience who can learn from the community is an 
                                                 
114 It is a common occurrence for research subjects to express having learned something 
about themselves from participating in ethnographic interviews. Such occurrences 
actually found the epistemological dimensions of both feminist and action-research 
ethnographic methods. See Virginia Oleson, “Early Millennial Feminist Qualitative 
Research,” in SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzin & 
Yvonne Lincoln (Sage Publications, 2005) and Ernest T. Stringer, Action Research 3rd ed. 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007). For more on the relationship between 
Action-based research and theology, see Helen Cameron et al., Talking About God in 
Practice: Theological Action Research and Practical Theology (SCM Press, 2010). 
115 Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, 233. 
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academic theological audience as, I would argue in agreement with Fulkerson, it should 
be.116  
As an alternative to Fulkerson’s method, one that seeks to complement it, not 
critique it, I endeavor here to cultivate a particular self-implicated mode of ethnography. 
In a sense, this self-implicated ethnography places the local ecclesial goods I imagine 
occurred in Fulkerson’s ethnographic interviews at the center of this project’s goals by 
guiding processes of everyday theological reflections through a conversational teaching 
practice. And I structure my alternative method in this way in part because I have learned 
through my ministerial role that this is one of the things everyday Christians want 
academic theologians to do with them.  
 
From Frontier to Institutional Theologies 
 As I noted in the first chapter, while it is a very helpful tool for analyzing our 
classroom conversations, Tanner’s theological continuum nevertheless tends to elevate 
academic over everyday theology by treating theological processes as a movement from 
the latter to the former. As I endeavor to articulate the movement from academic to 
everyday – as itself a simultaneous type of progression or good – I want to make sure that 
the non-academic voices from our classroom conversations also have a stake here in 
framing what a theological conversation that rises out of ecclesial, academic and 
everyday practices should look like. As academic theologians, we often ask one other 
how we should connect our work with the church’s. In so doing, we often overlook the 
                                                 
116 In this regard, it should also be noted that students of ministry, as part of that 
academic audience, will also read the text and, therefore, the text would be able also to 
effect Christian social practices through the insights that those students pick up from it. 
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fact that many people in the pews actually have some suggestions for us. In this section 
we see a desire from church members that academic theologians be present within the 
local communities they seek to serve, implicated in their practices and responding to their 
crises on the ground in practice. What they wanted was, therefore, not dissimilar from 
Tanner’s description of the academic theologian should do. The difference, however, was 
that the people I interviewed wanted academic theologians to enact this process through a 
genuine conversation with them. They wanted the academic theologian to be a part of 
their community, guiding its processes from within. And it is this desire that directs my 
method of guiding the construction of communal, conversational theologies from my own 
implication in such a place. 
 In all of the interviews I conducted after the “Jesus Christ and Salvation” class, I 
would describe my dissertation project loosely as an exploration of the relationship 
between theologies created in the church, or by non-academics, and theologies created in 
the academy.117 I would then ask some variation on the questions, “How do you think 
theologies created by people in church should interact with academic theologies?” or “Do 
you have any advice for me on this topic?” Everyone of whom I asked this question 
agreed that academic theology had an important role to play for the church. But no one 
thought that their everyday theologies should be treated as a source that academic 
                                                 
117 It is difficult to know whether or not their answers would have been the same had I 
asked my question before I taught one of the classes. Surely, having just participated in a 
process class that an academic theologian taught in the church impacted their view of 
what an academic theologian should do in the church. Even so, the fact that they support 
their points with narratives and histories that are distinct from the class indicates that their 
desires rise from a broader spectrum of practice than only that class. Furthermore, I began 
teaching at FBC not because I decided to initiate the practice myself, but because a 
congregant requested it. As she explained it, she figured if the congregation had a 
theologian in it, they should see if they could put that theologian to work. 
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theologians should systematize or even from which they should abstract in order to 
reflect on it. And, interestingly, no one answered that academic theology could provide 
them with the “right answers” to questions they might have about belief and truth.  
Rather, three key interconnected themes emerged during these discussions: 1) 
those who are trained in academic theology should help everyone else guard against 
being manipulated by what I came to think of as fast-talkers in times of crisis or hustlers 
with agendas because 2) academic theologians can help everyday Christians interpret the 
structures of what we all as Christians believe and why we believe it, thus helping us dig 
deeper into our faith and, in so doing 3) academic theologians do – or should – help us all 
to live better. Each of these themes is dependent upon the theologies that rise out of 
church, academy and everyday life working together in a larger project of faithful living. 
No one functions fully without the other. Each spends time apart and time together, doing 
theology in its own mode and then piecing their pieces back together, only to separate out 
again, like an unending dance.  
 These three themes, echoed by quite a few of the people I interviewed, come 
together nicely in a story Peter told me about frontier times. Peter began his career as a 
Baptist minister. He then worked for the Southern Baptist Sunday School Board – now, 
Lifeway Christian Resources – on “family and marriage enrichment” curricula. Peter 
describes the foundation of the resources he created being the notion of “marriage as a 
partnership between equals.” Thus, with the conservative resurgence that happened in the 
Southern Baptist Convention, which I will discuss more fully in the next chapter, he 
began to receive numerous complaints over his work, eventually leading to his need to 
leave his job. “My snide comment is,” he noted, “once you decide that man is the head 
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and the woman is submissive, there really isn’t that much to do after that.” And so his 
department was dissolved, and Peter finished his career as a pastoral counselor in various 
settings.  
Peter’s theological identity is thus complexly hybrid if we were to map it 
according to Tanner’s theological continuum. He has an M.Div that he gained for the 
purposes of practicing ministry, but he is not shaped by the distinct practices associated 
with a vocation in the theological academy. He negotiates various Christian roles, such as 
former-minister, former-pastoral counselor, and now, by practice, lay-person. But he does 
not negotiate the role of academic theologian. Versions of his type of complex 
theological identity are not uncommon in ecclesial life in general and, in particular, are 
especially not uncommon at FBC, as we have many retired ministers as members, as well 
as many current and former employees of Lifeway Christian Resources and other SBC 
institutions. Peter thus reveals the complex textures of practice and identity that give rise 
to the theological discourses that rise from church and everyday life. 
One afternoon, I visited Peter in his home. He seems to get a kick out of referring 
to his bright, efficient, airy digs – complete with granite kitchen counter-tops, a walk-out 
deck and a sprawling backyard, hardwood floors and full sized, beautiful windows – as “a 
basement apartment in my son’s house.” His adult son and daughter-in-law, who both 
live upstairs, built the apartment for Peter and his wife to move to after they retired. After 
a brief tour of the space, we settle into an efficiently organized office that Peter refers to 
as his “man cave,” the room in which he conducts his study both for fun and for what he 
describes as “a desire to never stop learning.” The darkest room in the home, the space 
does have a masculine feel with its large, dark leather chairs. Books are the chief mode of 
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décor in the room, and Peter gestures to them often while telling stories, even sometimes 
getting out of his seat so that he can pull one from the shelf to make a point. These books 
are primarily theological in theme, but also historical. He has books written by popular 
theologians and books written by academic theologians for a popular audience, as well as 
books that are more narrowly academic in nature, left over, probably, from his formal 
theological studies. There are some novels as well, and texts related to one of his hobbies 
of tracing his family genealogy. 
The way Peter tells the story of the theologies rising out of church, academy and 
everyday life is as a narrative back and forth between what he calls frontier and 
institutional theologies. As America expanded west, he tells me, frontier Christians left 
institutional, academic theologians behind on the east coast. And, he notes, “Having left 
academia, they evolved a kind of cultural, adaptive theology of their own…They didn’t 
worry about ‘theoretical stuff’ or doctrine.” In a sense, academic theology was not 
welcome on the frontier. It did not know how to fit in there. And so there was a real, 
tangible, geographical divide between frontier and institutional theology for a while. 
This divide was not a problem at first, however, according to Peter. The academic 
theologians were happy, “cloistered away in their ivory towers” to think about God, and 
the frontier Christians ticked along just fine with their contextual, everyday ways of 
negotiating faith.118 Indeed, we can imagine that separated out in this way, the theologies 
                                                 
118 A few times, now, when Peter has asked me to describe my dissertation to him, we 
reach a point in the conversation where he says, “So you’re taking theology out of the 
ivory tower!” “Ivory tower” is a phrase he finds helpful and uses often. The first time he 
asked me this question, I responded, “Yeah, I guess so.” Each subsequent questioning has 
made me rethink my position a little more, until one day I answered, here in a paraphrase 
because I was not recording this conversation, “Yeah, but also no. I want it to come out, 
but then it needs to go back in, and come out again, and go back in. I want it to interact 
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produced by the frontier Christians were as grounded in and shaped by their frontier 
practices as the academic theologians’ theologies were grounded in and shaped by their 
academic practices. But then, Peter continued, “different movements began to stir and the 
people were not prepared to discern…they just went with their guts – what seemed to be 
right to them.” Slapping his knee to punctuate his story’s end, “someone could come 
along with a powerful sermon and they’d be like, ‘oof, wow!’,” meaning that they were 
easily swayed by anyone with a good story. “They weren’t rootless,” he continued, 
leaning forward in his chair, “but they had been removed from their roots.” In other 
words, the further they moved away from their association with academic theology as a 
resource, the easier it was for them to be swayed by preachers with emotionally moving 
stories.  
For Peter, when our theology is immediately adaptive to its cultural context, in 
close proximity to the practices that shape it, and with little critical distance on those 
same practices, it also lacks the critical distance to resist a seductive line of thinking that 
can lead into lived error. That is, everyday theology works fine until crisis erupts. Peter’s 
description resonates well with the way I have described the habitus of pursuing wisdom. 
When just going “with their guts” ceased to work for them, the frontier Christians needed 
to develop skills of discernment to think carefully through the faith that was in their 
bones. And this is where the academic theologians found their way back in to help.  
                                                                                                                                                 
with the world outside, but it always needs to go back inside if it is to keep training in the 
gifts of the academy to offer them to the world.” With each subsequent answer, his smile 
has faded a little. With this last one, he clasped his chin in his hand, a look of 
disappointment tinged with curiosity fluttered across his expression, and he simply said, 
“Hmpf.” 
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While Peter’s story outlined that academic theologians could be helpful in this 
way, he nevertheless ended up emphasizing another aspect to the narrative. “I think the 
crisis brought a strong emphasis on doctrine…Institutions began to grow…academia 
began to establish itself again,” he added. With that, he shrugged his shoulders, gave a 
little knowing pout, and sat back in his chair. Story over. On the one hand, then, yes 
academics can be helpful in times of crisis, helping people think through what they really 
believe and want to believe. But on the other hand, times of crisis produce the conditions 
that enable academic theology to flourish. Peter is, of course, making a historical claim 
that may or not be accurate. My interest is in how this claim is situated within his own 
narrative understanding of how academy, church and everyday life relate, and what that 
tells academic theologians about what the church might ask of them. According to Peter’s 
narrative, academic theologians did not find a home on the frontier until the frontier had 
made room for their presence, until they could find a way to fit in and perform their 
particular role. In this way, everyday Christians might need academic theologians in 
crisis about the same amount that academic theologians need them to have those crises.  
Resonating with Tanner’s insightful and honest arguments that academic 
theologians do and must care about the perpetuation of their own discipline, then, Peter 
thus affirmed this idea that the church needs the academy to hold onto the roots of the 
faith for the sake of the faith. But he also reminds us – to extend the tree metaphor – that 
roots require ever-budding leaves to live. As academic theologians, we rely on the faith’s 
continued everyday practice for the very exercise of academic theology. Peter thus 
corrects the more uni-directional analytic focus in Tanner’s method from everyday to 
academic theology by adding the reverse direction: from institutional to frontier and back 
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again. And again. And again. Somewhere between the roots of the faith and the life of the 
faith seems to be, for Peter, where the growth happens. And I tend to agree: pursuing 
wisdom begins with embodied awareness of the faith in our bones, and progresses 
through disciplined study of other ways that faith has been embodied through space and 
time.  
Because we hold the roots of our traditions – both historical and contemporary –
academic theologians also have the ability to help everyday theologians understand the 
ever-expanding root-structures that give rise to their beliefs and practices. Like Peter, 
Rickie made this point explicitly. For Rickie, diving into this “more systematic study of 
trying to say: what is God, what is salvation?” guides our maturation as Christians. We 
make not only historical connections, but also contemporary constructive connections 
between aspects of the faith already in our bones, and between our own faith and the faith 
of other everyday Christians. 
I had the opportunity to explore this idea further with another class member, Ann. 
One evening I met Ann at the hospice care center where her husband was living. We 
spent some time with him, feeding him and participating in the delusional conversations 
that had become his chief mode of communication. The fact that on this night these 
conversations were marked by his joyful demeanor, rather than the sense of fear and 
panic that equally often characterized his narratives, set a peaceful tone for the rest of my 
and Ann’s evening together. After her husband’s dinner, Ann and I ventured down to a 
local Indian restaurant.  
Not having tried Indian food in her seven decades of life, Ann described her tastes 
and I attempted to order a meal that we could both enjoy. She would laugh uproariously 
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as she tried to figure out which colors in the food bore more spice: “What are you trying 
to do to me, Natalie?!” she exclaimed more than once. No matter how many times I said, 
“the colors are just colors. Just because green is spicy in the sauces, doesn’t mean it’s 
spicy in the spinach!” she kept searching for the underlying color to heat ratio scheme. 
Her laughter was so contagious that our young waiter began to flirt playfully with her 
whenever he was at the table, suggesting she should take some time and go to India with 
him. When I ribbed her about the waiter’s playful advances, she responded, laughing with 
wild abandon again, “Oh Natalie, he can do that. I’m old. I’m no threat!” She had me in 
stitches laughing most of the night, and at some point in our hours together, I asked her 
this question about the relationship between everyday and academic theologies.  
For Ann, the practice of “evaluat[ing] what your beliefs are, what undergirds 
them” gives us a depth to our faith that, again, stops us from being swayed by 
“conceited” and “prejudiced” preachers who are trying to impose their own self-
interested agenda on others.119 “I think that people in the churches I’ve been in are scared 
of the word ‘theology’,” she noted, “but they’re not scared of the word, ‘doctrine.’ I think 
that’s one reason why people who want to indoctrinate find ripe fields for indoctrinating 
people.” Her implication is that academic theologians need to help people in churches be 
less afraid of theology, otherwise they might be swayed by anyone who tells the lie, as 
she put it, that “you have to believe this, this, this and this or you aren’t a Christian.” Ann 
thus offered an expansion on Peter’s point that the academic theologian helps the person 
in church to avoid being pulled away from his faith. The academic theologian also keeps 
                                                 
119 Ann had a specific contemporary preacher from the Religious Right here. Describing 
his rise in politics and religion she noted, “Oh I never got so sick!  Turned my stomach he 
was the most conceited…[flustered by the memory, she is speaking rapidly with anger in 
her tone] He was supposed to speak on the family. All he spoke on was [himself].” 
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the conceited, self-interested religious leaders who have agendas from tricking Christians 
into thinking they have moved out of the circle of faith when they really have not. The 
academic theologian helps Christians see a broader understanding of their own, personal 
theology. 
 A few days after my interview with Ann, I was scheduled to meet with another 
class member, Joan, who will be introduced more fully in the next chapter, and her 
husband Harlan. Joan and Harlan worked for years together in ministry in Manhattan, but 
they retired to a condo in Nashville to be closer to their children and grandchildren. They 
invited me to their home for the interview. Ann and Joan are friends, so Ann had given 
Joan the scoop on what kinds of questions I would be asking. I teased Joan affectionately 
for trying to “cheat at something that wasn’t a quiz.” 
Like Ann, Joan also expressed the idea that theology does not only transform 
belief and practice, but that it helps us more deeply affirm what we know to be true, both 
for ourselves and as a guard against manipulation by others. Here she made explicit 
reference to one of the topics of discussion in the “Jesus and Salvation” class, noting that 
our conversations about sanctification did not change her beliefs, but rather helped her to 
understand more fully why she believed them. But a deepened understanding, she 
indicated, must also always then connect what we believe more deeply with what we do. 
She noted passionately, punctuating important words by drawing them out slowly, “I 
think that many in our church are interested in and involved in acting out their 
theology…To me that is theology – not talking theology, but acting theology!” To this 
Harlan added, “Yes, I think the theology term gets used when we might better speak of an 
enfleshment of our belief.”  
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Joan and Harlan thus bring us full circle, but with a much deeper understanding of 
what our original position entailed. Yes, academic theologians can help people in 
churches avoid manipulation, respond to crises, understand why they believe what they 
believe, and more reflectively affirm the beliefs they have. But at the same time, their 
work does and should simultaneously help guide the practices with which those beliefs 
are linked. As Joan and Harlan rightly point out, reflection and enfleshment are 
intimately linked. Thinking leads to doing leads to thinking leads to doing and so on. In 
this way, Joan and Harlan capture the spirit of the habitus of pursuing wisdom that I have 
used to describe our shared practices of theological conversation. And Peter, Ann, Joan 
and Harlan together provide a rich and complex image of what should happen in those 
conversations that both resonates with, but also tweaks what Tanner proposes by insisting 
on its location in the ecclesial sphere.  
As might be expected, no one in these interviews responded that academic 
theologians should write texts for lay people to read, or even that we should train 
ministers well in seminary, or write texts that ministers could read and then incorporate 
into their preaching and teaching. Quite a few of them do actually read such texts, so I am 
not negating the importance of them for everyday Christians. People in the classes I 
taught cited academic theologians, church historians and Biblical scholars they had read 
from Barth and Bonhoeffer to Karen Armstrong, Marcus Borg and Amy-Jill Levine (the 
latter being a particular hometown favorite in Nashville). More to the point, our creation 
of such texts enables academic theologians to continue our particular conversation with 
each other, as well as to contribute to the formation of ministers, thus impacting 
congregational life but, still, in a somewhat muted way. Even so, the overwhelming 
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response I got from people I interviewed was that the good that academic theologians 
could offer to local churches involved participating in those local churches directly. 
Whether they did this by providing direct instruction in local churches, or simply 
participating in ongoing interpersonal conversations with everyday Christians seemed to 
matter less than the fact that they do it in an intentional, sustained way.  
What is challenging about this conclusion is that it calls academic and everyday 
theologians into a joint venture whose success cannot be determined by either party 
alone. I am not saying that this is a venture in which all academic theologians should 
engage, although it is also a practice that many of us do engage, both within our own 
communities of worship, and as guest lecturers, preachers and teachers in communities 
that are not intimately our own. Therefore, I name it as one site from which the academic 
theologian already working in both church and academy can serve both. The classroom in 
and from which I did such work implicated not just my research partners, but also me. It 
is the place in which we all together became my research subject. My own experience of 
being implicated in this way is, in fact, the seed of my theological ethnographic method. 
Let me explain what I mean by this. 
 
From Participant Observation to Participant Objectification 
Just as it became clear in the last chapter that there is a particular complexity to 
my own mode of theological discourse in relation to that of those who took the classes I 
taught, it should also be clear by now that my own ethnographic fieldwork is also quite a 
bit messier than the practices we might typically associate with participant observation. 
My involvement in the community of study – my own church community – is not limited 
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to observation. Not only am I a member, I am also ordained by them. I have a 
responsibility to teach, preach and lead worship. Indeed, our classroom demarcated a 
place in which I imparted new ideas and sought to cultivate new practices in the very 
people who were simultaneously my research partners. In the following sections I unpack 
the ethnographic theory that authorizes the moves by which I am implicated in my field 
of study and guides my deployment of these moves as research tools. 
Bourdieu criticizes ethnographers who “in taking up a point of view on the action, 
withdraw from it in order to observe it from above and from a distance,” because they 
mistake multiple, dynamic, and inter-related, temporally embedded practices for a single, 
static “object of observation and analysis.”120 This is, for Bourdieu, a matter of the 
epistemological problems inherent to participant observation. The observer, he argues, 
experiences not only an epistemological break from the object of observation, but also a 
social one. She enters her field of study governed by a scientific or academic habitus, not 
the habitus of the field studied. And she therefore lacks the practical wisdom – the 
embodied, tacit knowledge, and shared tool-kit – inculcated in those she studies because 
she does not belong to their class or group.121 Indeed, even if she were a member of that 
group, she would not seek the loose performative integration of competing and cohering 
habitus that I am seeking here, but instead, according to Bourdieu’s scheme, she would 
need to hierarchize her scientific habitus over her habitus of belonging.  
Indeed, for an ethnographer to imagine herself as participant entails an 
unconscious, strategic forgetting of the conditions of her own scientific habitus, 
                                                 
120 Bourdieu, Outline, 2. We should hear here the underpinnings of Tanner’s and my 
ongoing critique of postliberal attempts to do second order reflection on supposedly first 
order events. 
121 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 33. 
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according to Bourdieu. But this is a problem because doing so leads her to mistake the 
occasional mimicking of actions performed in the community of study for the practical, 
bodily understanding gained from years of participating in them. For Bourdieu, the 
solution to this problem is not membership or the prioritization of a membership habitus. 
It is, instead, the reflexive reaffirmation of the scientific habitus, through an explicit 
accounting for the habitus that is being studied. Instead of participant observation, he 
argues, the ethnographer must perform a participant objectification that brings to detailed 
light the conditions that created the particular forms of practical knowledge, thus 
accounting for the practical wisdom the ethnographer lacks.122 
Bourdieu thus takes seriously the effects that an ethnographic approach has on 
what it produces as its object of study as he accounts for the tempo of practices, the role 
of the ethnographer, and the open-endedness of the relationship between “objective 
structures” and the practicing agents. The ethnographic field is not, for him, something to 
be mined for information. Rather, it is a field of cultural production in which the 
ethnographer participates by taking strategic account of her own particular relationship to 
it. Despite the differences between his hierarchical ordering of habitus and my proposal 
for a loose, performative integration of habitus, this image of the field of cultural 
production within which the ethnographer participates is where his method opens up for 
my purposes.  
                                                 
122 See especially, Bourdieu, Outline, ch. 1. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that 
Bourdieu holds so firmly to the epistemological implications of his method that even 
when he studies a community to which he does belong – the academic community – his 
focus is still on intellectually recreating the cultural conditions that give rise to academic 
identities and practices in order to isolate the problems inherent to them, rather than on 
deploying his own academic identity to bring correction to those problems at the level of 
the practices themselves. See Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
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For Bourdieu, the ethnographer participates as a cultural producer in this field of 
cultural production with her scientific habitus only. Her cultural product is limited to the 
texts she creates, and not to the impact she might have on the actual community of study. 
But what if, like me, she was inculcated with both the scientific habitus and the habitus 
of group membership, and what if, like me, she sought their loose performative 
integration rather than their hierarchization? The particular cultural conditions that need 
to be intellectually re-created would shift. Some reflection would be certainly required on 
the competing and cohering habitus associated with my ecclesial and academic roles. 
Otherwise, my narration of the experiences associated with each could lapse into 
solipsistic autobiography. But more so, it is the habitus of pursuing wisdom – a 
performative, loose integration of various other competing and cohering habitus – in 
which all the class members, including me, shared that needs to be objectified. As 
Bourdieu’s student, Loïc Wacquant, exploits this same moment in Bourdieu’s theory in 
ways that have import for my project here, we now turn to an analysis of his methods. 
 
From Participant Objectification to Objectified Participation 
Radicalizing Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus, Wacquant seeks to play with this 
notion of the sociologist’s membership into his or her community of study. Wacquant 
focuses his attention on a boxing gym in order to study the Chicago ghetto in which it is 
located. And to study the gym, he trains in it as a boxer, constructing a pugilistic habitus 
in his own body. This habitus, inscribed into his flesh by a disciplinary training regime, is 
beaten down deep into his strong, sore muscles and aching, stiff joints, buried into the 
muscle memory of himself as combatant. In his study, then, Wacquant does not shift the 
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conceptual meaning of the habitus. It is still the site, inscribed onto the body, at which a 
set of cultural practices and an agent meet and mutually shape each other. It is also the 
product and producer of practical, embodied wisdom. What Wacquant does shift, 
however, is the relationship between the ethnographer and the habitus of study. Rather 
than intellectually reconstructing the cultural conditions of the habitus of others, 
Wacquant submits himself to a set of cultural practices to form his own self as bearing 
the habitus of study; that is, he seeks to be possessed by, but also to possess the tools 
associated with, both the objective and subjective modes of a particular practical wisdom. 
A brief exposition of how Wacquant embeds this knowledge into his body helps 
clarify his method while pointing toward my own. Describing his training, Wacquant 
recounts the need to “repeat the same exercises to the saturation point,” to perform them 
“like a robot.”123 He describes them as becoming the type of instinctual second nature 
that Bourdieu writes about. No longer thinking consciously through how to form and land 
a punch, he strikes automatically. This improvisational competency reveals how 
Wacquant is more than a participant observer. As what we might instead call a participant 
objectifier, he is constructing his object of study out of his own flesh and studying the 
process by which that flesh is made boxer.  
Wacquant describes this process as pleasurable. And the more deeply his instincts 
are honed, the more deeply he feels the pleasure: “I feel great and my punches are 
landing right on target…Their snapping fills me with joy and whips up my energy.”124 
Even when the moves cause pain – “this is killing me! I can’t feel my right wrist or 
                                                 
123 Loïc Wacquant, Body and Soul: Notes of an Apprentice Boxer (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 60, 65. 
124 Ibid, 64. 
 126 
shoulders anymore” – he continues to perform them until the “right sound against the 
mitt” fills him with the motivating desire to move through the pain and “hit harder next 
time.”125 The “right” performance of the action – meaning competently improvisational, 
not strictly copied – produces pleasure. This pleasure produces more desire to continue 
with additional right, competently improvisational, performances so that more pleasure 
can be produced. And so the cycle continues again and again, as Wacquant pursues 
developing the wisdom that is slowly being inculcated into his bones or, rather, muscles. 
Wacquant does not describe his pugilistic practices exhaustively through his 
regime for the ring, however, but also through his relationships. Entering relationships at 
the gym requires embodied learning of and, due to his particular identity markers, re-
creation of strategies for cross-cultural interaction and relating to trainers and buddies. 
Wacquant describes himself as participating in a broad set of cultural practices through 
which he, as a French, white, Harvard-educated academic gains access to a 
predominantly African-American, working class, urban environment. The men gift him 
with numerous nicknames – Fightin’ Frenchman, brother Louie, Bad Dude, The French 
Bomber, The French Hammer, The Black Frenchman and his ring moniker, “Busy 
Louie” – all indicating at least some measure of acceptance of him as a co-pugilist and, in 
various cases, as a friend.  
Even more significant than their acceptance of him, however, is his description of 
his own self-perception that results from his feeling accepted: 
I’m at the point where I tell myself that I’d gladly give up my studies and 
research and all the rest to be able to stay here and box, to remain ‘one of 
the boys’. I know that’s completely crazy and surely unrealistic but, at this 
very moment, I find the idea of migrating to Harvard, of going to present a 
                                                 
125 Ibid, 65. 
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paper at the ASA, …and participating in the tutti frutti of academe totally 
devoid of meaning and downright depressing, so dreary and dread 
compared to the pure and vivacious carnal joy that this goddamn gym 
provides me…that I would like to quit everything, drop out, to stay in 
Chicago. It’s really crazy. PB [Pierre Bourdieu] was saying the other day 
that he’s afraid that I’m ‘letting myself be seduced my object’ but, boy, if 
only he knew: I’m already way beyond seduction!126 
 
Experiencing himself as “one of the boys,” he describes a desire to remain so, even to the 
extent that his academic self loses its lure.  
Based on his own methods, Bourdieu has an understandable concern over 
Wacquant’s radicalization of his theory. His student is not simply studying a culture, but 
moving into it. He is shifting from participant objectification to objectified participation. 
And as we have already seen, Bourdieu would worry that such a shift risks damaging the 
scientific objectivity of Wacquant’s sociological, academic habitus. But at the same time, 
the shift opens up great possibilities for the production of a particular type of bodily 
wisdom and its relation to academic study of that wisdom. 
 Through his scientific habitus, Bourdieu intellectually reconstructs the objective 
conditions of the subjective experience that he lacks. Wacquant, however, finds himself 
gripped by and able to deploy the tools associated with both the scientific habitus and the 
habitus of membership in the group he studies. Thus his reconstruction of the objective 
conditions happens at the social, bodily, and not purely intellectual, cognitive level. Of 
course, Bourdieu describes the objective conditions not only because he lacked access to 
that subjective experience, but also so that he could guard against the potential solipsism 
and lack of objective accountability associated with purely subjective knowledge. By 
inculcating himself with the habitus of study, and doing so with reflexive intentionality, 
                                                 
126 Ibid, pg. 4, note 3. Text is copied from his fieldnotes. 
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Wacquant attempts to overcome both problems. And the theologian who performs similar 
reflexive intentionality with her own ecclesial habitus embodies the same risks and the 
same potential. 
 The pleasures and pains of bodily practice, friendship and group membership all 
converge in Wacquant’s study at the site of his body. By making his own body into an 
object of study (“habitus as topic”), Wacquant is also able to deploy it for analysis in the 
broader fields of gym and ghetto (“habitus as tool”). Cultured as an improvisationally 
competent agent within those fields, he gains bodily, social access to them, thus giving 
him bodily, epistemological access also. As they become his world, he knows how to be 
in them instinctually. Yet, at the same time, his reflection on the processes by which he is 
made pugilist shapes him with a reflexivity that provides some form of objective distance 
for a view of himself as an object of study.  
This view is not perfect, as critics have observed. For example, as expert in urban 
sociologies Richard Lloyd argues, Wacquant tends to over-identify with his “buddies” in 
the gym in ways that lead him to eclipse his forms of racial privilege and other forms of 
symbolic, cultural and economic capital. Not only must this privilege have had some 
impact on Wacquant’s ability to even fully become “one of the boys,” these unobserved 
limitations further create “distortions” on Wacquant’s larger view of his field, argues 
Lloyd.127 Traces of disruption to his pugilistic regime and gym relationships caused by 
either Wacquant’s study, or his elite class status, are therefore rarely observable.  
Indeed, it is his tendency to over-identify as “one of the boys” that sometimes 
eclipses the way his loose, performative integration of academic and pugilistic habitus is 
                                                 
127 Richard Lloyd, “Sentimental Education,” in Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 37, No. 6 
(Nov., 2008), 538-541.  
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actually making his project possible. Wacquant is never so unconvincing to this reader, at 
least, as when he seems to overstate the ways he is accepted and feels accepted at the 
gym, or when he seems to over-state the battle he experiences between his pugilistic and 
academic selves. He describes his deep membership as creating tension in his self-
perception, leading him to describe a further desire to leave the academy for a career in 
boxing. At the same time, while boxing reveals the carnal gaps in his academic pleasure, 
it is also true that his analytical enjoyment of the boxing is produced not only by 
submission to the pugilistic regime, but also by the intellectual pleasures of observing and 
charting the process of that submission. The complexity of his theoretical positions, 
paired with the exuberance of his prose, even when that prose is excerpted from 
fieldnotes written in the midst of his pugilistic training, make it difficult to imagine 
Wacquant ever wholly thinking of academia as mere “tutti frutti…totally devoid of 
meaning and downright depressing.”  
At times it seems Wacquant is so eager to convince the reader of his belonging, 
that he avoids telling the ways in which he experiences real exclusion from and within his 
field of study. Taking these problems as a warning, then, I endeavor throughout my 
descriptions of my own habitus of pursuing wisdom to describe my insider and my 
outsider status, both the ways I feel a part of our group, and the ways in which I 
experience distance from it. Moreover, I recognize, at the same time that, like Waquant, 
there will be aspects of my performative practice that will remain obscure and 
unavailable to me.  
The pleasures of embodied belonging are complex in Wacquant’s text, as they are 
shaped in multiple loose performative integrations of his competing and cohering 
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pugilistic and scientific habitus. The more these habitus integrate, the more Wacquant 
describes himself as compelled to choose between them, but the more the reader realizes 
the necessity of each in co-operation for Wacquant’s pleasure – and, indeed, project – to 
continue. Both are necessary for constituting his self-implicating method.  
The theologian committed to both church and academy knows this series of 
experiences well. I too have a pleasurable, bodily understanding of the practices of my 
church in a way that makes me desire a deeper and deeper sense of belonging with them. 
Even when I disagree with the things we do, I have an instinctual sense of why we do 
them and I remain a member of the community that does them. Even with some of the 
moments of alienation I experience, as mentioned above, I am usually fumbling my way 
toward knowing instinctually how to function, fit and respond to what happens around 
FBC, even when that response might cause me pain. And so, like Wacquant, I experience 
myself as a member of my community of study, while others also recognize me as such.  
In a similarly complicated and even fraught way to what is revealed in 
Wacquant’s text, even when it is read against his insistence of his own belonging, my 
relationship to my study cannot be summarized primarily with me as “the sociologist” 
studying “them” because I am both an insider and outsider in and to our community. In 
some ways we are a community of friends together, within which I have particular 
integrated, often times confusing, ministerial and research roles as well. But then in other 
ways, that particular integrated, often time confusing, ministerial and research role keeps 
me from becoming fully friends with most of the class members.128 I have an experience 
                                                 
128 Some exceptions: My deep friendships with Miriam, Gary and Elaine were cultivated 
before I started teaching these classes. Indeed, when asked why they took the classes, 
their answers would often entail some version of, “because you are my friend.” Far from 
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of being an insider, while my outsider experience is defined not only by my ethnographic 
identity, but also my ministerial identity. Both insider and outsider status converge in 
complex ways, requiring discernment in each situation for how to perform a loose 
integration of my various roles. As we will see over the next two chapters, in the pursuit 
of wisdom, these performances are marked by as much failure than they are by success. 
Furthermore, like Wacquant, this duality creates a tension in my sense of 
belonging between my church and academic vocations, and I nevertheless endeavor to 
perform both in some sort of loose integration.129 Hybrid-vocations are difficult to 
negotiate, perhaps even more so when they already overlap and compete as they do for 
the academic theologian committed also to church life. Therefore, the complex hybridity 
of Wacquant’s position as fully pugilist and fully sociologist, even as aspects of each 
require constant sacrifice for performative relation to the other, offers insight into how 
both the ecclesial and the academic practices of theologians can contribute together to the 
formation of an ethnographic theological practice.  
For example, my academic commitments, in terms of pedagogy as well as 
research, shaped my desire to teach theology classes as the chief component of my 
theological ethnographic research; put simply, as an academic, teaching is what I do. At 
the same time, I drew materials for both courses directly from my comprehensive exam 
                                                                                                                                                 
simplifying them, however, these dynamics further complicate our balance of 
friend/teacher/minister/etc. roles. The type of ministerial authority I experienced in my 
conversation with Maureen, for example, would be experienced differently – or even, not 
at all – with these friends. 
129 While it is the relationship between my everyday and academic theological identities 
as a teacher that matters primarily here, it should also be noted that I experience these 
tensions in a personal way as well. For example, I have loving commitments to people 
whose particular beliefs in the exclusivity of Christ, the role of women in the church, 
family and culture, the rapture and the end-times, and the status of LGBTQ persons differ 
drastically from mine, and have social ramifications that I find deeply upsetting. 
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reading lists for my doctoral work. The particular figures I used were drawn from my 
historical exams, while the doctrines I taught combined into two courses the three 
doctrinal loci I studied for my systematic theology exams. At the same time, teaching 
such topics in the ecclesial, rather than academic, environment revealed the “carnal gaps” 
in my academic knowledge; it is not that ecclesial teaching is so much more radically 
embodied than academic teaching, but rather that the personal, concrete specific 
dimensions of texts that I have primarily read and reread through academic eyes became 
more evident in this ecclesial milieu.130 
My particular areas of academic interest therefore shaped the make-up of the 
ecclesial classes. Modes of theological discourse that have been formed into my 
theological identity through training in academic institutions thus made their way directly 
into a particular ecclesial environment in a much more direct way than they do in Tanner 
or Fulkerson’s models, for example. Indeed, by following Wacquant’s self-implicating 
ethnographic methods, I carried my distinctly academic formation and its related modes 
of theological discourse into the ecclesial environment in my bones, much as Peter, Ann, 
Joan and Harlan suggested academic theologians should.  
At the same time, we will see in the fifth chapter that despite this pleasure, I also 
found it difficult to teach texts in these ways. I lost a sense of their systematic coherence, 
which led me to worry that I was undermining appropriate interpretations of them – 
perhaps, a distinctly academic concern. Like Wacquant, the deeper integration of these 
                                                 
130 My treatment of texts in this way resonates with Wendy Farley’s description of non-
academic ways of relating to texts. See Wendy Farley, The Wounding and Healing of 
Desire: Weaving Heaven and Earth (Louisville: WJKP, 2005), ix-xiii.  
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roles and habitus thus also created greater tension between them, even as that tension 
could hold or give way in moments to numerous experiences of pleasure.  
 
Physical vs. Bodily Practices 
One key difference between Wacquant’s “sociology from the body”131 and my 
theology from the body must be addressed before I move on to how the structure of his 
text guides the structure of my own method. Wacquant’s pugilistic practices are much 
more dramatically embodied – or, rather, dramatically physical – than the typical 
Christian social practices with which I am comparing them. The pugilistic habitus thus 
displays a much more overt and visible type of practical, bodily wisdom. That being said, 
it remains the case that any and all practices constitute embodied, practical wisdom in the 
agents who perform them. While Christian social practices might not be as physical as 
boxing, my leadership of our small, monthly, early morning Lord’s Supper service, for 
example, is shaped by and shapes the way I experience other social practices in and 
beyond church. Let me explain. 
Standing at the front of the room, holding in my hands the warm bread that Tyler 
has baked, I break and serve it to the line of people walking down the aisle toward me. 
With each piece I tear off, my body remembers occupying a similar position in the chapel 
where I led worship at Divinity School. The memory is not so much consciously 
articulated as emotively felt. If my fingers rip a piece that feels too large or small, an old 
friend from that community flashes through my imagination. He used to take large 
                                                 
131 “Sociology from the body” is contrasted with “sociologies of the body” in Wacquant, 
Body and Soul, vii, to demonstrate how the ethnographer’s body, itself, can be ‘made’ 
into a field of knowledge. 
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chunks from the loaf, describing them as a recognition of grace’s immensity, and I feel 
that graced warmth I used to feel for him each time he did so. I smile. Feeling my love 
for my friend, the memory stays only as long as a spark, igniting the desire in me to 
connect with each person in this line now as friend too.  
As an instinctive consequence, I feel myself leaning my torso closer now toward 
each approaching person. Still, I start holding the bread closer to my own body as I lean, 
so that they too must enter deeper into our shared space. No one rejects this invitation. 
They lean in with me. And as the line moves quickly, I try to speak the names of those 
who come forward: “Christ’s body, broken for you, Elaine; Christ’s body, broken for 
you, Gene…” When I miss recalling quickly enough a name I know I know, I feel the 
guilt of failure, and I am surprised by how many names I do not know in this small 
community. I remind myself to learn the names of regulars but then promptly forget to do 
so. I will feel this guilt again in next month’s service.  
One man gently closes his hand over mine as he takes the bread from my fingers. 
The warmth in his smile disrupts my sense that I am ministering to others with a second 
of feeling that someone is ministering to me. The tenderness of his touch comes as a gift 
of affirmation, not unwanted contact or a thieving from my role. After the fact, I recall a 
time long before I came to FBC when the bread was yanked from my hand by a man 
seeking to usurp my ministerial presence simply because I am a woman. The difference 
between these touches gives me pleasure. I am here now, with acceptance, not there, 
without it. And as I look down the line of approach, I feel some resonance of the similar 
vision of a line of people waiting to lay hands on me for ordination a year or so prior. My 
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worship leading body, as an eating, praying, loving, touching body has its cultivated 
ecclesial instincts just as Wacquant’s boxing body has its cultivated pugilistic instincts. 
More significant for the present project: when it comes to the class, I have a 
bodily knowledge for teaching in this particular community. As I have already 
mentioned, one evening when I forget to ask someone to pray at the opening of one class, 
I feel in my gut that something is off kilter. Another time, my Baptist preacher hands 
know that striking the table, like pounding a pulpit, will emphasize my point. These 
hands recognize instinctively not only when to strike the table, but also when I have done 
it wrongly. Temperature fluctuations in the classroom, paired with the heat that rises from 
energetic teaching, register in my flesh. Sweat breaks through the surface of my skin 
under my arms and above my lip. On one occasion, I have not adequately prepared for 
such heat, and I feel discomfort as I inadvertently flash a strip of skin while removing my 
sweater so as not to overheat. I look around for my water bottle.  
While teaching, I often instinctively and unconsciously scan the room to track eye 
movements, people checking their watches, shifting in their seats, or thumbing through 
their Bibles distractedly in ways that communicate boredom, frustration, confusion and 
shyness. Some intuition usually kicks in during these moments so I can shift us to a new 
topic, clarify a controversial point or an unclear one, or invite a quiet person into 
discussion. In most cases, I do not need to think consciously through the steps that must 
be taken to do this. If this intuitive response fails, I feel that failure acutely as I struggle to 
get us back on track. Now my unconscious checking of the bodies in the space becomes 
more conscious. My slip-ups make me work harder.  
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Because my worship-leading, teaching body has ministerial and pedagogical 
instincts just as Wacquant’s boxing body has pugilistic, his method opens up possibilities 
for how to use my academic skills not only to study my own ecclesial habitus as a topic, 
as we did in the previous chapter, but also to deploy its integration with my academic 
habitus as a tool as I endeavor to do ethnographic theology from my body. 
 
The Problems and Possibilities of Habitus as Tool132 
Each of the three sections in Body and Soul relates to a different moment in the 
habitus’ definition – its construction, its dispositions, and its competent performance – 
which gives us three particular angles on the field of study. While my ethnographic 
theology relates most significantly with this final section – competent performance – 
understanding the former two is nevertheless significant for undergirding the 
performance I have here been calling, a loose integration of competing and cohering 
habitus and roles. In this section, I therefore compare and contrast my own particular 
subject position within my community of study with each of these three modes of 
reporting in order to demarcate the boundaries and contours of the studies offered in the 
next two chapters.  
I have already outlined above how Wacquant describes his initial inculcation with 
a pugilistic habitus through both physical and relational modes of bodily practice. These 
are the detailed narratives of learning how to land punches, or being gifted with a ring 
moniker. Of course, whereas Wacquant was able to chart the progress of his pugilistic 
                                                 
132 The notion of habitus deployed as both a topic and a tool is developed in Loïc 
Wacquant, “Habitus as topic and tool: reflections on becoming a prizefighter” in 
Ethnographies Revisited: constructing theory in the field, ed. Antony J. Puddephatt, 
William Shaffir and Steven W. Kleinknecht (New York: Routledge, 2009), 137-151. 
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habitus from his first punch, the genesis of my participation in Christian social practices 
preceded the moment when I decided to study them academically. Even so, Wacquant’s 
initial reflections on the construction of his pugilistic habitus thus continually remind me 
to re-imagine the conditions by which particular practices come to feel like second nature 
to me within church life. This helps me avoid the solipsism mentioned above, as it opens 
the possibility for me to tell my own stories by producing linguistic, reflexive renderings 
of what my body already knows implicitly about my field of study.  
This mode of describing habitus construction can, however, also be used to 
understand the habitus I am here interpreting as a pursuit of wisdom. The next two 
chapters offer descriptions of how the conversations engaged by our classes contributed 
to our habitus of pursuing wisdom. At the same time, I endeavor to ground my own 
habitus of pursuing wisdom in a reflexive interpretation of the pleasures and pains 
experienced both in my own ordination service, and in the ways I read academic texts. As 
my ecclesial and academic roles seek performative moments of loose integration through 
both narratives, the stories reveal the process by which the particular habitus of study, 
that of pursuing wisdom, is one I hope is being also inculcated in me. Like Wacquant, I 
am therefore held responsible to the objective structures of my subjectivity, unable to fly 
off into my own imaginative fancy. 
Given that I am unable to chart my entry into the process by which involvement 
in Christian social practices developed my forms of practical wisdom, the second section 
of Wacquant’s text – the one that outlines his inculcated dispositions – is particularly 
helpful for my method here. My own ecclesial role equips me with a wealth of already 
instilled embodied knowledge into which I must learn to tap. This embodied knowledge 
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comes in various forms; it is ever in a state of being developed, but as I experience some 
of it as malformation, I am also in a state of unlearning aspects of it too. This 
development and unlearning all contributes to the dispositions of the various habitus 
associated with my ecclesial role.  
In the second section of his book, “Fight Night at Studio 104,” Wacquant 
describes in great detail all the events of a single day; a day on which his co-pugilist and 
friend, Curtis, fought a title match.  In this section, Wacquant’s boxing-related 
dispositions become an interpretive lens for how Curtis might be feeling.  Wacquant 
articulates questions based on his own experience to ask Curtis and the others.  In this 
way, his inquiries are more directed; they grow out of the fighters’ shared experience, 
enabling the honing of insight into how each one encounters the shared experience in 
their own particularity. On the one hand, I too am able to draw on my embodied wisdom 
in order to formulate more directed questions that forge deeper understanding of the 
embodied wisdom of others in the FBC community. More so, my dispositions for life 
together at FBC – as well as my academic dispositions – enable me to formulate the 
questions that can guide our classroom discussions. I can anticipate where conversations 
are going, and how to direct them elsewhere by opening up unexpected avenues of 
thought.133 While my academic skills and tools help me chart out theological courses for 
discussion, my sense for the FBC game gives me embodied understanding of the terrain 
in which those courses are to be deployed effectively. 
                                                 
133 Indeed, this point was brought home to me when during the course of my fieldwork, I 
was invited to teach a two-week long Sunday morning theology class in a local mainline 
church. This required completely different teaching instincts than my role at FBC and, as 
I lacked a feel for the classroom game within this community, I found myself consistently 
surprised by their answers to questions. I needed to think more consciously through how 
to respond in each case.  
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In addition to deploying his dispositions as an interpretive lens, in the third 
section of his text Wacquant deploys his habitus’ improvisational competence to impact 
and shape his field of study. Here he rises through the pugilistic ranks to fight a match at 
the Chicago Golden Gloves, “the most prestigious amateur tournament in the city.”134 In 
the re-telling, he details interactions with friends, guys from the gym, and his girlfriend, 
as well as his strict diet, exercise and lifestyle regimes leading up to the fight. Moving 
beyond descriptions of how his body is trained, and how his trained body gives insight 
into the trained bodies of others, here he describes his body’s maintenance. We see his 
power to shape the community that shapes him. Furthermore, this shaping is formal as 
well as relational. By disrupting the structures of their shared boxing field – his rankings 
effect the rankings of others – he impacts the ways his research partners will experience 
their own environment even after his absence from it.  
Here a particular difference between Wacquant’s subject position within his 
community and my subject position within mine becomes especially clear, however. 
While deeply involved in his community to the extent that he is able to shape it, 
Wacquant nevertheless also remains a novice within it. He does not teach other boxers 
but rather learns from them without intentionally giving any tutelage back. Like 
Wacquant, I am able to contribute to shaping life at (and even beyond) my field of study, 
but whereas his submission to his field’s regime creates in him a novice identity, my 
submission to FBC’s regime creates in me an identity associated with a greater accrual of 
power and authority. I explore these questions of submission and authority, and the 
complex space of their overlap, more fully in the fourth chapter, but for now it is worth 
                                                 
134 Wacquant, Body and Soul, 235. 
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noting that the power that accrued to me in the classroom afforded me different types of 
opportunities for shaping communal life than Waquant had at the gym.  
Moreover, with this increased power came increased responsibility. Put simply, I 
am responsible for the spiritual care of others, as we saw in my conversation with 
Maureen, for example. I experience a sense of responsibility to teach topics that, while 
stretching our thinking beyond traditional Baptist beliefs, still do not depart too much 
from them, and which almost always remain anchored in explicitly Christian intellectual 
traditions. I instigated theological tensions and crises in our classes in an effort to be 
productive. As we saw with my fears around teaching more advanced theories of gender, 
race and sexuality, my intentions sought to block the development of tensions and crises 
whenever I perceived – rightly or wrongly – that they risked becoming destructive.  
Even with this difference, however, Wacquant’s third mode of storytelling offers 
an ethnographic precedent for the way that my teaching practices actually affected 
change within my field of study. Like him, I did not just train my own body in the habitus 
of my field. By the very definition of habitus, we both also contributed from our 
pugilistic and various ecclesial, ministerial habitus to our fields’ shaping. Given this 
precedent, I can return to as description of the practice of ethnographic theology in order 
to finish outlining my method here. In this final section, then, I argue that self-implicating 
methods like Wacquant’s offer a complementary alternative to theological ethnographic 
methods like Fulkerson’s for bringing the gestures toward concretion in Tanner’s 
theological continuum to life.  
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An Expanded Role for Ethnography in Theological Construction 
 The structure of my story overlaps Wacquant’s. As I have already mentioned, I 
cannot mark the moment when I began to form my particular subject location – and its 
concurrent authority and responsibility – within the community I studied. Perhaps it 
precedes the first time I attended worship at FBC and is located somewhere in the midst 
of completing my MDiv. Maybe the moment occurred in my ordination service in FBC’s 
sanctuary, or it was the day I converted to Christianity. Perhaps it was my birth? I have 
no clean moment at which I entered under a trainer’s watchful eye to punch and skip my 
way into a pugilistic habitus marked clearly by the bodily hexis of boxing activity. 
Infinite competing and cohering habitus, the fields for each of which I have no clear 
memory of entering, enable my negotiation between the positions made possible for me 
in those fields and my own particular ways of taking them up. 
The particularity of my subject position within the community in comparison and 
contrast with Wacquant’s within his thus shifts the ways in which I am able to deploy my 
various habitus as loosely integrated, performative tools. I am already situated as 
something other than a miner or even producer of knowledge. Rather, as I recounted 
Miriam pointing out at the beginning of the second chapter, my role in our community as 
both minister and academic theologian means that through my leadership of church 
practices I have power to guide the process by which we all make (and remake) each 
other theologians. I not only recreate the conditions by which a habitus of pursuing 
wisdom is constructed, negotiated and renegotiated in our community at an 
epistemological level. I actually participate in and even explicitly guide its construction – 
in myself and in others – at the social level. Here the connections to Bourdieu’s 
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epistemological and social access come back into the foreground. Pairing this with 
Ortner’s focus on moments of habitus slippage rather than reproduction, we begin to see 
how even the so-called participant observer might contribute to the self-understanding of 
those she studies. Disruptions of practice can become as important an analytic tool as 
perpetuations.  
Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s ethnographic work reveals this dynamic with brave 
and honest insight. Describing the tensions she experienced between the racially 
monolithic habitus of her own church life and her academic study of a racially diverse 
congregation, she confesses that upon entering an initial worship service at Good 
Samaritan Church, “…I am surprised at my own response to all the dark skin in the 
room.”135 When she attempts to hide her discomfort, she notes that “the overeager sound 
of my voice tells me I am probably failing.”136 Likewise, she finds herself unaccustomed 
to the congregation’s diversity in terms of physical and psychological dis/ability. The 
passage that describes her experience is worth citing in full: 
As I approach the man in the wheelchair, my body feels suddenly 
awkward and unnatural. When I get in his immediate vicinity, I realize I 
do not know where to place myself. My height feels excessive and 
ungainly. I tower over the pale man strapped in the wheelchair. Do I kneel 
down? Bend down to be face level with him? Speaking to him from above 
feels patronizing. Or is it the crouching down that would be patronizing? 
My hand moves to touch his shoulder, as if to communicate, ‘I care about 
you, despite your mildly frightening, contorted body and guttural gurgling 
sounds.’ But I withdraw my hand quickly, wondering if this, too, would be 
a sign of condescension. What was it like to be unable to command safe 
space with your presence, to be vulnerable to the groping of other people’s 
hands?137 
 
                                                 
135 Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, 4, 5. 
136 Ibid, 5. 
137 Ibid. 
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Orienting oneself to a new habitus, or even a slightly different type of habitus, for the 
purpose of study is difficult. But Fulkerson is not the only one who experiences her 
transition.  
When Fulkerson’s voice squeaks, it is not in response to racial difference; it is in 
response to actual people racially different from her. And they hear it. When she touches 
someone uncomfortably, she is not confronting disability; she is touching a present, 
disabled man. Fulkerson does not enter this space in a neutral way. She enters it with her 
own struggles and difficulties at blending in. And the people she observes simultaneously 
observe – and feel – her struggle. As a result, the field of study is changed. Much as she 
tries to guard against it, Fulkerson’s actions shape the responses of those she encounters. 
 What Fulkerson so insightfully describes is a process experienced by many 
ethnographers: the process by which what is foreign in their environment of study shocks 
them until they begin to understand it and manage to incorporate it into their own 
structures of understanding. This is not a failure in her ethnographic skills, but rather is a 
revelation of how the beginnings of an ethnographic project feel. And yet what these 
disruptions show is that even the theological ethnographer who is familiar with church 
life experiences disorientation and perpetuates disruption. Fulkerson is careful to 
understand her role in the community – as non-member – and to abide by the practices 
and ethics associated with that role; indeed, disruptions can be problematic not only from 
an ethical, but also empirical perspective and she therefore, seeks to limit them.138 But 
when, like me, the ethnographer is also a member of the community she studies, these 
                                                 
138 As noted above, certain feminist and action-research ethnographic methods offer 
exceptions to this general rule.  
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moments of tension and disruption can occur in additional and, in some cases, 
particularly productive ways.  
 On the one hand, like Fulkerson I experienced jarring moments due to racial 
difference and dis/ability. For example, I am bi-racial, born of a black mother and a white 
father, but the members of my classes were all white. Moreover, I am not Southern born, 
and I have consistently struggled throughout my five years living in the south to gain a 
bodily understanding of racial codes I find utterly alienating.139 I thus often found myself 
viscerally frustrated by what I perceived from some to be dispositions guided by a 
habitus shaped from an unquestioned racial majority perspective. Yet often times, my 
personal, visceral frustration, paired with my lack of bodily wisdom regarding Southern 
racial codes, left me unable to open up the discussion on such topics in fruitful ways. In 
this regard, like Fulkerson, I struggled to open up personal tensions and disruptions 
caused by racial difference so that they could be pursued in ways that contributed to our 
ongoing pursuit of wisdom. 
Another example: one evening an older man who did not usually attend our class 
came along with his wife to check things out. Over the course of the night, he interrupted 
me continually, spoke over top of my words, aggressively pursued points that I had 
trouble connecting to the larger lesson, and generally acted in what I perceived to be a 
disruptive way. Initially, I interpreted his behavior as stemming from an inability to 
respect a young woman as his teacher and I puzzled over it because I almost never, if not 
                                                 
139 For more on the complexity of racial identity in ethnographic settings, see Natalie 
Wigg-Stevenson, “Reconciliatory Hope: The Aesthetics and Ethics of Passing,” in the 
Postcolonial Body Performance Narratives series, Postcolonial Networks. 
http://postcolonialnetworks.com/pbpn/reconciliatory-hope-the-aesthetics-and-ethics-of-
passing/. Accessed 5/7/11. 
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never, encounter such an attitude at FBC. That is not to say that I do not encounter 
sexism; I just do not encounter sexism so overt as these actions appeared to me.  
Despite my academic commitments to the insights I have gleaned from theologies 
of disability – Fulkerson’s above insight included – it was not until the end of this man’s 
second time visiting the class that I realized he was experiencing a form of dementia. His 
interruptions were not connecting to the flow of conversation or my lessons because he 
was not able to track either. I had not yet come to embody my intellectual studies 
concerning disability in congregational life as second nature. I thus lacked the instincts of 
recognition. Like Fulkerson, my habitus also needs to catch up sometimes to new 
experiences. In this case, my realization helped me begin channeling what felt to me to be 
his random insights into the larger frameworks of our conversations. I worked harder to 
find and forge connections between his comments and what we were doing in an effort to 
maintain his inclusion in the conversation. But the struggle of doing so precluded larger 
efforts toward flourishing in the midst of the difficulty. The extent of my skills with 
regards to the situation kept me from doing much more than mere maintenance of it. 
 Even so, the fact that my ecclesial habitus is produced within and by the same set 
of social practices that produces the ecclesial habitus of the people in my class 
(acknowledging that those practices and habitus are never embodied in identical ways) 
entails another set of struggles that are potentially productive, but which also are largely 
irrelevant to Fulkerson’s particular subject position within her field of study. Consider 
again the experience of tension I felt when interviewing Maureen, while also feeling a 
need to offer her pastoral care. Just as Maureen’s attempts to choose consciously between 
competing habitus with her view of salvation could only offer temporary relief from the 
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tension, so too would attempting to choose consciously between the two sets of role-
related desires I felt in that moment. I was in fact responsible to both of them. As a result, 
they called for a loose performative integration, not hierarchical ordering; they required 
my own pursuit of wisdom in the midst of conversation. And so I needed to come up with 
a line of questioning that both continued the interview and cared for Maureen – which, in 
a fumbling, marginally successful way, I think I did.  
In this way, my research took on the tone of pastoral care and echoed the 
suggestions by practical theologians like Thomas Frank and Mary Clark Moschella that 
the ministerial role can become the subject position from which the study of a 
congregation happens.140 As Moschella in particular argues, ministers can use 
ethnography as a practice of care for spiritual transformation.141 Quite simply, by deeply 
understanding the theological crises of one’s congregants, the minister is able to serve 
them more effectively. The flip side of this is that by understanding those theological 
crises more deeply, we also help produce fresh theological insight that can prove to be 
both helpful and interesting for theologians across the theological continuum.  
By teaching historical theological classes in the ecclesial environment, I 
essentially reframe the way that the theologies created across church, academy and 
everyday life converse. Following Tanner’s suggestion, and like Fulkerson, I do not 
perform second order reflection on first order events. But at the same time, I do not 
abstract from the concrete situation in order to construct more general academic 
                                                 
140 Thomas Edward Frank, The Soul of the Congregation: An Invitation to 
Congregational Reflection (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000); Mary Clark Moschella, 
Ethnography as Pastoral Practice: An Introduction (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 
2008). 
141 Moschella, 12. 
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theological answers to everyday theological questions (indeed, the fact that I am unable 
to do so is one of the losses of my method in relation to Fulkerson’s). The gain for the 
local church community, however, is that because I am a minister within the community, 
I am able to guide an ecclesial conversation that incorporates various theologies 
associated with church, academy and everyday life. In other words, through this loose, 
performative, self-implicating integration of my ministerial and academic roles, I am able 
to bring the goods of academic theological institutional formation into the ecclesial 
realm. I bear it there in my bones. In this way, the theology that rises from distinctly 
academic institutional practices makes its way to the everyday theological discourses 
with a local immediacy that is lacking in Fulkerson’s model. I am not claiming that this 
immediacy is better, simply different and that, in its difference, it can function as a 
complement to Fulkerson’s methods.  
In addition to shifting the way that this self-implicating theological ethnographic 
method serves the church, I also shift the nature of the academic theological text 
produced out of it. Here, as the academic theologian produces resources appropriate to 
the academic social practices that give rise to her work, especially as she simultaneously 
desires to perpetuate those practices’ continuance, I see a definitive break or jump from 
the academic end of Tanner’s theological spectrum to the position occupied by the 
academic theologian. Indeed, for the theologian who feels her work should serve the 
church and the academy, my method frees her to do both, without compromising the 
academic integrity of the texts she creates. The method serves the church directly; the 
text is for the academy. 
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What this means is that the text I produce out of this method is not an academic 
theological answer to everyday theological crises. It is, rather, a reporting of what the 
pursuit of wisdom looks like when everyday and academic theologies tackle these crises 
together. As specialized academic theological discourse, it rises from both the ecclesial 
conversational practices that bridge the theological continuum and the context specific 
practices of the academy. While these first three chapters have outlined the theory and 
methods undergirding this process, the final two chapters, which are more theologically 
constructive, engage what this habitus of pursuing wisdom looks like in practice.  
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And afterward, I will pour out my Spirit on all people. Your sons and daughters will 
prophesy. 
Joan, First Baptist Church Member 
May 3rd, 2009 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
THEOLOGICAL PRACTICES IN ATYPICAL SPACE 
 
 
Having demonstrated how a self-implicated form of ethnography guides this 
dissertation’s method, I now need to account for that self-implication. I noted already that 
unlike Wacquant, I am unable to account for the whole process by which I was made into 
a member of my field of study, as I was a member before the study began. But in 
describing here the ritual by which the making of my ministerial authority was officially 
recognized – my ordination ritual – I begin to outline the contours of how academic 
theology intervened in this ecclesial environment.142 And in so doing, I begin to 
demonstrate both the possibilities and limitations to such a self-implicated method. 
As I have already argued, the way academic theology intervened in the ecclesial 
environment in this dissertation occurred through my attempts to perform loose 
integrations of my ecclesial and academic roles within the ecclesial community. Thus, my 
own endeavors to cultivate a habitus of pursuing wisdom – in Edward Farley’s sense of 
theologia, described in the second chapter – guide the ecclesial conversation practice of 
pursuing the wisdom embodied in ecclesial, academic and everyday spheres of life. In the 
                                                 
142 Baptist theologies of ritual practices – ordination, baptism, Lord’s Supper, etc. – claim 
that these rituals effect no necessary change in their participants but, rather, that they 
acknowledge a change that has already taken place. This is why I describe this ritual as 
recognizing my making, rather than actually making me into a minister. 
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second section of this chapter, I unpack my loose, performative integration of the 
competing and cohering habitus that give rise to my theological identity by relaying the 
bodily dimensions of academic attempts to understand my ecclesial role. In this section, I 
argue that my particular mode of entry into the ecclesial environment – the very mode 
that allows me to shape that environment – is also the mode that prevents me from 
disrupting the wider ecclesial system. The pleasures of belonging that I experience 
through the process of entering the system are the same pleasures that keep me from 
undermining that system’s power.  
By accounting for these processes by which I endeavor to pursue wisdom as a 
loose integration of my ecclesial and academic roles, I thus seek to objectify myself in 
order to make the academic theologian one of the characters in the ethnography. In 
essence, I endeavor to give descriptive, personal, intimate weight to the more abstract 
notion of academic theology’s intervention into the everyday, even as I then abstract from 
that subject position in order to make its efforts more broadly communicable. 
Having accounted for how I bear academic theology into Christian social 
practices as I am shaped not only by those Christian practices, but also by my academic 
ones – that is, having accounted for my revised version of Tanner’s model for relating 
everyday and academic theology – I move on to question the possibilities and limitations 
of what academic theologians can accomplish within Christian social practices. And I do 
so through a particular narrative of how my mode of intervention created an atypical 
space that did not disrupt the wider ecclesial system, but rather become integrated into it 
for the purpose of its flourishing.  
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A focus on how the equilibrium of the wider ecclesial system is maintained might 
sound disappointing to any readers whose instincts are to revolutionary impulses. Indeed, 
since most of the time the various habitus associated with my academic role greet any 
aspect of a status quo with a hermeneutic of suspicion, these are impulses I share. In 
general, I agree with Tanner’s assessment that specialized, academic theological 
discourse does not preserve or even simply build upon what came before, but rather, that 
it seeks to take apart the theologies that came before and reconfigure them in new 
ways.143 This is precisely the activity I have attempted to perform through the ecclesial 
practice that I guided. Nevertheless, in the conversation practice I did pursue and, 
perhaps, by nature of that particular practice, Tanner’s hope that a theological creativity 
“expressed through the modification and extension of material already on the ground” 
does not necessarily entail a “plodding reformism” was difficult to substantiate.144  
Tanners argues that “small changes” can “have a major effect,” and that small 
tinkers to an ecclesial system, really can “make the whole construction wobble and 
threaten it with collapse,” at least in terms of the unjust marks of that construction.145 But 
in seeking to bring her model to life, I learned that the very fact that small changes can 
threaten a whole system with collapse is precisely what makes them so difficult to effect. 
It is a rare tool that wields the precision to remove the unjust marks from a system 
without irreparably wounding it.  
Tanner is certainly right to say that the “established meanings and rules” that 
govern a system “have no power of themselves to resist alteration,” but rather, that they 
                                                 
143 See Tanner, Theories of Culture, 83. 
144 Ibid, 166. 
145 Ibid. 
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are “held in place through the exercise of human power – by the will of the 
participants…”146 But as we see in my objectified account of my own theological 
identity, this is only part of the story. In addition, we find that the pleasures of belonging 
can easily make one into a participant willing to deploy one’s power in ways that 
inevitably, even against one’s will, perpetuate these rules, strategies and tactics.  
As much as anything else, this desire I experienced might primarily reveal my 
own struggles.147 Nevertheless these struggles might reveal a problem in Tanner’s model. 
Theological reflection in her mode necessitates some sort of implication of the academic 
theologian in the everyday Christian practices she wants to impact. But to be an insider 
can entail a sense of group membership that at least complicates, if not diminishes, any 
desire to overthrow the whole system. Even the insider who is also outsider, like myself, 
as we saw in the last chapter, and will see here, might feel the pull between ambivalence 
with the system, and a simultaneous desire to invest more deeply in it. Performing a loose 
integration of the competing and cohering habitus and roles with regards to this 
ambivalence and desire might, at some point, entail moves toward revolution. But for the 
most part, it seems this is not how everyday life together works. 
                                                 
146 Ibid, 167. 
147 Therein lies the limitations of my particular method: it requires other academic 
theologians to corroborate my findings. It might also reveal the limitations to performing 
this model in a conservative congregation. Although, here Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s 
findings that a more progressive community struggled to sustain social change, 
particularly with regards to racial reconciliation, point to the possibility that I might be 
tapping into a larger ecclesial trend that transcends the differences between conservative 
and progressive congregations. See Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, particularly chapter 
7. See also Dawne Moon, God, Sex, & Politics: Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) for a descriptive analysis on how debates 
around sexuality and politics share themes across a conservative and a progressive 
congregation (see especially Pp. 229ff). 
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Perhaps my experience is unique, but as we see in this chapter, the prevalence of 
theoretical structures that can help explain it, plus the tendency of atypical spaces – even 
those created by people who interpret themselves as “insurgents” – to enable the wider 
ecclesial system’s flourishing, suggests it might not be. At the very least, this chapter 
functions as a minority report that complicates Tanner’s more idealized claims for the 
possibilities of revolutionary social change. Working with everyday theologies does not 
by necessity entail “plodding reformism,” but the possibility of revolution is much more 
difficult to attain – and even desire – than she makes it sound as she defends her own use 
of anthropological theories that have a tendency to be viewed as deterministic. By 
arguing that the practice of pursuing wisdom cannot necessarily be directly correlated 
with movements of social reform, then, we must ask what theological goods it does 
produce? And here is where Tanner’s insights into such goods are particularly helpful. 
Like her, I want to highlight the goods of the process itself – as a process than enables 
mutual understanding of difference, and which deepens participants’ shared commitments 
to the materials over which they are debating, thereby deepening their commitments to 
each other.148   
As I endeavor to show in this chapter, in agreement with Tanner’s claims to the 
same, when academic theology enters the everyday environment, it can only be heard if it 
works with that context’s particular ways of being together. As a result, such academic 
theological interventions into the ecclesial sphere do not necessarily manage to create 
pockets of atypical space that can overthrow unjust systems, precisely because those 
unjust systems have also participated in creating those same pockets of atypical space. 
                                                 
148 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 175. 
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Change in Tanner’s model, when it is performed in concrete practice, is therefore more 
chastened. It happens first as agents experience tension with the wider ecclesial system, 
second, as they more consciously affirm their integration with it, and third, as their more 
conscious affirmation of their integration creates small ripples of effect that might 
nevertheless enable the wider system to flourish. Each of these three modes of chastened 
change occurred in the course of my study, and I demonstrate them in this chapter.  
Parasitic on the processes by which structures are made and remade, change is 
evident in their moments of slippage, even when that slippage is re-integrated into the 
structures. Change might, therefore, be most evident on the backs of those who rebuild 
the structure. As we saw from the combination of Ortner’s and Swidler’s revisions to 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus in the second chapter, for transformation to occur, the social 
structures need to be reproduced, if in a slightly different way, while in those 
reproductions, agents become able to draw on new tools for living life in new ways. In 
this way, the pursuit of wisdom is revealed to be a good in itself for those who participate 
in it. The small tinkers that “have a major effect” are few and far between in the mostly 
“plodding reformism” that makes up ecclesial life. But that plodding reformism is, itself, 
part of the life of faith.  
The final narrative of this chapter endeavors to reveal just this: that while 
wisdom’s pursuit is not always producing social change, it is nevertheless working on 
something more subtle: small changes in the agents that make up the society. Moreover, 
in that subtlety, it is difficult to see the effects of the process anywhere but the minute 
details of a body’s shifting posture: it is, as we will see, audible in a voice tone’s 
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elevation, visible in a torso slumped in a chair, perceivable in an emotive response to 
facing evil. 
 
Self-Implicating Ethnographic Method and My Ecclesial Role 
 The epigraph at the head of this chapter is probably best recognized as the prophet 
Joel’s words, but for me they are Joan’s. They became hers when she laid her hands on 
me and whispered them into my ear during my ordination service. Her whisper 
emphasized the word daughters over sons, inaugurating me into a line of women seeking 
to live into that eschatological promise. Tracing the whole process by which my body 
became minister is beyond the scope of this discussion. Still, this ordination service 
marks the ritual action by which that identity was formally recognized and bestowed. In 
this section, I therefore focus attention on this ritual of ordination in order to begin to 
unpack the ecclesial trajectory that contributes to my endeavors to perform loose 
integrations of my competing and cohering habitus and roles within the field of my study. 
My body is in submission, on a prayer kneeler at the front of the sanctuary, 
waiting for the hands to come. At FBC, like some other Baptist churches, we lay on 
hands for clergy ordination, and we don’t lay them on all at once. And so a line of 
ordained clergy (of all denominations) and deacons begins to form stretching long down 
the center aisle.  
This aisle is the same one opened at the end of every Sunday service for the altar 
call. It is the same aisle that I walked first to join the church and then a year and a half 
later, to declare to our whole community my calling to Gospel Ministry. I have watched 
bridal processions walk this aisle, as well as processions of families bidding farewell to a 
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loved one now deceased. Indeed, I too have walked it to bid farewell in this way. We 
walk this aisle during business meetings to argue a point or raise a motion for vote from 
the microphone. It is the aisle down which the pastor carries babies to be dedicated so 
that we can all see the cuteness. Many of us walk down simply to get to our seats for 
Sunday services.  
All the feet that have trod this aisle, carrying whispers or shouts or declarations of 
dedication, mourning and hope, have made this aisle sacred. It throbs with memories – 
not one single memory-conglomerate to which the building bears witness, but rather 
constellations of particular memories upon, through and around which an infinity of 
shared gazes flow. The aisle marks the liminal space of becoming in our sanctuary: 
becoming saved, baptized, becoming dedicated, church member, or clergy. It marks the 
space of intention, of declaration that we are starting something new, even if that 
something new is so simple as attending a regular service. 
At my ordination, this aisle filled with feet treading up hands to lay on me. First 
came the hands of clergy, then deacons, the members of my ordination committee, and 
finally the hands of Pastor Frank. Each hand grasped me differently – holding my head, 
my shoulders, guiding arms to wrap fully around me – and then bending lips to my ear to 
whisper. Some whispered a prayer, some a charge. Others declared a gift they wanted to 
see me bring to my ministry. Some simply thanked me that they could participate in this 
day. Some prayed that justice would flow from my ministry, others prayed for a flowing 
of knowledge, of wisdom. One woman from my doctoral program, a Methodist minister, 
prayed in the power of the Spirit, unleashing energy from her body into mine that I found 
disarming, yet enlivening. One man’s lips accidentally brushed my cheek and ear in a 
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way that would lead a friend to comment later with awe on the shocking intimacy of 
bodies in space together. Indeed, even without lips and ears and the moisture of breath, 
all this touch relied on a suspension of the norms for bodily interaction that is rare in any 
form of ecclesial or everyday life. 
The whole experience was overwhelming, and yet I tried to hold myself together. 
The service included my presentation to the community, a clergy covenant to which I 
proclaimed, “I do” and “I will,” and ministerial charges offered by representatives from 
various arenas of my life: my academic advisor, my spouse (who is also an ordained 
Baptist minister), a friend and colleague, a member of my ordination committee and 
Pastor Frank. I had been surrounded by and caught up in words, gestures and touches that 
delighted, challenged, and called me into my new identity. Representatives from both 
church and academy were involved, highlighting the significance of my hybrid vocation, 
along with representatives from my family, highlighting that the simple dualism of 
hybridity can never quite capture all it is to which we might be vocationally called. And 
yet still I held it all together. Not yet broken, I felt wholly bolstered by the gathered. 
Words and songs and kneeling and hands – I felt able to hold myself together. 
And then came Joan. She is in her seventies, and yet she moves around the church 
building with a force unparalleled in many of our youth. She is serious about women in 
ministry. Faith for her is inseparable from justice. Talking about the Transfiguration with 
me one time, she laughed as she noted that the disciples wanted to stay on that mountain, 
make themselves “an ol’ boy’s club.” But Jesus said no. Those boys have got to get back 
down the mountain and get to the business of helping the people. Friends asked me 
afterwards who the lady was who made me cry. “She visibly broke you,” one 
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commented. “It was like your body crumbled for a moment,” said another. “There was no 
coming back.”  
Joan leans in to me, at her full height not standing that much taller than me 
kneeling. She rests one arm on my shoulder and brings her forehead to meet mine. I can 
see a small note pressed into her palm, which, unlike mine, is not shaking. A member of 
the deacon board, she knows the ritual format and she has prepared in advance. She 
knows what she wants to say and she knows how she wants to say it. “I will pour out my 
Spirit on all people. Your sons…and your daughters…will prophesy.” Her pauses and 
inflection let me know she is inserting me into this narrative, inscribing this Scripture into 
my body. Right here. Right now. And then as fast as she arrived, she is gone, and the next 
hands are on me.  
Before the service, Pastor Frank had warned me not to stand too quickly at the 
end of this onslaught of hands. I would be emotionally exhausted and a little dizzy, he 
warned, from being on my knees for so long. As Joan moves away, I realize how right he 
had been. The aisle is still full and I wonder if I will make it. Now people start sneaking 
tissues up in their hands to give to me to help me through the weepy, snotty mess my 
body tends to make in response to the Spirit’s influx. And at some point I become aware 
that everyone who has laid hands on me has been slowly gathering behind me. Tyler, the 
first whisperer, my husband, still has his hand on me, now on the space between my 
shoulder blades, and everyone is connecting to him. The brokenness I experience with 
each whisper transports the whisperer to this growing shape unfolding from my back. 
Some fragmented set of imagistic words that draws me to the prophet Isaiah – “But those 
who hope in the Lord will renew their strength. They will soar on wings like eagles; they 
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will run and not grow weary, they will walk and not be faint” (Isaiah 40:31) – flashes 
through my imagination. And I feel the bodies fanning from my back, stretching out 
across the sanctuary, as this promise of wings that will bear me up into ministry. 
And the promise is kept. I waver, but do not fall, as I sense these wings making 
me light, bearing me up the steps to the communion table to break bread and pour out 
juice. I step behind the table, place my hands on it and feel a jolt of gleeful surprise at the 
transformation’s effect. My hands feel different. They feel full of power – full of the 
power infused into them by the trail of hands that had blessed them to this table. I have 
been broken, cracked open, to make room for their power to reside in my hands. And 
now that power is pulsing with the desire to leap like sparks of electricity back and forth 
between the bread and cup, me, and those who have given it me – back to those who 
were, as one of my friends put it, loaning it to me for this occasion. By submitting to the 
authority of their hands to ordain me, I was gifted with the authority to bless them in 
return, by presiding but also by serving. Their authority has made me into something 
new: a person whose preaching and teaching now has an authority for them. 
Joan’s hands participated in ordaining me, but she also subsequently took my 
classes, “Jesus Christ and Salvation” and “God as Trinity.” Indeed, this service was also 
filled with others introduced in prior chapters – Miriam and Gary had speaking roles, 
Richard and Gene laid on hands – as well as class participants whom I will describe later: 
the woman who offered the charge from the church, the man whose lips brushed my 
cheek, the man who led me in my covenant with the church, and numerous others who 
joined the aisle to touch me into my new identity, to whisper me into ministry. These 
sparks of power, at that moment residing in my hands, did not flow one way. They were 
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passed back and forth between us, gathering energy, coming to life, functioning 
differently around our different subject positions and the ways we take them up. Power, 
indeed, I realized as my hands touched the table, is difficult to pin down. 
Being so firmly entrenched in this community is what gives me the power to 
shape its life. It is what enables me to speak to them using the skills, instincts and 
dispositions inculcated in me by the various habitus associated with my academic role in 
addition to my ministerial one. My implication in the community is what allows me to 
interject the wisdom of academic theology into its practices. But inasmuch as I can bring 
academic theology into this environment, this environment insists on its own ability to 
claim me and, in that, to shape also my academic theology. The two roles can be difficult 
to integrate, even loosely. 
 
Self-Implicating Method and My Academic Role 
The day after my ordination, a feminist theologian friend who had helped me 
discern my call is eager to hear how things had gone. Still feeling emotionally spent, I sit 
in my favorite chair in my living room and dial her number. We both self-identify as 
former Evangelicals, and we enjoy talking about the traces of that tradition that remain in 
us – both for ill and for good. I begin to try to explain to her this experience of 
“brokenness,” language common to both of our former faith lives. I am fully aware, I tell 
her, of the feminist implications of “brokenness” imagery, especially when it is 
experienced in such a bodily manner, and especially when it is inflicted on me by a 
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barrage of people who, despite the presence of Joan and a few other women, are mostly a 
band of white men with churchy authority.149  
Pacing the living room now, I feel my energy return. “And yet,” I continue, “it 
was beautiful.” As feminists, we value empowerment, emancipation, and wholeness. And 
despite the myriad anxieties and ambivalences I feel around my role as a Southern Baptist 
minister, I would be hard pressed to recall a time in life when I felt stronger, more free 
and more full than I did in these moments that I struggle now to describe without using 
some sort of violent metaphor. It was, for me, a shocking moment of being “bolstered by 
brokenness.”  
We toss this image – “bolstered by brokenness” – around for a few minutes, 
wondering how as academic feminist theologians we might make sense of these 
experiences of power in submission that we know with such bodily intimacy.150 The very 
set of habitus associated with my academic role that are making me question my religious 
experience begin to come to my aid. I realize that the same social theorists I was reading 
while discerning the call to ordination – theorists who outline the complex nature of 
power’s play in structural and social relationships – could help us understand how such 
submission can be empowering.  
                                                 
149 The texts my friend and I explicitly referenced in our conversation: Rita Nakashima 
Brock and Rebecca Parker, Proverbs of Ashes: Violence, Redemptive Suffering, and the 
Search for What Saves Us (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) and Serene Jones, 
Cartographies of Grace: Feminist Theory and Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2000). 
150 The relationship between agency and submission is receiving renewed attention in 
feminist scholarship. See, for example, Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: 
Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002) and Saba 
Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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Michel Foucault has shown us the disservice we do our interpretations of sociality 
when we imagine power to be located solely in a monarchic figure – like a church’s 
pastor – and not to be constellating between and accruing to myriad subject positions and 
their ways of being taken up within a social system or particular culture.151 All of a 
sudden I could see Foucault’s constellations mapped over all the bodies in the sanctuary 
that afternoon, mine included. But still, the habitus associated with my academic role 
nudged me, what was it about that submission that brought me such pleasure? What gave 
me that jolt of glee? 
I turned to my shelves that day, and numerous days following, to search for an 
answer. My fingers run over books’ spines and rest at a particular volume by Michel de 
Certeau.152 My hands – the power from the communion table still in them, but perhaps 
now as a memory’s trace – begin leafing through the pages, searching. Certeau, drawing 
on Foucault and Bourdieu, describes the role of power and submission, as well as desire, 
in the inscription of habitus into a body. We long to be named by particular social 
systems, he avers, and so we all – pastors and congregants and ordinands alike – submit 
to these systems, to let them give us our identity.  
                                                 
151 See, for example, Foucault’s discussion of “Docile Bodies” in Discipline and Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison, ed. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 135-169. I 
am borrowing the language of how a subject position is “taken up” from Pierre 
Bourdieu’s phrase, “prise de position,” which generally remains untranslated in his texts. 
This concept connotes the tension between how certain subject positions are made 
available to agents by the social systems in which they live, and the particular ways those 
agents take those positions up themselves. For more on this concept, see Pierre Bourdieu, 
“The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed” in Poetics 12 
(1983), 311-356. This essay is reprinted in Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural 
Production, ed. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
152 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). 
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Notes I have scribbled in margins draw my eyes’ attention. I reach a section 
where tentative penciled underlines become punctuated with pen markings. My hands flip 
slower now, revealing inked words that mark passages I tend to read more often: the 
script of the system that gives us our identity, Certeau argues, “would have no power if it 
were not able to support itself on the obscure desire [that one has] to exchange one’s flesh 
for a glorious body, to be written, even if it means dying, and to be transformed into a 
recognized word.”153 I begin grafting his words on to the words of my ordination 
covenant, both now digging in to my flesh together.  
Certeau’s language, like mine, is unavoidably violent. The process of being made 
legible within the structures and practices of a particular social system requires some 
form of dying to the possibility – which is actually always a delusional possibility – of 
self-determination outside of that system. I can never perform my ecclesial role apart 
from my academic, just as my academic role is always shaped by my ecclesial. Both are 
reaching toward some sort of loose, tense integration or, at least, co-operation with each 
other. The tension between them is not dissolving, but igniting, pressing each toward the 
ongoing search, the pursuit of an object I cannot quite name. I pull Bourdieu off my shelf 
now, too, and, sitting on my office floor, begin leafing through both texts, comparing 
underlined passages, finding new ones I had not noticed before, feeling the deep 
integration of these two writers coming together in my hands.  
Bourdieu describes habitus as a middle path between the radically free 
subjectivism of Sartre’s Existentialism and the overly deterministic objectivism of Levi-
                                                 
153 Ibid, 149. Certeau’s insight thus reveals the heart of my nuanced disagreement with 
Tanner in this chapter. Systems have no power outside of that which agents give them, 
true. And yet we find ourselves longing to give that power back to these systems in order 
to also keep it for ourselves. 
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Strauss’ Structuralism.154 Certeau describes this compromised path as a violent clash, 
because the habitus is written onto, even inscribed into, the flayed flesh of the subject. 
Freedom is always already shaped by the structures that make us, and remake us. The 
wisdom of habitus, for which we long, extracts a payment of something like a death to 
self from us when we receive it. We must be continually broken to be made continually 
new. Certeau’s language appears unapologetically theological next to Bourdieu’s. 
Perhaps this is why he draws my desire closer, especially in this moment when the 
habitus associated with my ministerial and academic identities are demanding answers of 
each other.  
Thought in the realm of FBC, Certeau’s insight reveals that the ritual of 
ordination in which we all participated could have no power, no meaning or effect, if we 
all did not desire to bear its power, meaning and effect in our own bodies. The hands that 
the ministers and deacons lay on me carry this power because they were instituted by the 
community to do so. And that power is now transported into my hands, now also 
instituted to carry it further. Named “Reverend” by the ritual, I continue to bear the 
ordination power back not only to the people who gave it and on to others, but also back 
into the institution itself that grants it. This power “is channeled and instrumented,” 
continues Certeau, helping me see that in this situation – in an echo of my friend’s idea 
that it is loaned to me – the way I hold the power of ordination is always turned into 
something that the broader ecclesial system can use, and then channeled by that system 
for that use. The institution shapes the power; the institution decides where the power 
will go. Put simply, and utterly unromantically, the institutional machine (of this 
                                                 
154 See Bourdieu, Outline, 4-5 for his discussion of Levi-Strauss’ objectivism and pp. 73-
76 for his discussion of Sartre’s subjectivism. 
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particular ecclesial community) empowers me primarily to be a cog that enables its own 
flourishing. And somehow, in the midst of all the ways my desire is constructed and 
made to want to resist this system, I also find myself also wanting to be this cog. 
Still sitting on my office floor, my lower back begins to ache from the hard 
surface. But I continue to compare texts and marginalia, each of which reveals an 
outworking spiral of conversation partners: Certeau is not making Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus more deterministic. No, his descriptions outline a fuller sense of subjective 
agency than Bourdieu’s. I lean back on my elbows to relieve the pressure from my back 
and take it all in. Perched there, I recall Ortner’s critique that in Bourdieu’s scheme, 
agents were mostly seen to reproduce the structures that shaped their habitus in a largely 
unconscious way, and I lean forward quickly to pull her down from my shelf too. I am no 
longer aware of the pain in my back. Indeed, I feel pleasure now at the idea of 
incorporating Ortner into my process; it does not feel right to let two men alone define 
the structure of a game inspired by a feminist conversation, no matter how much I love 
their theories.  
Certeau describes the process by which agents experience their reproduction of 
these structures and the way they cause slippage within them, both according to modes of 
resistance and submission. He writes, “the only force opposing this passion to be a sign,” 
meaning the only force that can disrupt our desires to simply reproduce the power of the 
institution’s meaning in our bodies, “is the cry, a deviation or an ecstasy, a revolt or flight 
of that which, within the body, escapes the law of the named.”155  
                                                 
155 Certeau, Practices of Everyday Life, 149. 
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I stand up and stretch, feeling my left hip crack, then make my way to my desk to 
grab some paper and a pen. I want to diagram this out by hand before I try to type 
constructed sentences. I scan Ortner’s pages again: she reminds me that there is a 
relationship between reproduction and transformation that occurs in moments of 
difference and slippage. I draw the church on my page, and place myself within it. I try to 
capture an image of the way its structures shape my various habitus and the way those 
habitus shape my ecclesial, ministerial role. I draw multiple, densely overlapping, arrows 
from the church directly into my body, which is represented by a little blob with an “N” 
in the center. As I attempt to draw my mutual shaping of the church’s social structures, I 
realize only one arrow, maybe two, is plenty for capturing the power of my presence 
therein. I read Certeau’s line again. There is a surplus, a moment of ecstasy, an almost 
masochistic, involuntary utterance of both protest and pleasure that erupts from the 
agent’s lips as she is wounded by the inscription of habitus into her flesh. “Yes,” I think, 
“that’s how I felt it.” That’s the shocking glee of my hands receiving power. 
I move to my keyboard and begin to type. Longing, wounding, ecstasy and desire 
come together as the subject is made and remade for the purpose of the institution’s use, 
but also as she resists – and resistance is always inextricably wrapped up with submission 
– the institutional grind. It is this inextricable blend of submission and resistance, as well 
as the spontaneous cry that erupts from somewhere between the two, that characterizes 
agency for Certeau and, now, in some way, for me. I am a female, bi-racial Southern 
Baptist minister: a rare commodity that many of the agents who hold together the power 
of the broader institution might not actually want to re-integrate. The tension between the 
markings of my gender and religious identity position me as something atypical, an 
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anomaly within a system I have been constituted to serve. I am an exception helping to 
prove the rule, and my presence is only possible because others with power within the 
system let it be. Indeed, by ordaining me, FBC too performs its own atypical act, an 
exception within the very rule that upholds the Baptist tension between church autonomy 
and denominational association.  
This type of bodily performance, by which ecclesial and academic roles become 
integrated within the same person, luring each toward a deeper understanding of the 
other, reveals the process by which my own habitus of pursuing wisdom is continually 
constituted. In charting some of this loose performative integration of roles, I have also 
demonstrated that my particular mode of bringing academic theology into the ecclesial 
environment is the same mode that prevents me from disrupting the wider ecclesial 
system. The pleasure I experience from belonging to this system, being named by it, also 
keeps me from wanting to undermine it; undermining the system, I realize, is more likely 
to result in my removal from it than it is to result in any long-standing social change. And 
I find that despite my leanings toward radical, intellectual pursuits, in the end becoming a 
cog, an utterly non-radical act, is about as radical as I am able to be. 
My experience is not normative for other academic theologians, and certainly not 
prescriptive. By accounting for the processes by which my own ecclesial and academic 
roles were loosely integrated, I hope that others might find a way to do it better. At the 
same time, accounting for this process has objectified a particular academic theologian as 
a character in this ethnographic theology. And in so doing, it reveals the possibilities and 
limitations of one method for how academic theology might intervene in the ecclesial 
environment.  
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Cogs in the Machine 
Feeling this loose performative integration between my academic and ecclesial 
roles, I begin to think about the people who take the classes I teach. I see Peter and 
Gloria, who describe themselves as “sneaky liberals” and “insurgents.” I see Joan and 
Harlan, and I recall Joan’s side comment to me one evening that the two of them are “that 
D-word we don’t say around here,” indicating that they, in contrast to their perception of 
the rest of the congregation, are not Republicans. I recall a moment in class when 
someone mentioned “The Conservative Takeover” in the SBC – complete with the tone 
and eyerolls that my capitalization of each word suggests – prompting various members 
of the group to offer knowing glances at each other.  
In this section, I engage some of FBC’s primary identity markers, particularly its 
denominational affiliation and, more fully, the relationship between its racial 
homogeneity and its understanding of mission. And I demonstrate how each contains a 
minority report, a trajectory of belief and practice that functions atypically in relation to 
the whole. The liberals have their “Democrat enclaves,” as Gloria puts it, for example. 
Those who are angry with the SBC join the Sunday school classes that tend not to use 
SBC curricula. The classes I taught, in fact, create a space in which both of these 
concerns find voice. Still, by having their own spaces within the larger whole, alternative 
viewpoints are kept from creating conflict, precisely because their own ways of directing 
their “moral energies” are not quashed.156 They are kept in line, their flourishing in fact 
                                                 
156 As Nancy Tatom Ammerman argues, people tend to join congregations that offer them 
a way to put their “moral energies” to work. See Pillars of Faith: American 
Congregations and Their Partners (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 268. 
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enabling the flourishing of the wider ecclesial system. There is no revolution at FBC, 
only the daily, indeed, pleasurable, grind of trying to make and remake church together.  
 Take, for example, one of the examples above: modes of relating to the SBC. It is 
not the case that members of the broader ecclesial system at FBC exhibit a particular 
conscious pride at denominational affiliation.157 Reflecting broader American trends of 
what Warner calls, “de facto Congregationalism,” in my experience, most members seem 
to have neither strongly positive nor strongly negative feelings about the SBC, but rather 
are mostly disengaged from the larger denominational body.158 Indeed, most FBC 
members of my acquaintance do not refer to the “conservative ascendance,” or 
“conservative resurgence,” to use more neutral language, at all. And if they were not in 
some way personally involved with it, they tend to know little about it. The wider 
ecclesial norm at FBC is to go with the flow of being an SBC church, with little 
conscious acknowledgment of that fact. 
Alternatively, by referring to this shift in denominational leadership as the 
“Conservative Takeover,” members of the classes I taught hold their primary 
congregational affiliation in a more polemical way. They intentionally distance 
                                                 
157 The rare occasions I have heard some form of explicit “denominational pride” have 
occurred around budget questions, in which there is an annual push by a small but 
outspoken group to increase FBC’s giving to the denominational missions fund. Of 
course, denominational pride is expressed more unconsciously in the ways that church 
members emphasize their congregational belonging, a distinctly Baptist kind of pride in 
itself. 
158 R. Stephen Warner, “The Place of the Congregation in the Contemporary American 
Religious Configuration,” in vol. 2 of American Congregations: New Perspectives in the 
Study of Congregations, ed. James P. Wind & James W. Lewis (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), 73. As Ammerman’s research also shows, at least half of 
Southern Baptists sense that the national body of the SBC has little to no effect on their 
local church practices. Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Baptist Battles: Social Change and 
Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist Convention (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1990), 258-271. 
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themselves from the convention, marking FBC as a faithful outpost for the “way things 
were before things went bad,” as they often describe the power shift. Continuing to go 
with the flow of being an SBC church, at the same time this group consciously resists that 
larger identity. They do not cease to be a part of the community that claims that identity. 
Nor do they affect any significant social change with regards to the aspects of that 
identity they dislike. For example, ordaining women is a longstanding FBC practice, 
begun before the SBC changed its formal policies on female ordination. It is, therefore, a 
continuation of a practice that has longer historical roots than the denominational 
practices that would deny it. The somewhat non-efficacious resistance that the group 
exhibits in fact contributes to FBC’s ability to maintain its affiliation with the SBC 
without repelling new members who might initially be put off by that affiliation from 
joining. And in this way, pockets of resistance end up contributing to the health of the 
broader ecclesial system. 
A larger identity marker for concern at FBC, in my view, is the homogeneity of 
the congregation’s racial and class make-up and the way that homogeneity relates the 
church’s sense of mission. Once again, as with the “de facto Congregationalism,” FBC is 
not bucking any national trends with this homogeneity. Sunday morning at ten o’clock, or 
thereabouts, is often named as the “most segregated hour of the week.” Michael Emerson 
in fact describes American congregations as “hyper-segregated,” as only 2.5 percent are 
comprised of a “stable, long-term ethnic mix.”159 Therefore, FBC is not one of the rare 
                                                 
159 Nancy T. Ammerman, “Congregations: Local, Social, and Religious,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. Peter B. Clarke (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 568. Ammerman is citing Michael O. Emerson and Rodney M. 
Woo, People of the Dream: Multiracial Congregations in the United States (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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churches that intentionally cultivates a more heterogeneous community out of a 
commitment, theological or otherwise, to diversity.  
Rather, the primary mission focus at FBC is on creating an atmosphere and 
programs in which “our friends, family and coworkers who do not know Christ,” an oft-
repeated phrase, will feel comfortable. In other words, the congregation is concerned with 
witnessing to and drawing people who members already know into the community. And 
as people tend to associate with others who share their similar experiences, Ammerman 
argues, one’s friends, family and co-workers tend also to share one’s racial, economic, 
and class traits. It is not that people “set out to make a choice based on class and race, but 
the results are often just that.”160 And in this way, as with many American churches, the 
primary mission focus at FBC contributes to the perpetuation of the congregation’s 
homogeneity.  
Take, for example, the 4th of July parades at which the Frisbees mentioned in 
chapter two were handed out. These caused an underground stir. This was evangelistic 
activity directed toward those who, like the majority in attendance at FBC on Sunday 
mornings, were coming in from neighboring suburbs for a particular purpose. FBC 
members engaged their bodily needs (free bottled water to quench the thirst of Southern 
summer heat) and potential bodily wants (Frisbee toys with which they could enjoy 
leisure activity).161 But these material needs and wants were much more frivolous than a 
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
161 Of course, these toys also had “the plan of salvation” and our contact information 
printed on them, but even that constituted a perceived spiritual need and want. While I 
have discussed the ways in which church members experience dissatisfaction with this 
model so far, it also produces effects that we as a congregation celebrate. At least one of 
the adult baptisms we celebrated in my year of ethnographic study was related to 
someone receiving a Frisbee at the parade and following up on its instruction. 
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safe place to sleep or food they might not be able to provide for themselves. And so, the 
question of why water was handed out at this event, to people who could afford to 
purchase it from the street vendors themselves, when the streets are full of thirsty 
homeless people every day, gets muttered among church members whose understanding 
of mission does not cohere with using resources in this way. 
Therefore, within this primary way of framing missions, there runs another 
current of belief and practice. FBC’s social outreach programs focus less on drawing 
people in to broader church life, and more on reaching towards the needs of the socially 
disadvantaged people living in the downtown core. They are not directed toward 
members’ immediate social networks, but toward a more socially disadvantaged group 
that tends to be more racially diverse than FBC’s general make-up, even as they are held 
together by shared class status.162 Almost all of the people who take the classes I taught 
volunteer or have volunteered in some capacity with one or more of these programs, and 
some exhibit outright disdain for programs like the Frisbee distribution. In addition, 
Miriam and Gary, along with their children, Gloria, Joan and I, all serve in some official, 
volunteer capacity that is central to one or another particular program’s functioning. The 
group is not necessarily uninterested in witnessing; but they are more interested in their 
witness being part of a larger, social justice framework. As Gloria frames her own 
                                                 
162 The desires motivating this “outreach” are complex. Some might want to avoid – 
consciously or unconsciously – disrupting the make up of FBC’s “family.” People who 
volunteer with the church’s program for the homeless frequently share a need to get over 
their fear around the guests in order to serve them. On the other hand, many also want to 
avoid linking social services to a willingness to “convert” or attend church services, as 
guests to FBC’s programs have shared that they do not like this common evangelistic 
strategy. The language commonly used to describe the homeless people who come to 
FBC’s programs – “guests” – further affirms this point. On the one hand, “they” are not 
encountered as one of “us,” and on the other, the programs are primarily characterized by 
hospitality for guests rather than focused on the conversion of others. 
 173 
involvement, “I think I’m probably more social gospel…you gotta do what you say you 
believe. You gotta do things to make the world better…help the poor…” 
Despite not being the primary missions focus of the church, the work FBC does in 
social programs is nevertheless diverse. The church participates in “Room In The Inn,” a 
Nashville-wide ministry to homeless people. It founded “The Next Door” ministry – 
which helps women transition back into society out of prison, rehabilitation or 
homelessness – and it continues to lease to this now independent ministry a valuable 
downtown building for offices and residences at one dollar per year.163 The church works 
with the “Christian Women’s Job Corps,” which prepares socially disadvantaged women 
for gainful employment. Sunday school departments participate in Habitat builds. And 
finally, the church’s “clothes closet,” which hands out clothing to homeless people, and 
conversational English classes for immigrants seeking to bolster their language skills, 
were both instigated by members who saw a need that was not being met. Even though 
this work is not a part of FBC’s dominant mission narrative, then, it fulfills a significant 
aspect of who the congregation understands itself to be. 
By maintaining these pockets of practice that resist the dominant narrative for 
mission at FBC, the church creates spaces for alternative understandings of mission to 
flourish. As the same time, in so doing, these spaces continue to support the 
homogeneous make-up of the congregation. Ministry to immediate social networks tends 
to draw people in; ministry to people with different racial and class characteristics tends 
                                                 
163 For more on The Next Door, see http://www.thenextdoor.org/ - The Next Door 
occupies a place of almost legendary status in the life of FBC. A group of women came 
together to pray about a building the church owned but was not using. This small group 
quickly grew to over a hundred “Wild Praying Women,” a name that still is used when 
this story gets told years later. The organization has received national recognition and has 
recently opened centers in Chattanooga and Knoxville.  
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to look outwards. In fact, tension seems to erupt – with little to no effect – when this 
balance is disrupted. One informant told me about how she attended a church meeting in 
which a consultant instructed the group on how to attract a “particular type of 
congregant.” The consultant did not name who this “particular type” was, although his 
advice to install big-screen televisions in Sunday school departments, renovate the 
classrooms, and use full color printing in worship bulletins indicated that he was referring 
to middle- and upper-middle class congregants. “If you want to get the homeless to join,” 
he said, “all you need to do is fling open the doors.”  
The way my informant tells this story, the consultant was not necessarily making 
a judgment between these two populations; he was simply outlining the appropriate 
tactics for attracting each (although, one might question whether or not his plan for 
attracting homeless people would actually work). Nevertheless, my informant tells this 
story with anger in her voice: “I shouted ‘Amen’,” she said, “and I said to the people 
around me, ‘don’t we want the homeless to join? Let’s save this money and just fling the 
doors open!’” Her outburst was greeted with silence. The narrative she wanted to tell fit 
neither the dominant practices of perpetuating homogeneity, nor the more atypical 
practices of reaching outwards toward alternative populations. Her view, in fact, was too 
radical. The silence with which it was greeted revealed that there are limits to the social 
change that atypical beliefs and practices can accomplish.  
Moreover, that these atypical practices can tend to get caught up in the larger 
institutional grind reveals that theologians might need to think more carefully not only 
about which modes of academic theology might be helpful to aid everyday theologies 
work through their context-specific problems, but also the tactics by which such 
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theological programs can be integrated into ecclesial life. As we see here, my own 
academic theological interventions, which focused on helping congregants bring to full 
articulation their views of Jesus Christ, salvation and God, and which focused on 
cultivating more expansive visions of each, nevertheless ended up affirming most of the 
theological commitments already held – or at least accepted – across the wider ecclesial 
system. 
 
The Classroom as Atypical Space 
 As I have already begun making clear, the classes I taught on Sunday nights 
tended to attract FBC members who associate themselves more with this undercurrent to 
church life, both in terms of their strong sense that the SBC’s conservative ascendance 
was a “Takeover,” and in terms of the way they understand missions. For the most part, 
they also saw the classes I taught as one of these atypical spaces within congregational 
life. In this section I establish that these classes functioned like FBC’s other atypical 
practices I have described here, both in the sense that they functioned differently – or, at 
least, were viewed as functioning differently – than other FBC classes, and in the sense 
that their atypical nature was easily incorporated into the larger ecclesial equilibrium. 
 Before I get to describing the classes’ atypical nature, I should offer some brief 
words on who took them. A core group of ten people took both classes—six men and 
four women. Of the six men, four had previously been employed in ministerial work, 
three as senior pastors, one as a music minister. None of the women had previously been 
employed in ministry leadership. All ten do, however, participate in some form of lay 
leadership at FBC, as does almost every member of both courses. When I conducted 
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interviews after each course, all ten core members participated with relation to one course 
or the other, except for two.164 Of the ten, seven had perfect or almost perfect attendance 
across the two courses. All ten have already been introduced in the preceding chapters: 
Miriam and Gary, Elaine, Peter, Richard, Joan and Harlan, Gene, Rickie, and Mike.165  
Overall, both classes tended to draw slightly more men than women. Yet, while 
men in general seemed more comfortable talking than women, among those who talked 
the most, the gender division was equal. Among the men in the classes, at least half were 
retired ministers.166 The official enrollment for each course hovered between twenty-two 
and twenty-five members, which is high for a Life Change University course. On any 
given night, there were approximately eighteen to twenty-two members present.  
Just by describing the demographics of the courses then, a few exceptional details 
stand out. First, while many (but not all) education classes at FBC are divided by gender, 
marital/family status and/or age group, these Sunday night classes were intentionally co-
ed, mixed family status, and inter-generational.167 And these were all aspects of the 
                                                 
164 One denied my request for an interview, the other attended only sporadically and so I 
did not make a request of her 
165 Some other demographic details: all ten are white, middle-class professionals and 
retired middle-class professionals. There are two married couples in the mix: Miriam and 
Gary (in their late thirties), and Joan and Harlan (both in their seventies). Elaine, in her 
late thirties, is divorced. Miriam, Gary and Elaine all have young children. Gene, about 
fifty years old, is single. Peter, Richard and Mike are all retired, and are all married with 
grown children. Peter is the oldest of the three, in his late seventies. Rickie, also around 
fifty years old, is married with no children. 
166 FBC in fact has many retired ministers as members, enough that their integration into 
lay life is not strained or a significant challenge to our current pastoral team’s authority. 
As Richard pointed out, one likely reason so many ministers and theologically educated 
people settle in our congregation is because of its proximity to Lifeway, the SBC 
publishing company, as many ministers finish up their careers there. 
167 Classes divided by gender are more common in the evening programs: consider the 
Beth Moore and pastor’s martial arts class, mentioned in the introduction. Divisions by 
marital/family status and age are more common on Sunday mornings than evenings. 
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classes that members said they appreciated, particularly with regards to the inter-
generational component. This was also a group of leaders. On the few nights when a 
deacons’ meeting was scheduled at the same time, for example, the room felt strangely 
empty. And finally, it was a highly educated group, with all of the retired ministers 
having some form of advanced theological training. Nearly everyone had a Bachelor’s 
degree; a few had Master’s degrees; and at least four members had Ph.D.’s. As a 
somewhat more elite group of leaders within the broader church structure, then, it might 
seem strange that they would think of themselves as insurgents, but they also tend to be 
leaders within more atypical areas of church life, and/or alternative voices within larger 
power structures.  
I outlined the roster of Sunday night course offerings in the introduction to this 
dissertation, noting its broadly Evangelical appeal. The classes I taught fit within this 
roster atypically, not only because they were studies of doctrine, but also because of their 
style and goals.168 This atypical nature became especially evident when, on the final night 
of the “God as Trinity course,” I set aside fifteen minutes for us all to write responses to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Furthermore, because there are no visible same-sex couples at FBC, classes designated 
for either men or women (there is also no formal recognition of sex/gender beyond this 
dichotomy), are not open to couples. As more stable, enduring communities, Sunday 
morning, “Sunday school,” classes tend to attract couples enrolling in a class together. 
With the LCU turnover each semester, this coupling is less prevalent for Sunday night 
classes. For example, Harlan attended a previous course I taught, while Joan attended 
another elsewhere in the building. 
168 A brief note on how a typical class proceeded: the syllabus framed each class with 
guiding questions and a list of who would be studied. Some looked up thinkers in 
advance online or in aids they have in their personal libraries, but most did not. Each 
class opened with prayer, then brief discussion on the theme for the day (if there was 
one). Usually I prepared a handout that included relevant or interesting quotations from 
whoever we were studying, sometimes for us to interpret together, sometimes simply to 
give a feel for the thinker. We then moved between brief lectures by me on key figures 
and class discussion, with the lines between these two forms of discourse often blurred. 
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questions like, what had worked? What did not work? What surprised you? What 
challenged you? And so on. Following a comment from another class member, “it [the 
class] has been a[n intellectual] stretch,” Joan responded to much agreement from others: 
…and I think that’s atypical. What I’m trying to say is that it’s unusual to 
have – in a Baptist church – a course where you have to think [She says 
this with such a dry type of humor that is not innocent in its execution, and 
everyone starts laughing. I quip, “that is definitely going to make it into 
my dissertation,” and the laughter becomes raucous at the joke Joan and I 
have created together]. No, seriously, it’s like you’re spoon-fed, you 
know? Read this. Fill in the blank. That kind of thing. Although some of 
what we’ve discussed has gone way over my head, I still would do it 
again. It was [she pauses to find the right words] you’re learning, you’re 
stretching, you’re seeing what other people think. And also, that there’s 
just not conclusions to everything. 
 
According to Joan, our classes were “atypical” in part because they allowed 
authority to be questioned. People were invited to come up with their own answers, and 
leave theological questions open rather than tie them up with neat conclusions. Departing 
from the more typical “fill-in-the-blank” format of much of the curriculum used 
elsewhere in FBC’s life, these courses endeavored to help members come up with their 
own avenues of thinking and doing. 
Joan’s comments, and others offered like them, are not necessarily criticisms of 
the other courses on offer. She and others describe other LCU courses they have 
immensely enjoyed. Rather, it is a direct, focused, positive appraisal of the rarer (in their 
experience) kind of critical reflection – the very type that an academically trained 
theologian is able to lead – engaged in our time together. 
Indeed, it was this desire for critical reflection and deeper, broader thinking – the 
very aspects that made the class feel atypical – that bonded the group together more than 
their demographics. For example, while these courses tended to attract church members 
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who gravitate more toward social justice concerns and left leaning politics, they also had 
some conservative members. Some of these members drifted away after a couple of 
sessions. But one of the more active members of both classes, Mike, was among those of 
a more conservative bent who stayed.169 As he put it one night, regarding the diversity of 
our group and his own place in it: 
I’ve been surprised to realize that I’m sitting with fellow Baptists, with the 
different backgrounds and the different beliefs and interpretations of 
beliefs…And we’ve enjoyed hearing each other, I think…And it all, it causes you 
to leave with the idea that maybe I need to search just a little more…  
 
Whether “liberal” or “conservative,” then, the people who took the classes I 
taught all seemed to want to engage processes of being opened up and challenged in the 
Christian beliefs and practices they already embody. They expressed dissatisfaction with 
the types of courses that give them simple answers, instead wanting help to develop not 
only their own answers, but also their own questions. From the framework of this 
dissertation project, they wanted to develop the skills and dispositions of pursuing the 
wisdom of the faith that was already in their bones. 
 Given that these classes can be established as atypical spaces within the 
congregation, we must now ask how they related to the wider ecclesial structure. Like 
other atypical spaces within church life, the classes I taught caused their members to 
experience more conscious forms of tension and coherence with the broader church 
                                                 
169 I refer to Mike as “conservative” based not only on my own assessment, but also 
because he is repeatedly described as such by other class members in interviews. Self-
described “liberals” point to him as an example of valued diversity within the group. One 
night, as we were dismissing class, I caught Mike and said, while laughing, “oh Mike, I 
feel like you’re always saying, ‘well it’s this, of course, or that,’ and I’m always going, 
‘but what about this, and what about that?’” I loosely grasped his wrist while saying this, 
and gestured on his arm the motion of picking at him over and over again. He walked 
away laughing saying, “but it’s all good; it’s all good!” 
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structure, forms of tension and coherence that are not, of course, by necessity either bad 
or good. But at the same time, similar to how the ministerial authority I was given was 
channeled and instrumented to the larger system’s use, the tools acquired by members of 
these classes was integrated into the ecclesial structure in a way that enabled that 
system’s flourishing more than its disruption. And in this way, the intervention of 
academic theology into everyday theologies – at least in the mode of intervention I 
attempted – did not disrupt, but rather served the broader ecclesial structures. 
A moment from a particular “God as Trinity” class will help clarify this first 
point, that the classes created moments of tension with the wider ecclesial system. That 
morning we had sung a Trinitarian hymn in worship, but we had left out the third verse 
about the Spirit to save time for the larger medley. We opened our discussion that night 
on the topic of the hymn and a number of class members expressed intense shock at what 
we had done, but with the simultaneous and somewhat paradoxical admittance that “I 
probably would never have noticed it though if I weren’t taking this class.” What they 
were learning in class impacted their experiences of the rest of church life, causing 
moments of incongruity that led to their deeper reflection on why we do things the way 
we do. “I wanted to know what you guys would think of it,” said a class member arriving 
that evening, eagerly noting that she had been thinking about the hymn all day.  
Her experience, which resonated with that of others in the class, myself included, 
had involved first noticing the disruption, as she might not have done before studying 
Trinitarian questions explicitly. Then, periodically throughout the day, she had mulled 
over the disruption, thus stimulating her desire to hear what others thought about it too. 
And then finally, she introduced the recollection of the disruption into the evening 
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conversation, and conversed with others about it. In this way, her experience in the class 
had given rise to a new way of interacting with Christian practice that simultaneously 
gave rise to a personal and corporate pursuit of wisdom in order to understand that new 
experience in light of the rest of her faith experiences.  
Some sort of change in larger social practices is certainly possible in this instance. 
Perhaps a choir member from the class would report our conversation to the music 
director and he, in turn, would shift the practice of cutting the verses about the Holy 
Spirit out of hymns to save time. This could create the ripples of effect that Tanner 
mentions. As the congregation sang about the Holy Spirit’s power more often, its deep, 
embodied understanding of the Spirit’s importance would be affirmed. This could have a 
cyclical effect, such that removing the verse about the Holy Spirit from hymns would 
come to seem completely unnatural, as it might in a church that more intentionally 
affirmed the Trinity. And with time, the congregation could be inculcated with a more 
powerful pneumatology that further impacted other ecclesial practices.  
All of this is certainly possible. Indeed, Mike commented that he would speak 
with the choir director about the hymn and report back to us, but he never did. This might 
be because once he left our atypical space, any attempts to rock the boat alone elsewhere 
felt less possible than they had seemed when bolstered by twenty other people calling for 
the rocking. Indeed, as Mike had been the one defending the possibility that the verse had 
been cut “only” to save time, perhaps he did not bring it up with the choir director later 
because upon further reflection he had seen the other class members’ point, and had felt 
that asking what initially felt like an innocent question would instead come across as 
critique. Or maybe he simply forgot. It is possible for the recognition of cracks in the 
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system to produce social change, but it is also rare, as it is also difficult. And it might 
require a more focused plan for integrating theology’s work into the broader system; even 
the force of a good, communicable argument does not by necessity create strong effects.  
Based on the way that I tried to introduce academic theology into the ecclesial 
environment – a way, I have argued, that makes it able to be heard in the ecclesial 
environment – it seems that the social changes that are possible and which are, indeed, 
more common, are not particularly dramatic. But that does not mean they are not worth 
pursuing. Indeed, what they reveal is that inasmuch as social change might be a goal for 
academic theologians to bring about in ecclesial environments, the process of pursuing 
wisdom itself might be its own type of good. 
Just as often as the group’s reflections in the course created moments of tension 
for them with the larger church structure, they also created moments of deeper coherence. 
Harlan, for example, noted that his belief in the Trinity was more consciously affirmed as 
he sang the Doxology benediction one morning in worship, a chorus that is sung as often 
as any other hymn, but has no standard, repeated liturgical function at FBC. In addition to 
moments of disruption, then, as with the removal of Spirit from a song, class members 
also experienced recognitions of coherence on occasions when they praised the fullness 
of the Trinity, each person by name. As much as the pursuit of wisdom entails holding 
the tensions between practices together in loose, performative integrations of the ways 
they shape us, it also involves recognizing these moments of surprising coherence.  
While any impact on the larger church structure remained at best largely 
imperceptible, then, our shared conversational practices, as atypical practices, were 
nevertheless able to reorient participants to the larger structure in fresh ways. And in that 
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re-orienting, the ripples that were sent into the broader community may not have changed 
it, but they contributed to its flourishing anyway. Joan, for example, shared a story about 
one such ripple: 
One thing this course did for me – I had an assignment to do a devotion 
for the deacons, and in keeping with the, our [FBC’s] theme for this year – 
Worship and Prayer – I chose to think of hymns to sing that we sing 
specifically to God, Jesus or Spirit. And that, this class triggered that 
thought in me that I developed for that devotion. 
 
As Christian Scharen has argued, “for most people most of the time, worship is less 
formation as con-formation, a reinforcement and reminder of what is important in life as 
they envision it in that place.”170 While devotions based on the Trinity might be atypical 
for Deacons’ meetings, they are certainly not disruptive, or even controversial. By 
carrying a little piece of our class to another room in the church, Joan did not disrupt or 
dismantle anything. But she did remind FBC’s crucial leadership team, whether they 
were aware of it or not, of a belief they hold but rarely articulate. Like a missionary from 
our field, arriving to a place she finds needs no converting, Joan was able to share in a 
collective remembering that affirmed the coherence of our community. The very tool she 
had picked up from our atypical space was put to work for the larger institution’s use.  
 
New Tools for Our Tool-Kits 
Scharen further grounds this distinction between worship practices – or, for our 
purposes here, any ecclesial practice, like religious education – as con-formation or 
formation in the difference Ann Swidler draws between “settled” and “unsettled” lives.171 
                                                 
170 Christian Scharen, Public Worship and Public Work: Character and Commitment in 
Local Congregational Life (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2004), 221. 
171 Ibid, 221. 
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Settled lives are marked by periods of normalcy, when culture seems so “intimately 
integrated with action” that it becomes difficult to see the role of agents in the 
reproduction of social structures.172 For Scharen, settled lives thus give rise to the con-
formative nature of practices, as we saw with Joan’s picking up and carrying of a 
Trinitarian framework into another location within the church. Alternatively, unsettled 
lives mark periods of dramatic change, like with rites of passage or religious conversions 
(consider, for example, my own ritualized ordination).  
Unsettled lives describe times when the standard, accepted ways of doing things 
no longer work. They expose the need for new strategies of action – new tools for the 
tool-kit – to be formed from the very cultural elements that have seemed to fail.173 In 
these times, small shifts in the deploying of cultural elements can lead to genuine change 
in the ways people’s habitus are constituted and, thus, in the ways they are oriented to 
their worlds. It is possible that revolutionary change can result from such minor shifts, as 
Tanner argues, but as we will see here, in practice these changes might instead occur on a 
much more local, personal level. Indeed, they happen according to Tanner’s more 
process-oriented goals of shaping relationships and identities of the people who engage in 
the conversation. I have argued throughout this dissertation that tensions arising between 
our competing and cohering roles might not be able to be resolved, but that we can 
nevertheless live with the tensions through the loose, performative integrations of various 
habitus contributing to wisdom’s pursuit. When we do this, we begin to fashion new tools 
for our own tool-kits. This happened in the “God as Trinity” class. 
                                                 
172 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies” in American Sociological 
Review, 1986. Vol. 51 (April: 273-286), 278. 
173 See Swidler, 278ff for a fuller discussion of “Unsettled lives.” 
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I found the “God as Trinity” class much more difficult to teach than the “Jesus 
and Salvation” one. I struggled to find the prompts that could get conversations going 
and, when those conversations did start to get traction, students would often shut them 
down by claiming, “It’s just all a mystery.” They lacked the tools to understand where I 
was coming from, just as I lacked the tools to understand where they were coming from. 
We needed to find our way toward each other in conversation. Before I realized my own 
failings, however, I initially found myself frustrated by the group’s constant foreclosures. 
I would become nervous for teaching and, as a result, enjoyed it less. And both of these 
factors compounded the problems further as we all struggled to find the motivations and 
words to get us back into dialogue. In that moment, my pedagogical instincts directed me 
toward a practice upon which they often rely when students seem unwilling to talk, 
offering an impromptu lecture. 
And so, I launched into the following, as a somewhat frustrated response to 
another conversation foreclosure: 
The way that I think about mystery is that mystery is not the thing we have 
when we run out of things to say, because mystery is so much better than 
that. And mystery is actually the place where we start. We can do 
ourselves a disservice when we make mystery the place where we run out 
of answers to our questions. God is mystery from beginning to end. And 
even when we think we’ve caught some sort of glimpse of understanding, 
all we’re still doing is walking through mystery when we’re talking about 
God. And so as we go through, it will be interesting to notice the places 
where we do think we know something about God, and to realize that 
those are actually places of mystery as well. And the places where we 
don’t know something probably aren’t all that different from the places 
where we do. That no matter where we are, we’re walking through the 
mystery of God. Because I know that the Trinity is difficult and 
frustrating. But I think that if we hold on to that idea of walking through 
the mystery of God, it will make it a little more pleasurable. 
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This speech functioned as a turning point in our discussions because it articulated an 
unnamed tension hidden in our conversation, therefore unearthing some new tools with 
which we could work. Our disagreement had been over what mystery is. Naming that 
disagreement allowed the tension – a tension we were not understanding – to break.  
The following week, as I opened the class, Richard offered the comment, “I think 
where you ended last session was really appropriate, talking about the mystery that must 
remain.” My words – which had grown out of their words – had lingered, causing a shift 
in the way our discussions were approached. This tiny shift contributed to the ongoing 
process of constructing a habitus of pursuing wisdom. Fulfilling one of the things it is 
teachers should do, I had helped hear them into speech. Other class members noted 
agreement with Richard’s consideration. My confidence – and pleasure – with teaching 
began to return as they began to catch themselves when they turned to mystery as a way 
of halting inquiry. Indeed, the desire to use mystery in this way even became a point for 
humor in our discussion, with people saying things like, “It’s all just 
mystery…[pause]…but I know, I know, that means keep going.” 
 This mini-lecture also became something I needed to build upon continually to 
maintain its efficacy. As something new, still nevertheless drawing on Christian 
intellectual and practical traditions, these words introduced more instability into lives that 
were already unsettled by the situation in which they had placed themselves. We might 
not have been starting from scratch. Aspects of the wisdom we pursued together were 
grounded in traditions that the group – to varying degrees – already embodied, with 
varying degrees of consciousness. Still, as Swidler points out, when lives become 
unsettled, even though agents might draw on the cultural resources they have long had at 
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their disposal, the process from articulating a newly formed idea out of those resources to 
its acceptance as common sense is slow.174  
In an effort to sustain this momentum for using the new tools we were acquiring 
together, I instigated an open discussion of why we struggle so much to talk about God. 
Employing an intentional pedagogical strategy, I asked them in a direct way to reflect on 
the difficulty they were experiencing:  
So sometimes when we’re thinking theologically, I feel like Trinity is the 
hardest one [i.e. doctrine]. Jesus Christ, no problem, salvation, not that 
difficult, Holy Spirit, I’m all over it [with these last few words, I leaned 
back in my chair and mimed a dismissive “no problem” gesture with my 
hands. Then, leaning forward again and clasping my hands together on 
the table...] But the Trinity feels like a difficult one to me, and it feels like 
a scarier one too – something about thinking my way into the mystery of 
God feels overwhelming, and I wondered if others felt the same way. It 
feels like there’s a lot at stake. It feels different.175 
 
Peter responded, with his usual willing openness to the new: 
                                                 
174 Ibid, 279. 
175 It might be interesting to reflect for a moment on my method in order to offer a layer 
of self-reflexivity to it. With both these words, and the words on mystery incorporated 
above it, I am experiencing discomfort at including a chunk of my own impromptu 
speech, transcribed directly from my recordings, into the ethnographic reporting here. As 
scholars, we tend to revise and edit and polish our thoughts before offering them for 
public consumption. Off-the-cuff speech is reserved for question and answer periods in 
public presentations, a genre that is by nature improvisational. We almost never put our 
impromptu speech into print, however. With these speech, even more so that the one on 
mystery, some of what I said is actually embarrassing: the phrase, “Holy Spirit, I’m all 
over it,” paired with a dismissive gesture is utterly ridiculous, as I recall thinking as soon 
as it came out of my mouth and I leaned back in my chair. Indeed, being able to get away 
with saying it depended on the already marginal status of pneumatological doctrines 
within FBC’s theological commitments. I thus perpetuated what I perceive to be 
theological problems in my church with a flippant claim. Despite the failings of my 
speech, however, I am convicted by the power imbalance implicit in the ways 
ethnographic self-representation can become polished in contrast to the ways we 
represent others. Furthermore, I am convinced that study of our own everyday theological 
speech can yield similar types of helpful insights as study of the everyday theological 
speech of our ethnographic partners. My own speech is as full of context-specific 
compromises – conscious and unconscious – as anyone else in the class. 
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I agree, and I think it’s the temptation to say, well I can’t understand that, 
and go on to other things. But there’s something about the mystery of God 
that is like a magnet. It’s not that I don’t want, or that I want to solve the 
mystery – that’s not it. It’s that I can’t leave it alone. I keep coming back 
and, well, ok, I’ll never know it all, but I wanna know more. 
 
Drawing on knowledge I knew had been inculcated into me through reading for my 
doctoral exams, the origins and specific references for which remained beyond my 
articulation and, even, awareness in the moment, I responded, “I do think of theology as 
the words that move us between God and God.” Drawing on tools that my academic role 
had made second nature to me, the image also resonated with a few class members who – 
drawing again on their new tools – repeated it in subsequent classes, as well as in one of 
my post-course interviews. Peter’s openness invited us all to follow, and we began to 
delve deeper into the dangers we feel are associated with theological speech.  
Miriam, who at that time was working on reading the entire Bible in a year, and 
was finding herself shocked by stories she had never read before, brought up God’s wrath 
against idolaters in the Old Testament. Elaine responded: 
I think that’s what makes the Trinity such a kind of scary concept to 
wrestle with. You don’t wanna get it wrong [people laugh quietly and 
somewhat awkwardly in agreement]. You don’t wanna give Jesus too 
much credit and not give everybody his due. And so you have this prism 
to look through and you don’t know how do I address my prayers? What 
am I supposed to do here? I think there’s just more at stake. You 
remember that vengeful God! 
 
Others resonated and murmured notes of agreement with Elaine’s description. And in that 
moment, a theological distinction rose out of our shared practice. We have seen 
throughout this dissertation that the group laughs in the face of heresy. Indeed, they 
deploy claims that they intentionally name as heretical as theologically productive 
 189 
tools.176 They have no problem, it seems, experimenting with a belief that does not jibe 
with the authoritative beliefs of others. We have even seen that there is a sense among 
some in this group that truth sometimes lies in the places of resistance to authority. The 
radical individualism of American Evangelicalism and the Baptist affirmation of self-
determination invite such resistance.177 But in such a schema of resisting worldly 
authorities, there remains one final arbiter of truth in this group’s understanding: God. 
And so getting God wrong becomes a key place where theological freedom hits a wall. 
Naming this fear out loud undermined its ability to grip us so firmly. Finding the 
grace and space to converse, the group cultivated more and more tools for talking about 
God, and I continued to learn how to frame conversations that invited freer speech. As we 
came to the close of the course, and I was preparing to teach about theological responses 
                                                 
176 The group’s consistent deploying of “heresy” as an intentional mode of speech echoes 
Bourdieu’s understanding of how unarticulated doxa – that is, the “self-evident” things 
we don’t say out loud (or even bring to conscious articulation) because they mark the 
“quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles 
of organization” – is brought into the realm of speech (Bourdieu, Outline, 164). For 
Bourdieu, doxa can only be brought into the realm of discourse as orthodoxy when it is 
“euphemized,” (meaning that such discourse is disguised in order to be made palatable) 
or by dismissing it as heterodoxy through the articulation of blasphemy (see Pp. 159ff.). 
“Heretical power,” argues Bourdieu, entails “offering the means of expressing 
experiences usually repressed” (171). “Heretical discourses” actually “derive their power 
from the capacity to objectify unformulated experiences, to make them public” (170-171). 
For Bourdieu, bringing doxa to light by blasphemy does not have the intentional aspect to 
it that it did in our classroom. Nevertheless, the structure by which he understands 
heterodoxy to relate to doxa and discourse, is helpful to us here for understanding what it 
was the members of the class were doing with their playful heretical speech. By repeating 
“heresies” that they had heard before, class members were continuing to draw into speech 
aspects of Christian traditions that hover beyond both our articulation and our acceptance 
but which, nevertheless, remain present as a surplus to our orthodox claims.  
177 For more on the relationship between modern American religion and the ways in 
which heresy is no longer a possibility so much as it is a necessity for being able to claim 
religious affiliation, see Peter Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary 
Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1979), see 
especially Pp. 26ff. 
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to the Holocaust, I decided to try an activity I thought might allow them to use some of 
these tools they had acquired in a more powerful way. This activity, which I had read 
about in a book, functions as a communal performance of the clash between concretion 
and abstraction in the theological pursuit of wisdom. In it, the teacher invites the group to 
brainstorm answers to the question, “Where is God?” She then reads to them a 
particularly unsettling passage from Elie Wiesel’s Night, and asks them the same 
question again: “Where is God?” The author of the activity promises that after hearing 
the Wiesel passage read, no one can offer the somewhat trite answer, “God is 
everywhere,” likely to have been given in the first round.178 Thusly, the clash between 
concretion and abstraction that we had been performing all semester long would be 
revealed to the class in a dramatic example. Over-trusting this author’s advice, as well as 
his particular read of Wiesel’s text, I was perhaps somewhat foolishly over-eager to see 
how the group would respond.  
I moved from my chair, to stand at the white-board. “Where is God?” I asked 
them. The first answer came from Mike, “Everywhere.” Perfect, I thought to myself. This 
was going to work splendidly. “Right here,” said another. “Within us,” “in my heart,” 
“Heaven,” called out others. When the answers died down, I handed around copies of the 
Wiesel passage – a brutal passage in which a child is hung in a concentration camp – and 
asked for someone to read it aloud. Mike fluttered his hand to volunteer, and we all began 
to be drawn in by his voice. In the midst of the scene, a character asks, “Where is God,” 
and the author, also a character in the scene, answers that God is on the gallows in the 
                                                 
178Jon Pahl, Shopping Malls and Other Sacred Spaces: Putting God in Place (Grand 
Rapids: Brazos Press, 2003), 34ff. 
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child.179 We paused for a moment after reading. A few class members had tears in their 
eyes. Gloria’s fingers were pinching her lips in a gesture of futility. Her usual energetic 
presence was stilled. The mood of the room was solemn and I worried for a moment that 
I had not adequately introduced the activity. I hadn’t. The transition felt jarred and so the 
silence hung heavily. Feeling there was nowhere else to go but forward in the planned 
activity, though, I asked the class again, “Where is God?”  
Mike began again, “Everywhere, still everywhere.” His answer shattered my 
expectation. Why isn’t this working? What am I doing wrong? Why don’t they just get it? 
For a single moment I did not see that Mike’s body was now hunched over, slumped in 
the chair, his tone dejected and with a grasping edge to it. The words of his answer were 
the same, but the answer was different. The author of the activity was both wrong and 
right. If we believe that the answer is the words, then the same words offered before and 
after witnessing tragedy seem foolish the second time. But if we believe that the answer 
is more than the words, that tragedy changes words’ meanings, then the embodiment that 
now accompanied Mike’s words matter.  
Wiesel’s passage offers an image that can amount to God’s death, an image that 
potentially makes belief absurd. Mike’s hunched, slumped torso revealed the possibility 
that his body had absorbed this absurdity or, at least, had absorbed his sense of struggle 
with the image, before his words could catch up to either. And from this unsettled place, 
his grasping tone indicated a reaching toward affirmation that God is everywhere, but 
perhaps not an affirmation itself. In contrast to his initial confidence, Mike’s response 
                                                 
179 Elie Wiesel, Night (New York: Bantam, 1960), 61-62. 
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now bore a distance between body and words, a distance within which both doubt and 
hope had space to reconstruct Mike’s habitus of pursuing wisdom anew. 
Others followed in with answers that picked up our shift in tone in more 
discursive ways: “He’s where the ugliest things go on as well as the good things;” “He’s 
where there’s death;” “He’s hanging there…” “…on the cross.” “God is in silence.” “God 
is in the question and the answer.” But then the final answer came from the youngest 
member of our class, a bright college student, Sarah. Refusing even to answer my 
question, she moved us back to the realm of disposition and affectation. In the face of 
tragedy, she denied the need to interpret or analyze consciously and simply said, sitting 
back in her chair and letting the sheet of paper fall on the table, “I hate that passage.”  
 My initial frustration grew out of my thinking that the group was failing to use the 
tools that I, somewhat arrogantly, thought I had given them. But they were showing me 
something much better. The tools we were gaining together over the course of an 
unsettled semester were settling, to play with Swidler’s language. New strategies of 
action, cultivated in unsettled times, come eventually to feel “natural,” she argues, like an 
“undeniable part of the structure of the world.”180 They become habitus, wisdom 
inculcated into us through our own pursuit of it through the shared, ongoing practice of 
conversation.  
Faced with the unsettling gravity of the relationship between suffering and God’s 
presence in that moment, the group neither turned away or offered panicked excuses, as 
they had done at the beginning of the semester. Rather, we all allowed ourselves to be 
unsettled for a moment – they better than I – and then to pick up the words that still made 
                                                 
180 Swidler, “Culture in Action,” 279. 
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sense to us out of the rubble to use them again anew. Surely whatever happened in that 
room that night had little (to no) effect on FBC’s broader ecclesial structure. We made no 
social change, or even theological impact on how everyone else at FBC believes and 
practices their faith. In this sense, the goods of pursuing wisdom were kept local, as the 
group worked together to a fresh understanding of God and of each other that could shape 
their own lives. Mike, Sarah and the others thus demonstrate that there is a wisdom to be 
pursued not only in, but also somewhere beyond discourse, in the way discourse is held 
together by its writing onto our bodies. It is the tone of our voices, fingers fluttering to 
lips now silenced, the curve of a man’s back as he slumps into a chair, and the emotive 
cry of a young woman.  
 
Conclusion 
The very methods by which I gained access to bring academic theology into the 
ecclesial sphere in order to shape the Christian social practices therein are the same 
methods that undermined both my desire and ability to effect dramatic forms of change. 
In this way, my own theological identity has served as a minority report, revealing the 
more idealized dimensions to Tanner’s model for understanding the relationship between 
everyday and academic theologies. While she is right to claim that systems only have the 
power with which their agents imbue them, I have sought to reveal here, through the 
reconstruction of my own theological identity as I endeavored to bring academic 
theologies into the ecclesial environment, how deep the desire to be named by such 
systems can run and, by extension, how much agents can be shaped to be willing to give 
institutions back their power. 
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My ways of teaching the classes stamped them with traces of my own competing 
and cohering academic and ministerial habitus. As my academic work was drawn 
towards concrete Christian social practices and my ecclesial experience was drawn 
towards abstract, more systematized reflection, I lived the tension between the two as the 
experience of searching, as the pursuit of wisdom. But as has become clear, concrete 
experiences send me quickly to my bookshelves. My books, however, rarely make me 
run toward concretion. I need help to get there. The community of our classroom, and the 
conversations we had therein, kept me – and them – in this place of pursuing. They 
helped us all maintain the tensions we needed for our various habitus to be opened up, 
challenged and refined within the very contextual practices that give rise to them. As I 
have said already, the process of pursuing wisdom mattered more than any grasping of it. 
Far from revolutionary training grounds, then, our conversations instead effected small 
shifts in the ways the habitus of their participants were constructed.  
Injustice in social practices – like the forms of racial injustice perpetuated by the 
homogeneity of FBC’s members – is not perpetuated simply because it has remained 
unrecognized, though that is certainly sometimes the case. Rather, the injustice that 
marks Christian social practices is perpetuated because it is inextricably bound up with 
both the powers and privileges that the system bestows upon the agents who belong to it. 
The members of the classes I taught who tend to participate in the more social justice 
oriented practices associated with the undercurrent of FBC’s understanding of missions, 
still direct those moral energies outwards. My informant who wanted to fling open the 
doors to the homeless people living downtown found no allies. Perhaps they, like me, 
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liked being able to practice their practices a little atypically, without overthrowing the 
whole system that allows them to do so. 
 Therefore, I have argued that the goal of introducing academic theology into 
Christian social practices might need to have more to do with the processes of pursuing 
wisdom than it does with the explicit processes of affecting social change, or even than it 
does to do with discovering or articulating that wisdom as discursive content. The 
concrete ecclesiology I have presented here reveals the way in which a band of 
“insurgents” flourished, not through changing “how we do things here,” to quote Edgell 
Becker’s colloquial way of describing a church’s sense of its own identity, or even by 
coming up with a set of new words for naming and describing the Divine.181 Rather, their 
flourishing happened through how they developed tools for dealing with the tensions and 
ambiguities of their own positions within the larger whole, and within the practices that 
make up their faith lives in general. My argument has therefore been less about the 
efficacy of a struggle for ecclesial or even theological revolution, and more about the 
fidelity of the struggle itself. Whether or not our practices of pursuing wisdom actually 
altered FBC’s more formally stated identity and theological claims matters as much as, 
and maybe less than, their ability to keep that identity and those claims contested, as 
Tanner’s more process-oriented goals implies.  
 
                                                 
181 Penny Edgell Becker, Congregations in Conflict: Cultural Models of Local Religious 
Life (New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1999), 85. 
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But when you get to the place where you see you’re making a mess and you want to be 
rescued out of that mess you say, ‘Ok, take me. I’m yours from now on.’ Because I 
believe he shows you what ‘from now on’ means. And it means good works. It’s not a 
real experience of initial salvation, conversion, unless good works follow! 
Ann, “Jesus Christ and Salvation” class 
First Baptist Church, Spring 2010 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
PRACTICES OF PERFORMANCE THEOLOGY 
 
 
 
 Ann, my friend with whom I shared Indian food, as outlined in chapter three, died 
suddenly between the “Jesus Christ and Salvation” and “God as Trinity” classes. She had 
entered the hospital for a non-life-threatening procedure, but then declined rapidly as a 
result of complications. Towards the end, as I visited her daily in the hospital, I would 
linger at her side, never quite knowing which departure would my last. And then one 
evening my husband Tyler and I received a call that we should make our way to the ICU 
to say good-bye. Harlan, Joan, and I had been updating each other and the church 
leadership about Ann’s sickness, so I sent them all a quick email letting them know it was 
time. Tyler and I spent a few hours that evening, holding Ann’s hand, praying with her 
and singing hymns for her. For the first time in my singing those old hymns, it felt like 
every one was about death, punctuated with glimmers of a life beyond. Tyler would begin 
to cry, and my voice would need to become stronger to keep the song going. Then he 
would do the same for me as I found lines too difficult even to read. And I found myself 
hoping in these moments that the glimmers of a glorious after-life punctuating the songs 
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were true. When Ann pulled her oxygen mask to the side to join her shaky voice with 
ours for a line of favorite verse, I even found myself believing they might be. 
 Ethnographers often form intense emotional bonds with their research partners 
and, as a result, have intense emotional experiences of their own.182 While this experience 
felt uniquely painful to me, its intensity was not, therefore, unique to my own particular 
ethnographic method.183 Nevertheless, when such moments happen in ethnographic 
studies, they are usually aberrations, strange surplus fragments that hover at the fringes of 
the academic study. They are reported as flashes of insight that might illuminate the 
whole project, but are not incorporated as methodological guides or sites for explicit 
reflection throughout it. Intentionally implicating myself (especially as minister) into my 
field of study, and then deploying my implication as a research tool, however, makes 
moments like this matter for what I am doing.  
Throughout this dissertation I have resisted correlating everyday and academic 
theologies with distinct personal identities, like “everyday theologian” or “academic 
theologian.” Everyone who participated in the classes I taught, myself included, speaks in 
everyday and academic modes, with moves toward both immediate relevance and 
systematic coherence. Still, as I have endeavored to distinguish between discourse and 
identity in this way, we have nevertheless encountered distinct personalities throughout 
these pages. We have not witnessed a group of theological discourse speakers. We have 
                                                 
182 Consider, for example, James M. Ault Jr.’s conversion to Christianity in his work 
Spirit and Flesh: Life in a Fundamentalist Baptist Church (Knopf, 2004) or Dawne 
Moone’s intensely emotional experience at a Eucharist service in God, Sex and Politics: 
Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
183 The fact that Ann’s death connects not only with my ethnographic project and my own 
personal relationship with her, but also that it connects directly with the life of my family 
might, however, be a more unique ethnographic occurrence as, perhaps, was my 
ministerial role in helping choose the hymns for and speaking at her funeral.  
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witnessed Miriam’s frustrated complaints about a Frisbee’s simplicity, Peter’s animated 
descriptions of the frontier, and Joan’s steady palm bearing Scripture. Conversation has 
not been a philosophical concept in this context. It was a flesh and blood practice, wholly 
dependent upon which people were in the room at any given moment, and shaped to an 
immeasurable degree by the various relationships constellating between us all.  
Ann’s death cut through a whole knot of those relationships. When we lost her, 
we lost more than a unique hub of relationality at which various conversational vectors 
crossed. We lost a beloved friend whose energy kept our evenings lively. We lost 
someone who both Gene and Gary described, in interviews before her death, as someone 
to whom they could turn for “wise counsel” if they needed it. We lost someone who 
would “struggle her way through” a problem, as Richard described her. I always 
encountered this struggle in her as inspiring and ferocious tenacity, but Gene described it 
with calmer notes, recalling how Ann was always able to “filter information and avenues 
and take a deep breath and reflect.” Ann, it seemed, saw herself differently, as she would 
often apologize for “talking too much.” Each person in the room connects with the others 
differently. The relationships in the classroom thus matter not only for how we interpret 
what is said therein, but for shaping what actually gets said to begin with.  
But how can we account for these relational layers of complexity in Tanner’s 
model for relating everyday and academic theologies? In this chapter I expand Tanner’s 
metaphorical description of theological construction as “bricolage,” arguing that our 
conversational pursuit of wisdom, and the relationship of this pursuit to the academic 
theological text created out of it, is best interpreted like a version of performance art. This 
expanded metaphor helps us to see that the human, relational and agential elements of 
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theological conversation are part and parcel of the pursuit of wisdom. Like performance 
art, the pursuit of wisdom is dependent upon who shows up, as discourse cannot be 
abstracted from the people who speak it.  
I then outline two narratives that put flesh on this process, as I endeavor to 
demonstrate both the possibilities and limitations of these wisdom-pursuing 
conversations. In so doing, I argue that like performance art, the product created 
subsequent to the performance can never capture it, because the process always resists the 
commodification that nevertheless needs to happen to make it more broadly 
communicable. At best, the text can gesture toward the process, offering fragmented 
representations of it. And these representations, through their fragmentation, inevitably 
re-create the process as something new: guild specific glimmers of something that always 
transcends them. 
I have described theological reasons why the “God as Trinity” class was harder to 
teach than the “Jesus and Salvation” one. And while those theological assessments grasp 
significant aspects of the problems we encountered, I also think we suffered because Ann 
was not there. Sometimes a chatty person can be helpful for a teacher, simply because 
they leave little empty, dead time for us to fill. But more than filler, Ann also called out 
the best in me as a teacher. As we will see in the chapter, she would often articulate a 
theological idea shared by a number of her classmates. Sometimes she would make points 
that, in my error, I might have dismissed too quickly if spoken by someone else. When 
she spoke them, however, my trust in her instinctively made me work harder to see the 
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fullness of what she was saying.184 Doing so allowed us all to open up ideas further 
together. And so Ann helped me avoid moving too quickly through wisdom’s pursuit to 
try to construct some theological product. Without her presence, I had to learn how to 
embody such dispositions without her help. This took time, as it also required the creation 
of new relationships: Maureen and Joe, and Gloria, for example, joined us in the second 
class. Even with these new additions of conversation partners who I came to treasure, 
however, this new class always bore a trace of the old. Ann’s absence became less 
pressing, as absences often can, but it never disappeared. 
This chapter speaks theologically out of this relational space. Rather than arguing 
for it explicitly, this chapter presumes the claims of the prior chapters, claims that 
everyday and academic theological discourses came together in our group’s 
conversational practice of pursuing wisdom. And it endeavors to show – like with the 
dinner party that opened this dissertation – that theological claims here are inextricable 
from the people who make them, as well as from those people’s stories. They rise from 
embodied agents and the interactions of embodied agents. We will see how ad hoc 
context specific comments within these conversations were continually drawn out, 
                                                 
184 In particular, I felt a deep trust in Ann with regards to issues around gender and race. 
She was passionate about women in ministry, and had agreed to serve on my ordination 
committee during a particularly stressful time in her own life. Moreover, she served 
saying, “I would have wanted to do this myself in another time; at least this way I get to 
be a part of someone else getting to do it,” with an utter lack of bitterness regarding her 
own missed opportunities. And so I trusted her generosity of spirit. She would also tell 
me stories about how her job at the Southern Baptist publishing house was threatened 
during the Civil Rights Movement because she tried to put pictures of black children and 
white children playing together in Sunday school curriculum for SBC churches. Knowing 
she sought coherence between her words and action, and that she would take risks to do 
what she thought was right, I therefore trusted her. Also, as outlined through my 
interview with her in chapter three, her personal experiences greatly shaped her 
theological claims. If she was struggling to articulate an idea in class, I always trusted 
something deeper was going on that she was trying to reach.   
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engaged and tested by moves toward systematicity, while those moves of abstraction and 
systematic connection were continually drawn back to the concrete lives of the people 
who were interacting with each other. This process of back and forth movement matters 
more than its product for our interests here; the pursuit matters more than any elusive 
wisdom fragmentarily gained. Moreover, by focusing on the process rather than the 
product, we are able to see that the messiness involved with theological constructions 
across an everyday and academic theological conversation has as much to do with 
interpersonal, relational interactions as it does with a clash of theological ideas or beliefs.  
 
Performance Theology 
The way Ann describes it, salvation has a moment when it begins, and a process 
by which it is worked out. But Ann does not convey this idea in such a dry way. Rather, 
she blends different types of language: narrative, doctrinal, theological, emotional, and 
more. Salvation happens “when you get to the place where you see you’re making a 
mess, and you want to be rescued out of that mess.” It has a conversion moment when 
one says to God, “Ok, take me. I’m yours from now on.” There is a transaction of 
ownership over the convert’s life. She hands it over to God and, in that action, God 
removes her from her mess, but then reorients her to it. With new knowledge of what her 
“from now on” will look like, she becomes able to greet the mess, able to do the “good 
works” that clean it up.  
Like Ann, all of us in the class spoke using this mix of personal, theological, 
Biblical, narrative, and other language forms to articulate our embodied beliefs with and 
for each other. Moments of crisis therefore often erupted when the inconsistencies in both 
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those beliefs and the language forms clashed. In Tanner’s paradigm, the academic 
theologian collects these crisis moments and systematizes them into a loose “bricolage” 
theology. She refers to the academic theologian as drawing on the “creativity of a 
postmodern ‘bricoleur’…”: 
…the creativity, that is, of someone who works with an always potentially 
disordered heap of already existing materials, pulling them apart and 
putting them back together again, tinkering with their shapes, twisting 
them this way and that. It is a creativity expressed through the 
modification and extension of materials already on the ground.185  
 
Tanner’s description resonates with what we sought to do in our classroom conversations. 
But in order to grasp the more performative elements  and agential aspects that shaped 
our practice of flesh and blood people speaking to each other, we can also refine what 
kind of bricolage it was that happened. To make this refinement, I turn to the metaphor of 
performance art.  
Whatever I worked with was disordered, certainly. But because I did my 
“tinkering” on site, it happened with a polyphony – sometimes a cacophony – of voices 
that continually spoke back, refusing to be pinned in place. No sooner had I pulled apart 
someone’s gestures and comments to “modify” and “extend” them, did that person or 
                                                 
185 Tanner, Theories of Practice, 166. For more on bricolage, Tanner cites Michel De 
Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); 
Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London and New York: Routledge, 
1988); and Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their 
Discontents (Boston: Beacon, 1988). One might also consult Claude Levi-Strauss, The 
Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), where the concept is first 
developed in philosophical discourse rather than the arts. As Levi-Strauss’ Structuralism 
undergirds the objectivist epistemological leanings of Bourdieu’s project, which I have 
been engaging throughout, the image of bricolage seems particularly apt here. This 
oblique reference to Levi-Strauss should, however, be read in light of my critical 
engagement of Bourdieu’s work. As Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus has offered too 
deterministic a vision for the human agency I have been describing in these pages, Levi-
Strauss’ vision of the structures that give rise to spontaneous bricolage are decidedly 
more so. Hence, the helpfulness of the art metaphor I develop in this section. 
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another take it from me to play some more. Round and round we would go, no clean idea 
coming immediately back to me, or even ending at me with me to tie our pursuits 
together with systematic precision. As we see throughout this chapter, every twist and 
tweak opened more paths to pursue than we had time to do. Nothing ever hit the ground; 
whatever we were making – we were never fully conscious of what – remained in the air, 
tossed back and forth between us until it was time to go home. In the end, what we 
pursued was not an object, but a shared experience.  
 The differences between our class experience and Tanner’s model seem slight, but 
one aspect might demand an expansion of theoretical method for an adequate accounting. 
With Tanner’s image, the process of assemblage appears as solo work. The work of the 
everyday Christians is less visible than the work of the academic theologian. As the 
academic theologian who taught these church courses, I, of course, set the process in 
motion, guided much of it, and had an authoritative voice within it. Nevertheless, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, my power in the classroom was only one part of the whole 
picture. The pursuit of wisdom required all of us to use our skills of context-specific, ad 
hoc reasoning and our skills of systematizing abstraction; it required tools that were 
general-use and specialized.  And in that, we found that our temporally, spatially, 
relationally defined process continually resisted its eventual commodification. Expanding 
Tanner’s metaphor of bricolage into performance art, we become able to see both the 
workings of this process more clearly and how the theological outcome created by the 
process bears these marks of resistance.  
To explore how this might work, I use Rhythm O, a 1974 work by performance 
artist Marina Abromović as a lens. In this performance, which I liken to our classroom 
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conversation practice, Abromović sat still in front of a table filled with seventy-two 
objects – including a rose, a camera, oil, a whip, honey, a gun and a bullet – for six hours 
without speaking. While she had the power to set up the whole scene, and to close it 
when she was finished, throughout it she remained, in her words, “totally passive.”186 
There were no security guards to intervene when people began to harm her, and no rules, 
besides those internalized through the habitus borne into the room by whoever became 
present. In the span of the six hours, people cared for and fed the artist, while others cut 
her clothes from her body exposing her breasts and stuck thorns from the roses into her 
flesh. One visitor even loaded the gun and pointed it at her neck. Another visitor moved 
the gun away. Still, there was no formal intervention. At the end of the six hours, 
Abromović stood up and ran towards the gathered people. Not expecting this, they 
scattered in fear, as she describes it, “to escape actual confrontation.”187  
 Some structural similarities, to begin: Abromović’s power to set up the whole 
scene, and to close it when she was finished, is similar to my authority as a teacher. Also, 
just as Abromović invited gallery visitors to create the performance of the artwork using 
                                                 
186 Indeed, the image resonates with my own ordination ritual. While Abromović 
describes herself as “totally passive,” she is not, but rather she endures a period of 
passivity that is both pleasurable and painful, as I did at the ordination kneeler, while 
other bodies inscribe meaning into hers.  
187 Continuing to interpret Abromović’s ritual through the lens of my ordination ritual, to 
continue deepening the texture of its basis for my theological method: at the appropriate 
time, at the end of the ritual, her transformed body re-engages the group, with a new 
authority made able to do so in a new way. She charged, whereas I served communion. I 
would therefore interpret her charging of the gathered not only as their inability to engage 
confrontation, but hers also. Left with no resources for a genuine engagement of those 
gathered, her only option was the type of aggressive communication she had allowed 
them. By remaining “totally passive” throughout the performance, she ended up 
demanding the same of them through her totally aggressive response. Submission and 
power function similarly to my descriptions in the previous chapter, if not more 
dramatically here.  
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the materials she had provided, so too our class was dependent on its participants to do 
something with the stage I had set up. But two immediate differences also seem to 
problematize a comparison of this performance art with the pursuit of wisdom that 
happened in the classes I taught. First, Abromović was silent throughout the performance, 
whereas I led various discussions in our classroom. And, second, through its intense 
focus on the body, her artwork offered an almost hyper-bodily performance. These 
differences are real and significant. Engaging this extreme silence and embodiment in 
comparison to our classroom practice, however, productively uses performance art to 
reveal some of our class’ hidden edges.  
I have noted how our group all censored ourselves to varying degrees in relation 
to what we said in the classroom. As with Rhythm O, there were no formal classroom 
rules that kept what we said and did in check. Rather, our own various habitus – some of 
which we loosely shared because of our shared ecclesial formation – shaped for all of us 
what felt right and comfortable or wrong and uncomfortable for us to say. Like 
Abromović, I had freedom to lead, direct and re-direct conversations as they developed. 
And yet precisely because that freedom was shaped by the various habitus related rules, 
strategies, and tactics upon which many of us in the class unconsciously agreed, I 
experienced moments in which I felt I could not say things that the rules, strategies, and 
tactics of academic theological speech, or simply other discourse patterns in which I also 
participate throughout my life, led me to want to say. Indeed, I would silence myself 
precisely because – in an echo of the previous chapter – despite wanting to disrupt our 
particular conversation, I also and simultaneously desired to maintain the order of our 
particular shared space. Like Abromović, my silence was self-imposed for the purpose of 
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keeping the performance – the conversation – going. Throughout this chapter, I explore 
these moments of silencing – and speech – to reveal the contours of a theology of 
sanctification as it was communally performed. 
Our classroom conversational practice was also clearly not as hyper-embodied as 
Abromović’s. There were no obvious objects of bodily pleasure and torture present, ready 
for us to use on each other. I could make an argument that the Bibles we carried can 
function in this way, but their presence was not so dramatic or arresting as a gun or a 
whip. The presence of such objects in Abromović’s work, however, invited breaking the 
usual rules of engagement that tend to govern public space. And yet, we saw in my 
ordination service how certain ecclesial practices can suspend the normal rules for bodily 
interaction and, even more significant, we saw how our classroom’s atypical nature 
allowed conversations to occur that could not happen in broader church life. The 
pleasures and pains of a habitus inscribed and re-inscribed again and again into bodies 
might be more visible in Abromović’s thorn-scratched skin. But there is a violence to 
education too, particularly when a new way of experiencing or interpreting the world 
replaces our old way, as we saw with Mike’s defeated posture and Sarah’s emotive 
protest at the end of the last chapter.  
Rather than a bricolage of objects, then, Rhythm O gives us an image of a group 
of agential bodies. And in this way, it offers a more suitable metaphorical expansion on 
Tanner’s vision for the project I am articulating here. Like Abromović’s performance art, 
I demarcated a space which brought together a number of participants. And like with 
Rhythm O, these participants created a work together where the process mattered – at 
least to us as a group – more than the creation of a final, stable, consumable product. 
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Such methods thus exhibit a resistance to their inevitable commodification; a resistance 
that remains visible in the final product.  
But – as does Abromović – I still want to have something to show after the fact. 
The others in the gallery space are not her only conversation partners, just as the 
members of the classes I taught are not mine. Like Abromović, I want something to 
endure out of this communal process that I can communicate to others, primarily those 
others in my guild. Abromović owns the official photographs and videos of the show. 
Like me, she thus keeps for herself the authoritative voice for describing and analyzing 
what happened. Other artists might borrow from her method, and art critics can argue for 
and create new meanings out of it, as most all academic theologians hope other academic 
theologians will borrow from, critically engage, and find new meanings in the works we 
share with each other. And these final products, both Abromović’s and mine, do not rise 
only out of the communal process that led to their creation, however, but also out of the 
social practices associated with particular guilds.  
Throughout this chapter, as with the last, I am concerned with questions around 
how everyday and academic theological discourses come together in the pursuit of 
wisdom. How are the various habitus inculcated in us by our participation in Christian 
social practices – and academic social practices – opened up, challenged, reshaped and 
re-affirmed in the context of theological conversation? The themes of power, submission 
and desire that dominated the previous chapter give way in this one to concerns about 
silence and speech in the process of theological construction. How can we bring to 
articulation the faith hidden in our bones? When do we silence it? What is gained and lost 
in silence? And in this play of speech and silence, how do we find common ground to 
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keep talking and, just as important, keep listening? These themes contribute to the overall 
argument of this chapter, which is made more visible through the metaphoric lens of 
performance art, that the conversational pursuit of wisdom cannot be extricated from the 
human, relational and agential elements that give rise to it without losing some of that 
conversation’s meaning. Any attempt at extrication therefore bears the marks of 
resistance to it, marks I endeavor to make more visible here than might usually be the 
case in academic theological writing.  
 
Mystical Enough for a Baptist? 
 In this first conversation we explore here, everyday and academic theologies are 
revealed to be different dialects of the same language, rather than completely different 
tongues. Speech is silenced when these different dialects go unacknowledged and we 
therefore misunderstand each other. Common ground is then found when we are able to 
enter each other’s linguistic forms. Silence that creates space for such entering enables 
conversation to flourish. Silence halts conversation, however, when we fail to find such 
common ground, usually for interpersonal, rather than explicitly theological reasons. 
Here we begin to see the non-theological – at least in an explicit sense – textures of a 
theological conversation, as we also see how revealing these textures can help us to 
understand the conversation’s performative process and ongoing development of 
meaning. 
The class had a more intense response to Beatrice of Nazareth than any other 
figure we studied. Indeed, as we began reading sections of her Seven Ways of Holy Love 
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together, the group’s reactions were quite vitriolic.188 In the Seven Ways, Beatrice 
outlines a pathway of mystical ascent to the Divine. The language is poetic and bodily as 
it details the processes of detachment and renunciation associated with various meditative 
practices.189 We read a few lines, and the first response proceeded: “What is she trying to 
earn? It seems like she’s trying to gain her own salvation rather than relying on God for 
it!” Another class member, Elizabeth, continued this line of thought: “It seems selfish. 
She wants to do it all. Why would you want to transcend your humanity? God made us 
human. It’s a little selfish!”  
 I experienced a rush of feelings in response to their response. First, I experienced 
a twinge of frustration. “Why was no one concerned about powerful activities of prayer 
when it was men we were studying?” I wondered angrily. I experience FBC as a complex 
place when it comes to the construction of gender. On the one hand, I felt fully affirmed 
in my ordination as a woman there. But on the other, as is true of any church I have 
attended, liberal or conservative, I nevertheless run into attitudes I perceive to be sexist. 
Language around men as the “spiritual head of the household” is spoken – and contested 
– at FBC, by both members and leadership. I have already noted the presence of LCU 
                                                 
188 The fullest handout I gave the group was the one with excerpts from Beatrice’s 
writings. Here we did the closest textual reading of the whole course. I taught Beatrice 
this way in part because my attempts to describe her poetic language would inevitably 
obscure the meaning embedded in her style, and in part simply because I think she is fun 
to read.  
189 Recent studies in religion have demonstrated the problematic nature of studying 
“mysticism.” In general, the mystical experience has been understood as some form of 
direct contact with the Divine, apart from any social, cultural, linguistic shaping. Such as 
view has been appropriately interrogated. See, for example, Robert H. Sharf, 
“Mysticism,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 96ff. For a study on how male power has defined the 
borders of the concept “mystic” and, by extension, has excluded female forms of 
“mysticism” from its definition, see Grace M. Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian 
Mysticism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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classes on Sunday nights that affirm traditional gender roles. And I have personally 
experienced what I perceive as sexism as well through comments like those often 
received by female preachers, such as, “I couldn’t hear a word she was saying, but I sure 
enjoyed watching her say it.” If I am over-sensitive to gender issues in some contexts, 
that sensitivity is not unfounded with regards to other contexts of FBC life. And so my 
immediate reaction was a frustration that remained difficult to verify. 
And second, I often feel that I am a rare voice in our church who wants to 
emphasize the positive role of embodiment in the Christian life. I am saddened by what I 
perceive to be harmful restrictions on sexuality that are connected with a general mistrust 
of embodiment, and I worry that the ongoing, intentional inculcation of our youth with 
such attitudes is detrimental to their well-being. As I have done in this dissertation, I 
argue in various contexts throughout our church that embodiment is a locus for wisdom, a 
site of God’s activity. And I seek out the rare, atypical spaces that feel safe to say that the 
pleasures of embodiment are not to be so restricted and feared. And so the instincts and 
dispositions shaped by all these experiences and practices rushed forward in an instant, 
without my having immediate conscious apprehensions of why. 
One of the reasons I assigned Beatrice in the course was because I thought she 
could help us see the roles our bodies play in worship. I also thought she might help us 
tease out the deep connection between immanence and transcendence in the relationship 
between embodiment and the Divine. And so my perception that the group would need 
help with the move to grounded embodiment was upended by their desire to critique 
transcendence. This was not the direction I had intended this lesson to go, and so I 
initially felt confused by how to proceed with what seemed like an agreement between us 
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that I also sensed should not be trusted. I began to worry I would never get them see 
Beatrice as doing anything other than what they referred pejoratively to as “works 
righteousness.” And thus, my intellectual and pedagogical expectations were challenged, 
as I had to re-imagine new directions for our conversation – for our pursuit of wisdom – 
to go. 
Throughout both courses, the desire to protect the theological belief that no one 
can “earn their own salvation” was consistently revealed as one of the few 
unquestionable theological borders maintained by almost everyone, if not everyone, 
present. Whereas some borders proliferate questions and thus produce deeper insight, this 
one most often served as a stumbling block to discussion. We were able to tease out some 
of these issues in our discussion of Luther (as we see below), but until that point, the 
group tended not only to worry that work was being perceived by any given author as 
able to accrue righteousness, but also that it was perceived by any author as initiating 
salvation. Indeed, these two ideas were conflated for them. Therefore, any description of 
things we might “do” – even if that doing was Beatrice’s doings of detachment and 
renunciation rather than, say, less submissive actions – immediately raised the group’s 
hackles and brought the speaker under negative scrutiny.  
Despite my rush of feelings in response to their response, then, I take a moment to 
step back from trying to convince the group of whatever confused, personally loaded 
point I was wanting to make. I pause for a moment of self-silencing, and then try to frame 
Beatrice’s practice in language that resonates with our shared ecclesial life. I had the time 
prior to class to prepare what I was going to say about her. The group now needs similar 
space to process it. Mystics “don’t think they’re doing this of their own power,” I note, 
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“but rather this is what it feels like to be lifted up by God.”  “Their beating of the flesh is 
like us singing songs,” I continue, “we all do these things to connect with God.” Being 
“lifted up” by God, and “connecting with God” are experiences that this group can 
perceive practices as making possible. And then, to demonstrate that Beatrice, like our 
orthodox view, did not expect reward for her “works,” I affirm the possibility that she 
was practicing her mystical worship because she thought it might be purely “pleasing to 
God. And so, for a moment, I try to inhabit their discursive modes for interpreting a 
theological idea or text, rather than trying to get them to enter my frameworks, and the 
reins on the conversation feel loosened. We thus enter a space where our language begins 
to be shared. 
While I am seeking to inhabit their language, I feel Ann take a step toward me. 
Or, to put it more accurately, she takes a step toward the figure I am trying to teach. 
Admitting that she is using a lens that makes sense to her but which might be foreign to 
or, at least, not central for Beatrice, Ann asks: 
What is the connection between this mysticism and salvation by grace 
through faith? Now, that’s our terminology. But is she a Christian? Has 
she already put her faith in Christ and she’s talking now after that? It 
begins to sound like we’re talking about salvation by works. But can we 
settle that she is a professing Christian? And this comes after that. That 
helps me [to understand what she’s doing]. 
 
In that moment, I trust that Ann is imposing her own structures for understanding onto 
Beatrice – structures that do not fit – because she wants to open Beatrice up for 
understanding, not because she wants to package Beatrice up in a discursive regime that 
would enable rejecting her. Back and forth and circling around our shared and different 
languages, Ann is thus seeking to create a common ground for difference to intersect. 
And it works. We all move into the space together.  
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Up until that point it had not occurred to me that the group would require 
convincing that Beatrice was a Christian. I had not thoroughly questioned my own 
ingrained assumptions of what constitutes Christian identity. Indeed, the fact that I was 
considering the problem in that moment as one about “Christian identity” is already an 
academic assumption with which I probably should have spent some time grappling as I 
endeavored to teach a class on salvation to a group of my fellow Baptists. 
The ground between Ann and me in this moment could not be mapped only by 
whether Beatrice had “put her faith in Christ,” as Ann puts it. The ground between us was 
mapped – still using my academic theological discourse – by whether “Christian” was a 
culturally produced identity or a soteriological state and whether or not that matters. 
Ann’s comment jolted me into realizing and, indeed, feeling the distance between us 
more acutely. In this moment, in a conversation about salvation and mystical practices, I 
was the one framing things wrongly. I needed to stop distancing myself from the 
everyday theological discourse if I was going to learn from its wisdom. Just as I wanted 
them to come to engage whatever confused them about Beatrice, I needed to do the same 
self-reflection with regards to what they were teaching me.  
In the moment, I pause, and resist responding with what my academic habitus 
instinctually flashes through my thoughts – something to do with how Ann’s way of 
framing the question is dependent on a post-Reformation view of salvation that does not 
really apply in this Medieval case. I resist this not because it is “too academic” for the 
group to engage. Indeed, such historical situating of a particular theological question 
often opened up conversations for us throughout both courses. It was, in fact, something 
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they often found interesting, but only when offered at the right time. Rather, I resist using 
this analysis because in this moment it is I who needs to shift paradigms.  
And so I say, “Oh, yes, absolutely she is a Christian,” quite simply because she is, 
but, more complexly, because by admitting that she is being loose with her language 
translations, Ann allows me to do the same. As soon as Ann is invited to recognize and 
name Beatrice as Christian according to Baptist understandings of conversion and 
profession others, including me, feel the same invitation. And in this naming, Ann helps 
me to see where the group’s confusion is taking place so that I can explain Beatrice’s 
mystical ascent not as a prescriptive course for what one must do to “be saved,” but 
rather as a descriptive account of what it feels like to be “lifted up by God.” Inhabiting 
their language for a moment, I am able to lead them toward the language of the text. And, 
together we begin to unravel each of our preconceived notions in order to create a 
framework for understanding that text – or, fragments of texts – in front of us. 
 And things begin to open up. Playing off of the language of ascent, Peter slaps the 
table and with a grin says the words to a familiar hymn, “I’m pressing on the upward 
way.” Ann laughs and gestures toward him, adding, “New heights I’m reaching every 
day.” In a move that felt strange after I made it due to its gendered implications, I had 
been trying to authorize Beatrice’s mystical activity by telling the class that Augustine 
had practiced the same. My academic habitus had certainly kicked in there: who better to 
authorize a questionable practice than the foundational theologian of the Western 
tradition? But in the end, it was this reference to a favorite Baptist hymn that got the 
group brainstorming how Beatrice’s actions connect with Christian forms we take to be 
theologically authoritative in our community. Again and again, able to use their own 
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structures for understanding to interpret Beatrice enabled them to open those structures 
up for questioning. The process of conversation, as a relational, personal, theological 
process of pursuing wisdom, continually opened us all to deeper understanding and more 
conscious articulation of the faith in our bones. 
The conversation continues: someone else adds the example of a ritualized prayer 
form with which our congregation has been experimenting. Elizabeth, who was initially 
so critical of Beatrice, also enters common ground by noting how her own experiences of 
bodily transcendence tend to happen while she is gardening because that is where she 
“loses all sense of time.” Others start drawing on the Scriptures, noting that this is not all 
that unlike Jesus’ time meditating in the desert, Paul’s references to being called up into a 
third heaven (2 Cor. 12:2-4) and even his references to having a thorn in his flesh (2 Cor. 
12:7-10). Jesus sweated blood in the garden, notes Peter, leaning forward and hanging his 
head to mime the drips falling from his own forehead (Luke 22:44, a verse that says 
Jesus’ sweat was “like blood,” but which Peter recalls as actual blood, with no 
corrections from the group). They mention also that Ezekiel did some “really crazy 
things.” Here, Biblical language – acknowledged as the most authoritative discourse 
governing FBC’s life together – further bolsters their engagement of Beatrice.  
Through this bolstering, Beatrice starts to help the group open up their readings of 
Scripture, though tentatively and tensely at first. One of the class members wonders aloud 
if John’s visions at Patmos functioned like Beatrice’s. Mike, whose bodily movement 
usually consists of small, restrained fidgets in his seat when he disagrees with what is 
being said, pushes his chair back from the table. His voice shoots up an octave: “You 
mean to say that John’s visions were like THIS!” he exclaims, emphasizing the final 
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word by first smacking his palm to the handout I had passed around of snippets from her 
writings, and then picking it up and shaking it before slapping it back down onto the 
table. A few of us start laughing and I smile, “Maybe Mike, who knows? They might 
have been!” Our shared laughter grows louder as Mike, shaking his head with a look of 
amazement on his face, chortles, “Well, I don’t know. I just don’t know.”  
Mike’s dramatic response keeps the point about John on Patmos in front of us for 
a moment in contrast to the way that the mentions of a third heaven, sweating blood, and 
Ezekiel quickly fade into the background. The friendly humor of the moment allows us 
all to feel comfortable with the drama, to rest on it and incorporate it into our own ways 
of approaching the texts. But also, the fact that many in the class understand themselves 
as “progressive” or “liberal” in relation to Mike indicates that his willingness to link John 
and Beatrice likely challenges others to be even more willing to do so too.  
As the laughter subsides, Elizabeth, really coming around to engagement with 
Beatrice now, notes her own experience of feeling that sometimes God “just puts names” 
into her head to pray for them: “Perhaps,” she quips, “that’s mystical enough for a 
Baptist?” By continuing to open up the frames of reference for reading Beatrice, the 
conversation is propelled forwards. I had been trying to translate Neo-Platonic 
philosophy and Christian practices of mystical ascent in order to frame her experience. In 
other words, I had been framing her according to academic theological discursive norms. 
But the group wanted to know she was saved and united with God. They did not want to 
encounter her as a text – as I had reduced her to; they wanted to encounter her. 
In beginning to relate to Beatrice not as a text or distant example of historical 
Christianity, but more as a fellow pilgrim on the path to God, they begin to question 
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further the imagery of her writing. By integrating her experiences with our own, the 
violence of the text starts to come a little closer to us. Someone asks how such beating 
submission of the body, as well as fasting unto what appears to them to be hypoglycemic 
fits, can be reconciled with a belief that the “body is a temple” (1 Cor 6:19-20). One 
woman, who works in counseling, particularly with young women, worries that Beatrice 
actually experienced some form of Anorexia Nervosa.  
“Yes!” I say with excitement. An old academic interest in Simone Weil had led 
me to do some research in the area of female mystics, theologians, and eating disorders 
back in Divinity School.190 Also, because of my own theological commitments, I was 
always thrilled when a concern raised by the group connected with feminist set of 
arguments and concerns. While this group wants to “affirm women,” as they put it, “in 
ministry,” none of them ever self-identified as “feminist.” And indeed, in one discussion 
some of the older men in the class noted that they feel uncomfortable when they see 
female construction workers, and scared when they board a plane with a female pilot. 
Nevertheless, they did not flinch whenever I self-identified as a feminist, but I sense that 
had more to do with their comfort with me than with the language itself. Indeed, 
whenever I pointed out that their concerns aligned with feminist ones, they would express 
surprise – forgetting, perhaps for a moment, that a feminist was in their midst. I was, 
                                                 
190 For a discussion of Simone Weil’s relationship to eating and the Eucharist, see Claire 
Wolfteich, “Attention or Destruction: Simone Weil and the Paradox of the Eucharist,” in 
The Journal of Religion, 81 no 3 (July, 2001), 359-376 For more general discussions of 
female mystics and eating disorders, see Martha J. Reineke, “‘This Is My Body’: 
Reflections on Abjection, Anorexia, and Medieval Women Mystics,” in Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion (LVIII/2); Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy 
Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987) and Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the 
Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books, 1992). 
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therefore, always eager to make these connections, to open up the possibilities of feminist 
critique for them. 
In response to this woman’s comment about eating disorders, I tell the group how 
some feminist scholars have written on this very topic. Their bodily postures remain 
attentive and so, assuming that this line of thought might be of interest to them, I launch 
into it: “Indeed,” I add, “because Anorexia Nervosa is connected as much to issues of 
control as it is to body image, it’s possible that women engaged strict eating practices as 
an attempt to have some self-determination over their own faith lives in a Christian 
culture dominated by men.” My outburst receives a few interested expressions, but 
mostly it lands flat. My instincts are slightly off. Because the various habitus associated 
with my academic role create a sense of affirmation in me when a scholar shares my 
concerns, I unreflectively respond to this woman’s comment as if she would feel the 
same. But the authority of feminist theological discourses does not connect with the types 
of affirmation associated with the various habitus inculcated in her through ecclesial and 
other social practices. She looks at me blankly, allowing the silence to hang for a moment 
after my comments without pursuing them.  
There is a clear tension in the room – indicated by the silence and confused looks 
with which I am being greeted – but no one seems to pick up on the explicit, more 
systematic connections between my language of “control” and their concerns with 
“works righteousness.” I quickly steer the conversation back to Beatrice and the violent 
language in her text before they do make these connections, because there had been some 
energy around that. But in so doing, I want to reframe the problem of violence so that it 
feels less to me like a judgment that Beatrice was intentionally disobeying what the group 
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takes to be a Biblical mandate, and more like a description of what the experience God 
had created in her had felt like. “Perhaps,” I note, “it’s not that she’s saying we have to 
hurt ourselves to encounter God.” “Perhaps,” I continue, “what she’s showing us is that 
sometimes the path to God just hurts.”  
My reframing connects with theirs again as it ignites a reaction in some of the 
older class members who worry that the comforts of modern life make us all incapable of 
enduring the pain and hardship that was expected and endured in their parents’ worlds. 
Ann who grew up at the tail end of the Depression and who has lived an intentionally 
simple life, notes that “we find ways to numb the pain,” while Rickie, whose general 
style and demeanor tends to be less glamorous and more cleanly simple than exhibited by 
many of the women at FBC in her shared age and class bracket, adds, “we could learn 
something [from Beatrice] about suffering.” In this, Beatrice starts becoming an example 
for us through her willingness to suffer if that was what God wanted her to do. As a 
result, the conversation turns to a critique of our own spiritual practices. 
First Peter tells a story about a contemplative prayer workshop he had attended at 
which he was the only Baptist. Richard, with a sad tone in his voice, asks why it is 
Baptists avoid doing practices like contemplative prayer. One of the quieter men in the 
class quickly chimes in, “because we’re scared of it.” “What are we scared of?” I ask, 
“That it won’t work or that it…” He cuts me off: “We’re scared it will work!” He thus 
implicitly introduces the possibility that we, rather than Beatrice, try to control God’s 
ability to act in our lives. Others nod agreement. Someone frames what Beatrice was 
doing as desiring to be united to Christ, and Richard notes, “We’re interested in it [being 
united to Christ], but less interested in the discipline.” This opens a discussion about what 
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being united to Christ looks like for us, while it also catalyzes a semester-long call from 
some in the class that I develop a course on worship for them so that we can explore 
some of these questions further together. 
This discussion of how we experience unity with Christ returns us to Elizabeth’s 
concern from the beginning of the discussion that Beatrice’s desire for transcendence was 
selfish, a view that she softens over the course of our conversation. One man, Charles, 
notes that Baptists are “practical” and do not necessarily want to transcend the world: 
“We think God is already in us – there’s no need to transcend our bodies.” His point does 
not negate Beatrice’s practice, so much as it draws a distinction between the way she 
experienced God and the way he understands typical Baptists to do so. And while others 
largely resonate with his point, they also voice concerns that because we frame 
transcendence in this way, we might also miss out on some of the mystery inherent to 
Beatrice’s ways.  
As a result, Peter and Elizabeth begin to articulate more explicitly the possibility 
that we have a controlling edge to the ways that we practice prayer. Leaping off from 
loose, performative integrations of the numerous points bubbling up and flying around 
between us all, the two note together that perhaps it was not Beatrice trying to” 
manipulate God,” but us, precisely because we do not allow God to take us over in this 
way: “we’re scared it will work!” In coming to see how Beatrice was not necessarily 
doing the negative things they thought she was, the group comes to wonder if we are. As 
a consequence, their insight into their own prayer and worship lives is opened up, 
complicated and loosely re-integrated. 
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 As the group members allow Beatrice’s more violent language to critique their 
own spiritual practices, thus forging distinctions between all the forms of language they 
use to make theological claims, I wonder how willing they might be to entertain her more 
erotic language too. As soon as the thought occurs to me, I become acutely aware of my 
flesh. As a female leader in the church, I am sometimes aware of being sexualized by 
others. I therefore take care in this community – as I do in my academic community and 
life in general – to self-present as I want to be perceived, regardless of whether or not 
others are willing to perceive me that way. While eroticism is an area of academic 
interest for me, about which I speak quite freely in an academic context as well as in life 
in general, as soon as I move into trying to talk about it in this ecclesial arena, I find 
myself struck – thanks to my various bodily habitus inscribed in me through participation 
in Baptist practices as well as the more broadly Evangelical practices of my past – with 
something akin to the fear of God. And so I start euphemizing my academic interests – 
not to mention personal experience – with all the grace of an embarrassed teenager.   
 “I realize the language is violent,” I begin, “but doesn’t anything in it also sound 
good?” Maybe someone else has picked up on the sexual aspects, I hope to myself, and 
will bring it up so I don’t have to. But no one takes the bait. Perhaps they do not share my 
sub-conscious affirmation of sexual pleasure as a good thing; perhaps they hear this 
sexual, but don’t like the sound of it. “No,” they respond, “it just sounds painful.” Out of 
the corner of my eye I see Miriam, only a few years older than I, smirk and lower her 
gaze. No one is coming to help me. “Really?” I continue, “there’s nothing in Beatrice’s 
bodily experience that sounds familiar?” I immediately think what a silly thing this is to 
ask – why presume this is familiar to them? – but I swear I see Gene smile now too. Still 
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no aid, though. “Ok,” I try a final time, really euphemizing my way to an abstract point, 
and continuing, even sub-consciously, to presume the goodness of sexual pleasure, 
“there’s nothing in the panting, sweating, heat overtaking her body, and then a moment of 
ecstatic release that sounds good to anyone here?”  
 My voice is raising in pitch, and the pace of my words is now rapid. I feel the heat 
flush my own face, a little sweat too. But this is embarrassment, not ecstasy. Someone 
giggles quietly, and now the class is divided between those who get my point and are not 
saying anything while refusing to meet my gaze, and those who are not getting it and are, 
therefore, protesting. “No! No, it sounds awful,” Ann says, shaking her head 
emphatically while a few other older ladies nod vigorously in agreement. I let it go. 
 Perhaps I should have just said, “Beatrice is using orgasmic language to describe 
her unity with the Divine.” Indeed, I halted the conversation – silenced myself – because 
explicitly saying the word “orgasm” was necessary for making my point any clearer. 
Immature or unenlightened though it might seem, my skin felt squirmy at the idea of 
saying that word to this group. Simply put, these are not the people with whom I talk 
about sex. At the same time, by euphemizing it, I created a knowledge divide between 
those who had ears to hear and those who did not. And I felt guilty that my discomfort at 
saying something plainly was leading some of the older class members to a somewhat 
comical, unknowing refusal of sexual pleasure. I did not want my own embarrassment to 
embarrass others. And that is why I finally let it go.  
 After class that night I wrote about the experience in my fieldnotes, noting how 
silly I felt for not being able to simply say what I was thinking. I challenged myself in 
that reflective text to handle things better when I taught a female mystic in the next 
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course. I wish I could say things did go better, but in the second course I over-corrected. I 
framed everything about the mystical experience in terms of sexuality, so much so that 
the class members ended up too perplexed to engage, rather than my fear that they would 
be too shocked to do so.  
 And in both cases I realized that it is one thing to discuss a set of somewhat 
abstract concerns about “the erotic” in an academic environment, and an entirely other 
thing to talk about sexual pleasure with an inter-generational group of my fellow Baptists. 
The abstraction of academic theological discourse allows us to talk about pleasure as an 
analytic category, distanced from our personal experience. With everyday theological 
discourses of concretion, talking about pleasure feels like too vulnerable an exposure of 
my own particular bodily experience. As academics, we might discuss pleasure out of a 
desire to impact concrete social practices and beliefs about sexuality, but it is our very 
tendency to abstraction that enables us to do so. In some ways moves of abstraction help 
us better understand particular context-specific points, as I have been arguing throughout, 
but in other ways, moves of abstraction actually allow academic theologians to 
communicate those points. In the conclusion to this dissertation, I reflect on the need for 
seeking out, nurturing and constructing modes of conversation that might enable the 
communication of such abstracted points – even about topics that remain taboo in 
ecclesial environments – back into those environments. 
 In this section, I have endeavored to put descriptive flesh on Tanner’s model for 
how concretion clashes with abstraction, and how the ad hoc clashes with the 
systematized. At the same time, we have seen how theological clashes occurred because 
our languages and the commitment-laden practices that shape them lead us to encounter 
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and interpret shared Christian elements with completely different authorizing norms. As 
we performed our theology together in conversation, passing it back and forth between 
our hands, seeking common ground, we felt tensions between “Christian identity” and 
“being a Christian,” between the encounter with Beatrice as a text, and the encounter with 
her as a person. Somewhere in these tensions we pursued the wisdom of habitus 
construction through performing the practice of a conversation across various theological 
fluencies. 
 At the same time, using the metaphorical lens of performance theology to 
supplement and expand Tanner’s notion of bricolage, I have endeavored to show the 
possibilities and limitations to my particular way of bringing Tanner’s model to life here.  
Enfleshment, we have seen, reveals that conversations between people, not discourses, 
create interpersonal as well as theological tensions. We become frustrated with each 
other, or embarrassed to talk about topics that feel taboo. Issues of gender and sexuality 
came to the fore as I realize acutely how my speech is always connected to and ushering 
forth from my body. The insight that comes from the interaction between concretion and 
abstraction, and the blend of emotive, doctrinal, experiential and other forms of language 
is thus paired with a particular, bodily felt, discomfort. The full messiness of bricolage, 
understood in this more performative way, therefore comes to the fore here, 
demonstrating that when everyday and academic theologies are hoped to impact and 
shape each other, modes of conversation for doing so need to be considered. Moreover, 
each mode, as a context-specific, ad hoc, concrete mode, will have its own goods and its 
own limitations. 
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My Mother’s Hips 
 After the group’s response to Beatrice, which I sensed stemmed from a (perhaps 
unduly) strict Protestant understanding of “works,” while teaching Luther I focused on 
exposing how his similar fears ended up leading to a weakened understanding of 
sanctification. In so doing, I hoped we might further loosen the constraints on the group’s 
concerns about works in ways that could lead to deeper reflection on them. 
 As I engage the moves of this conversation, I again explore how everyday and 
academic theological concerns were exposed, competed with each other, and sought 
common ground, as different types of emotional, theological, Biblical and experiential 
language comprised our shared pursuit of wisdom. The performative relationship 
between embodiment, wisdom and theological construction is explored here again. Even 
with moments of success, we see again that the tension between speech and silence 
remains and, indeed, reveals both the possibilities and limitations of the particular, 
performative way I endeavored to bring Tanner’s model to life in ecclesial practices of 
classroom conversation. Here, in particular, I focus on how our classroom conversation at 
times made it difficult for me to communicate academic theology without inadvertently 
obscuring it.  
I begin the discussion on Martin Luther by contextualizing him first within his 
own personal story – as a deeply anxious, intense monk whose supervisor sent him to 
study theology to try to move his focus off of his own failings. Then I contextualize him 
within the narrative of the church of his time. Narrating the medieval church, of course, 
includes some description of indulgences and simony. These, I try to reframe with more 
nuance than I imagine the group has heard before. I explain that Luther’s concern was not 
 226 
with the authorized practices themselves, but more so with the corrupted ways they were 
being performed.  
To make these claims accessible, I describe the practice in contemporary Baptist 
or broadly American congregational terms. The pope was engaged in a massive “capital 
campaign” to rebuild St. Peter’s, I note, tapping into debates around FBC over whether or 
not resources should be spent on renovations to our own building. According to the 
official church theology, I explain, money given for indulgences and simony was 
supposed to be an offering out of gratitude for what God had already done, not a payment 
for services to be rendered. In that way, I explain, it was not unlike our own Sunday 
morning financial offerings that we give for the work of the church out of gratitude for 
God’s work in our lives. But the capital campaign, I note, with an implicit caution for our 
own renovation projects, had gotten out of hand. Consequently those who collected the 
money for indulgences and simony became a little more aggressive. And so, over time, a 
practice that was supposed to be the giving of money out of gratitude became something 
more like a bribe. I ask the class if they had ever heard indulgences explained this way 
before, and they all say no. Peter in particular exclaims, “So it’s like their theology didn’t 
match their practice!” “Yeah,” I respond, “pretty much!”  
What I was wanting them to see was that a strong reaction to a concrete situation 
had led to a theological revolution of which we are all inheritors, both in our faith beliefs 
and practices. If I could destabilize the concrete problem, then I might be able to loosen 
the hold that the theological outcome had on their thinking. This theological outcome – a 
strict focus on justification by faith – had, as we have seen, effects on our ability to 
engage ideas that even remotely threatened its power. Perhaps, I was thinking, if I went to 
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the source itself, I would be able to open up those conversations that were at times feeling 
stilted. 
Having established the concrete church practice context, I go on to describe the 
theological revolution. I give a brief introduction to the concept of justification by faith, 
arguing that Catholics had always believed in justification by faith; they just did not 
centralize the idea such that the rest of their theology was interpreted through it. To 
emphasize this point, I tell them how Luther’s view of justification in fact undermined his 
vision of sanctification. And here is where I – and by extension, we – focus our attention. 
Whereas with Beatrice, the group began with reactionary criticism of her, with 
Luther they begin with reactionary defense. Ann starts us off: “He’d seen the extremities 
of works, so you can understand why he was like that.” I affirm her point: yes, the 
practice of indulgences was deeply problematic, but it is also a problem to lose 
sanctification from one’s theology. I feel a twinge of guilt. I think I might be overstating 
the problem in Luther’s theology for a rhetorical effect of persuasion. I will need to fix 
this as the conversation goes on, I think to myself. But then Charlie, a vivacious, middle-
aged man in the class, quickly redirects my attention by asking an explicit question of 
me, “was it just not on his radar because he was so focused on indulgences?” I falter for a 
moment. How can I communicate that a theologian does not have the freedom to let 
sanctification “fall off of their radar,” even for a minute? But while I am thinking that, I 
falter again: when did I become so obsessed with systematicity? One of the things I like 
about Luther is how episodic his theology is. How can I communicate all these layers 
efficiently without taking focus from the task at hand? I find myself able to respond with 
little more than a “yeah, sure, but…” answer that quickly peters out into nothing. 
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But as I am trying to regroup and refocus the point that I want to make, the 
questions keep coming. “Was he scared he might stop over the line?” asks Ann. “Did he 
want to close that door quickly because we might think we can save ourselves?” I realize 
now definitively that I have overstated the case. And they are trusting my interpretation, 
agreeing with me that it is in error, but also defending Luther’s need to make that error 
from a practical perspective. I really need to fix this, I think again. As when I taught 
Beatrice, I was inadvertently and mistakenly leaning toward academic concerns – here, 
the way that attempts to make systematic coherence between Luther’s view of 
justification and his view of sanctification can cause theological problems – to convince 
the group of my point. But here, once again, they are much more concerned with the 
concrete stuff of life. Once again I am speaking a language inconsistent with the context, 
and I need to move toward common ground. 
 I begin to do so by trying to clarify the ways I have accidentally misconstrued 
Luther as having no theology of sanctification. “It’s not that he excluded the possibility 
of sanctification,” I explain. Drawing on academic practices of close reading and 
language analysis, I try to stay near Luther’s particular language of spontaneity, and I 
continue, “But what we do has no bearing on whether or not those works spontaneously 
happen. Because the connection between God’s work and ours is spontaneous,” I add, “it 
becomes difficult to see how the life of faith has any real impact on who we are and how 
we live.” I stop here because I know, as we have seen throughout, that this group cares 
about “who we are and how we live.” I have managed now to draw my concerns close to 
theirs. 
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Again, it is Ann who meets me in the middle ground: “How would Luther have 
felt about the idea of ‘psyching ourselves’ up for sanctification?” she asks. I, and others, 
give her inquisitive looks. She is searching for the right words, getting animated with her 
hand gestures, “I mean, the idea that the Holy Spirit is as involved in our process of 
sanctification as Jesus was in our redemption [pause], salvation, [she pauses and makes a 
frustrated noise as she tries to clarify], you know, I mean, our initial salvation.” She 
pauses again, perhaps recognizing that there is a difference between salvation and 
conversion, even though many in the class, and Baptists in general, can tend to conflate 
the two.  
Unable to find the right language, Ann has been alienated from what typically 
works for her, but has not yet found something to replace or renew it. And so she is 
struggling to make her point, even as she is reaching towards it. Moving her mouth 
silently and still gesturing with her hand, it is clear she is not finished, and it seems the 
group, like me, wants to hear her get where she is trying to go, as no one interrupts or 
takes her pause as an opportunity to jump in. “I can’t do anything more about 
sanctification than I could about my conversion,” she bursts, now having found the words 
she needs from a whole set of theological words she already possesses. “God has to work 
that in me too. I have to be as dependent upon grace during my ‘growing salvation’ as I 
was during my ‘initial salvation’,” she adds, now inventing new terms to make sense of it 
all. And in so doing, Ann weaves together a number of types of language in order to 
perform the process of reaching a theological point in conversation with others.   
In one way it seems that Ann is agreeing with the way I have construed Luther’s 
theology. God does the work in her framing of it. But at the same time, I hear her 
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describing our posture in relation to God’s work. God’s work is not bursting from us 
spontaneously; we actually need to “psych ourselves up” for it and be in the posture of 
dependence. The parallel to the Spirit’s work in sanctification, as Ann puts it, is Jesus’ 
work in justification. In both, then, we need to make a conscious decision to “accept the 
gift,” as numerous class members put it on a number of occasions. And once again, Ann 
and I have found common ground upon which the whole class can begin to build. 
Interpreting where Ann is trying to lead us, then, I ask them if we have a 
responsibility to act on our salvation, on our sanctification process. And they begin to 
think through examples of how this might be the case. Gene, perhaps the quietest class 
member, speaks first: “We’re told to be transformed, work out our own salvation with 
fear and trembling” (Philippians 2:12-13). “And,” he continues, indicating the role we 
play in this transformation, “we’re told to submit to the will of God…so that would seem 
to hinder your sanctification if you fight that.” I affirm his point, and introduce the 
language of human agency, noting that we too are “agents who participate in the process 
by which we are sanctified.” I have learned from our conversation about Beatrice to 
avoid language of “self-determination” and “works,” eschewing it for language of 
“agency” and “participation.” This makes more sense to them, but it also feels more 
accurate to me. And they have helped me make that clarification. Peter responds, 
interpreting my comment by adding, “we’re still accountable.” “Yes,” I affirm, “we’re 
still accountable.” The flow of our conversation is shifting and changing. From Ann’s 
longer, slower, searching speech, into a few quick comments, and simple, short sentences 
as we clarify each other and seek understanding. And then Rickie chimes in with, as often 
was the case with her comments, a clear Biblical example to sum things up.  
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Referencing the hortatory letters sent to the various churches at the beginning of 
the book of Revelation, Rickie adds to Gene’s comments: “we get exhorted to do 
things…he [it is not clear whether she means God, or the writer of Revelation] says “do 
this, change that, you’re not doing this…I mean, why exhort people if they can’t do 
anything about it?” She pauses and, when no one jumps in to pick up the point, she 
continues, “I have trouble saying we’re puppets and God does it all and we just sit back 
and kind of…[she trails off, pauses, and starts up again…] I think God does most of it, 
and we have this strange tension, paradox maybe even, doing what we allow God to do 
within us and how we allow him to transform us…”  
I feel awkward in this moment. I want to nurture the way Rickie has introduced 
notions of “tension” and “paradox” into the conversation, as I feel that would help us deal 
with some interesting questions about the relationship between Divine and human 
agency: questions their line of talking has brought to the front of my thoughts. But I also 
feel the need to clarify my framing of Luther one more time. It seems I still have not 
rectified my initial miss-steps. Especially because Rickie is a bright, engaged class 
member who often interprets hidden aspects of my lessons that did not necessarily occur 
to me, I trust that this is my error, not hers. Rickie’s statement that she has “trouble 
saying we’re puppets” thus makes me worry that I have implied first that Luther would 
claim such a thing and, second, that I want her to accept it.  
Torn between this desire to nurture and to correct, I falter for a moment, and Ann 
jumps in before I have the chance to speak. This moment would haunt me throughout the 
remainder of the two courses, as a few times Rickie would say something like, “Yeah, 
that’s why I can’t get on board with Luther, because he doesn’t have a view of 
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sanctification…” or, “well, like Luther says…” Each time, the context will not create 
room for me to mend the misperception, and each time I find myself uncomfortably 
surprised by how much Rickie has accepted my framing of Luther as what Luther had 
actually said.  
I had not interrogated the gaps I presume between text and interpretation 
thoroughly enough when I created my lesson plan, and in this situation I – and, perhaps, 
Rickie – paid for it. This mistake points to a further tension in the way I am framing the 
relationship between everyday and academic theology here, however. The way that I 
taught Luther, for example, to this group, differed dramatically from how I would write 
scholarship about Luther, or even teach him in a seminary classroom. After offering an 
incredibly brief, broad strokes view of his theology, my focus landed squarely on 
sanctification. In fact, I worried afterwards that members of the class would think Luther 
should be understood entirely through this lens of his understanding of sanctification. At 
least for Rickie, Luther became equated less with justification by faith, and more with a 
problematic view of Christian responsibility and the sanctified life.  
I had taught Luther in this way because that was how he connected with the 
conversation we were having in the class, at least as I perceived it. But I also taught him 
in this way because I thought doing so could disrupt a view I perceived as limiting our 
ability to talk about particular topics, like anything that smacked of “works 
righteousness,” to these faithful Protestant ears. In sum, I taught him this way because I 
thought it best served as a conversation stimulant, regardless of how accurate or full an 
impression of Luther it would give to the group. Having negotiated my pedagogical goals 
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in this way, however, I tipped the balance too far in the direction of ad hoc reflection and 
contextual goals, losing the loose systematic coherence that I also value. 
Such pedagogical concerns and my attempts to balance them surrounded all my 
teaching choices. And for the most part, I felt a coherence with the way I taught particular 
figures in the class and my broader understanding of their work, even though I was not 
explicitly communicating that broader understanding to the class. But with Luther, I 
inadvertently allowed some slippage that I did not realize until after the fact. It was not 
until Rickie repeated her dismissing of him a few times over the rest of the semester (as 
well as into the next) that I fully realized what I had done, and by then it was too late. 
These are the kinds of pedagogical decisions we make on the fly all the time while 
teaching. What we say in the classroom is never as fact-checked or coherent as what we 
might write in our scholarship. The freedom afforded to my authority in this ecclesial 
classroom brought this aspect of teaching to the foreground all the more. 
Following Rickie’s comment, Ann jumps in with a question that leads into a 
controversial idea, around which much of the rest of the discussion pivots: 
Don’t you think we could stop the whole thing [i.e. the whole salvation 
experience, sanctification itself] as much as we can stop the whole 
conversion experience? I need to be dependent on the Lord to transform 
my life…I can stop the whole process by not being willing to do his will. 
We can stop the process anywhere we want to, but we can’t speed it up by 
anything we do. 
 
The introduction of ideas like speeding up or slowing down sanctification raises hackles 
as people begin to argue that if we can do that, then we have returned to saying that we 
could either earn or lose our salvation. The temporal dimensions of salvation, something 
Baptists tend not to consider too frequently or too explicitly, even though they would 
accept these dimensions when they are articulated, are complicating the conversation. 
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With various modes of discourse on the table with which we can play, we as a group are 
now grappling with which ones to pick up, and how to create performative integrations of 
them to keep the conversation moving. 
What got lost by all of us in this moment was that Ann never said we could speed 
up sanctification, but only that we can stop it by our disobedience. Jumping into the gap 
between sanctification as something that can be stopped or stalled, and the idea that 
sanctification is part of salvation, Mike responds to Ann playfully by invoking the Baptist 
belief in “once saved always saved.” Grinning, he asks provocatively, “if we can slow 
down the process of sanctification, in that slowing down, can we slow it down enough to 
lose our salvation?” Establishing the borders of what we are describing, Mike reminds us 
that Baptists do not believe someone who is truly “saved” can cease to be so. Once the 
gift of salvation has been accepted, according to Baptists, it cannot be given back. But, 
Mike reveals, there is a fine line between not having the power to give it back, and 
having the power willfully to slow its progression in us. 
 These metaphors of speed spill over into metaphors of movement in general, as 
Peter – still pondering the line of thinking about accountability that he had tossed into the 
fray earlier – then shares a paraphrase of a Biblical Story that helps him understand 
Christian responsibility: as he tells it, Paul was headed on a missionary journey to 
Bithynia, when he was stopped by a flooded creek. God then changed the “missionary 
team’s” direction, telling them to go to Macedonia instead. “Well,” Peter says, “it looks 
to me like that it’s easier for God to use us when we’re moving, even if it’s in the wrong 
direction…I need to stay tuned.” I ask Peter why it is more difficult for God to use us 
when we are still, and he responds: 
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Inertia…it’s easy to get passive and interpret the Bible, ‘wait upon the 
Lord,’ to mean, expect God to knock us over the head with his will…part 
of salvation as we go through life is asking, “I really would like to know,” 
and sometimes I ask that while I’m moving, while I’m headed some 
direction. Otherwise I’m sitting at home going, “Lord I sure hope you tell 
me someday what I’m supposed to do because I’m not going to move until 
you do.” 
 
With this last line, in his usual dramatic performative style, Peter leans back in his chair, 
twiddles his thumbs, rolls his eyes to the Heavens, and closes out the speech by miming 
an appearance of someone whistling nonchalantly.  Ann has been nodding along with his 
story knowingly. I, meanwhile, have no idea what they are referencing. I thumb through 
the book of Acts later, and still cannot find it. Eventually I enter “Paul + Bithynia + Acts” 
into an online search engine and discover that the reference is a single, seemingly 
inconsequential, verse: Acts 16:7.  
Paul reaches the border of Bithynia (not a creek) and “the Spirit of Jesus” (not a 
flood) does not allow his group to cross, so they travel a different route (still to Bithynia, 
not Macedonia, even though they reach Macaedonia a few verses later). What matters 
here is not that Peter garbled aspects of the story, however, but that he knew a minute, 
random reference at all. Moreover, he expanded and changed the narrative, shifting 
details like the creek and the flood, allowing the story to be integrated with his 
understanding of his own practices of faithfulness in relation to God. This freedom with 
the text, paired with its significance for Peter’s own daily living, indicates a knowledge of 
the Scripture that is as embodied as cognitive.  
Indeed, most of the class members would toss out Biblical verses and narratives 
as proof-texts, examples, exhortations, and for insight, all with varying degrees of textual 
accuracy, throughout both courses. Biblical language is so firmly integrated with their 
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own modes of speaking – indeed, into the various habitus that give rise to their discourse 
– that textual accuracy is somewhat beside the point. What they were doing is better 
described as living the text than reading it, even as living it is impossible without 
repetitive – and, it seems, forgetful – reading of it. Despite the fact that I was not raised 
Baptist, and therefore lack the childhood Bible training common to Baptist practices, I 
nevertheless share a form of these habitus and am therefore able to know how to respond 
to a textual reference, even when I cannot quite make the cognitive link to the reference. 
Their varying degrees of accuracy, in fact, heightened my ability to do so. Often, when I 
tried to find the reference after class, only to discover how garbled it had been, I would 
wonder how many of them, like me, were also struggling to make the connection, even as 
their instincts helped them also appear as if they had made it. 
Rickie, blending the theological musings that were circulating between us all with 
her own personal experience, then follows up on Peter’s understanding of sanctification 
and movement: “As I have lived my life I have grown and changed physically, 
emotionally – everything in my life changes me in some way.” “So how,” she continues, 
“if I’m letting God work in my life, how is that not changing me?” If everything we do 
has the power to change us, how much more so does God have the power to do so? “We 
open ourselves up to allow God to come in and change us,” she continues, “to get rid of 
the old and change it into new.” Responding to a number of the issues we had discussed 
all at once and, like Peter, adding a layer of Biblical authority to her claim, Rickie’s 
comments develop a picture of sanctification as a process of maturation: “We must 
change and grow as Christians. The Bible is replete with needing to grow. Paul’s idea of 
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eating meat and maturing. Encountering God changes us. We keep moving toward what 
we’ll be at the end of time.”  
While Rickie is speaking her whole thought, its opening line, comparing physical 
growth to God’s work in her, begins percolating for me. And I pick this one up and start 
to run with it. Notions of sanctification and the body begin to swirl together, and a new 
theological articulation starts rising out of my own embodied wisdom. Caught in the flow 
of the conversation, I forget for a moment that I am responsible for the class, and dive 
instead into simply participating in it. In Rickie’s comments, I see an image of a God who 
continually fills us with her image until we look more like her. And this evokes a body 
memory of my mother. Without really thinking about how my own feminine vision of 
God is allowing me to make this connection, I begin to share it with the class.  
I tell them how my mother has this stance she does where she puts her hands on 
her hips and leans to the side. The stance is loaded with communicative meaning. It is 
cheeky, an assertion of my mother’s self. Never angry or imposing, it indicates that she 
knows she has just lost whatever game we were playing but she is going to hang on for a 
minute more with grit. “As soon as I put my hands there,” I say to the class, and 
instinctively I sit upright in my chair to make room for my hands to find my hips, “I can 
feel my mother in my body like I’m incarnating her. I feel her in my body and I feel my 
body become hers.”  
I laugh; I did not even realize my hands had made it to my hips to tell the story, 
but now feeling them there, I can feel my mother in the room with me. It is amazing how 
a posture can incarnate a memory. My thoughts are buzzing and I feel my face scrunch a 
little as I try to interpret what I am feeling in this moment deep under my skin in my 
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muscles and bones. It is like my thoughts are searching through my body, coursing my 
veins in search of the words for articulation. My body is becoming more and more 
explicitly necessary in my performative articulation of a theological idea.  
 I push my fists a little harder into my hips, as if I can find what I am looking for 
there. But as soon as I do so, I have directed my consciousness to myself; as fast as a 
flash, I am fully myself again. And my mother has left the room. But the flash creates a 
space and I realize that the reason my body becomes my mother’s for a moment has 
something to do with the continuity of our relationship through time. “It’s through deep 
relationship with my mother,” I add then, searching for it, but not quite grasping it, 
“Maybe something…[pause] something similar is happening with God working through 
me. Maybe sanctification is something like an evoking of that relationship I’ve had with 
God over a lifetime.” Perhaps it’s not the movement from somewhere to somewhere else, 
I think, but a movement that takes us deeper…deeper into our own bodies…deeper into 
what makes me me. I stop and exhale. Reading my body aloud to the group was hard 
work, but good work, and I am smiling at my hands still on my hips. The room is quiet. It 
seems as long as I hold my hands there the floor is mine. I let go. 
 As soon as I let go, the silence of the room still hanging, I worry that I have said 
too much, and I feel grateful, then, that I avoided speaking my final thoughts about the 
relationship between transcendence and immanence aloud. I have just crafted a bodily 
image of the Divine feminine, based on my mother’s hips, as some sort of exuberant 
performative utterance. The image had erupted from the theology, personal narrative, 
Biblical allusions, and other found objects we had all been tossing around between us. It 
somehow fit with the conversation we had been having, but it also disrupted it.  
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Time moves slowly when you are nervous, but after what felt like an aeon, Gloria 
laughs joyfully and exclaims, “I think that’s part of this whole thing we’re talking about!” 
She pauses and, gesturing with her hands because she is an animated speaker, continues, 
“when you allow God to be as much a part of your life as your mother, that does change 
you, and we do begin to reflect what he’s doing in us. That’s a good thing!” Gloria meets 
me in common ground, highlighting the parts of what I had said that could be acceptable 
to the group and relating them back to the conversation as it is flowing, while couching it 
all back in masculine language for God and replacing my metaphor with simile. She 
makes my story a little safer, more accessible and, as a result, the description becomes 
able to be integrated into our continued conversation. Nods circulate the table, and I 
notice how late it is getting. “Ok,” I say, “now some of you have said you want to be 
Calvinists, let’s talk about him for a bit and see how you feel then!” The group laughs, 
and we move on. 
 
    
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have endeavored to show how interpersonal relationships and the 
embodied dimensions of conversational interaction shaped the theologies that rose out of 
our theological pursuit of wisdom. And I used the metaphor of performance art to frame 
this process for two reasons. First, the metaphor of performance art helps us see how 
conversations performed across theological fluencies are dependent upon who shows up. 
It is intimately connected with the bodies in the room. And second, the metaphor of 
performance art helps us distinguish between the process of conversational theology and 
the subsequent product of the theological text that seeks to represent that process – 
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however fragmented – to an alternative audience. Performance art is captured in various 
modes: the performance itself, and the recordings, photographs and descriptions of that 
performance created according to the principles of artistic guilds. In much the same way, 
our pursuit of wisdom gives rise to a text that resists abstracting from the interactions of 
the process itself.  
Furthermore, throughout this chapter we have seen clashes not only of theological 
beliefs, but also of personality, as we have also seen both discomfort and comfort in 
bodies as they sought to negotiate those tensions. In some cases, where we were able to 
bridge linguistic difference, these tensions opened out into fruitful conversation. In 
others, where our various habitus gave rise to dispositions of awkwardness and 
discomfort, conversation was halted. Speech was dependent on moments of silence to 
punctuate it, as we all negotiated what we could and could not say in public. Both silence 
and speech, therefore, marked both the possibilities and limitations of all of us 
performing loose integrations of our various competing and cohering habitus in our 
ongoing pursuit of wisdom. 
Silence comes in many guises – a flush across the skin that halts a euphemized 
point from being expressed or a conversation cut short by death. If it is to be overcome it 
requires new words, and new friendships. But when we imagine the relationship between 
church and academy happening through abstracted discourses rather than embodied 
people living in relation to each other, we miss out not only on the messy complexity of 
lived practice, as Tanner puts it, but also on the factors that give rise to that complexity to 
begin with. In this chapter, then, I have sought to further complicate the complexity to 
which Tanner suggests theologians should pay attention, by teasing out what it might 
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actually look like in practice. It will be the task of the conclusion now to assess what this 
method has actually added to Tanner’s method, as well as Fulkerson’s, overall. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the first chapter I used Kathryn Tanner’s framework for interpreting theology 
as a cultural practice, one that gives rise to ad hoc, everyday discourses and specialized, 
academic discourses, to unpack the core question of this dissertation: what fruits can a 
conversation incorporating various theological fluencies into a pursuit of wisdom 
produce? The argument at the heart of Tanner’s methods, outlined most fully in her book, 
Theories of Culture, is that the tasks of academic theology are “abetted by a highly 
complicated and subtle reading of the whole cultural field in which Christianity 
figures.”191 In large part for Tanner, this reading focuses on the permeable borders at 
which cultural practices are made Christian. I have sought here to explore the permeable 
border at which everyday and academic theological discourses compete and cooperate 
with each other. And I have done so in order to articulate the three distinct research 
questions that would give shape to my self-implicating ethnographic method. These three 
research questions asked how academic theology can hear everyday theology, how 
everyday and academic theologies can communicate their context-specific wisdom to 
each other, and how everyday theologies can impact the shape of academic theologies.  
A constant division of labor has therefore marked this project. Taking seriously 
how concrete practices give rise to various habitus, discourses and particular social roles, 
this dissertation’s key contribution to academic theology involves bringing to light one 
form of the embodied, interpersonal practices that could undergird Tanner’s discursive 
categories of everyday and academic theology. The particular practice I sought to guide, 
                                                 
191 Kathryn Tanner, “Shifts in Theology in the Last Quarter Century,” in Modern 
Theology, 26:1 (January 2010), 43. 
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then, was a communal conversation bringing a group of people speaking various 
theological fluencies together to pursue the wisdom of the faith that was already in our 
bones; put simply, we sought together to constitute our own habitus of pursuing wisdom. 
By performing and interpreting the practice thusly, I endeavored to ground the way 
Tanner frames the relationship between everyday and academic theological discourses in 
a descriptive analysis of the interactions between the practitioners who speak them. 
In this conclusion, I reflect on these methods and practices. I endeavor to show 
how my attempts to perform a revised, expanded and, even, corrected vision of Tanner’s 
scheme has opened it up to reveal the complex texture and messiness to which she 
alludes. At the same time, in opening this scheme up, we see that Tanner might frame this 
messiness a little too neatly. Of course, as I mentioned in the introduction to this 
dissertation, all theoretical schemes tend towards neatness; their systematicity relies upon 
it. What interests us here is an inquiry into what Tanner’s particular neatness hides about 
Christian practice. The description of these points of messiness thus serve as a friendly 
warning to theologians seeking to use some sort of ethnographic practice in their 
reflection. Different modes of research create different experiences and, by extension, 
yield different intellectual results. 
This conclusion therefore clearly demarcates some of the limitations against 
which this project butted. These limitations were certainly a result of my own methods, 
but they also grew somewhat organically out of interpreting – and then shaping – the 
field of study through the theoretical lenses borrowed from Tanner. As a consequence, 
these limits serve as disruptions and corrections to her theory. 
 244 
Engaging concrete practices always complicates theoretical categories, even as it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret (and in this case, guide) these practices if we do 
not deploy some sort of theoretical structure. Even the simplest attempt to understand a 
practice and articulate that understanding is itself its own kind of theory. Academic 
theories, of course, are more specialized. They engage with other academic theories to 
gain deeper understanding of the practice. In other words, they do not arise from the 
practice alone. Academic theories fail to interpret concrete practice accurately, however, 
when they are negotiated only or, even, primarily in conversation with other academic 
theories rather than with the practices themselves. At the same time, no sooner have we 
articulated a theory to understand a particular set of practices does our ongoing 
observation of and engagement with those practices disrupt it again.  
Categories like everyday and academic theology, for example, cannot capture the 
fullness of the conversation that takes place between everyday Christians and academic 
theologians, but they can help us frame what is happening in that conversation. Likewise, 
describing particular social roles – like everyday Christians and academic theologians – 
cannot fully capture the plethora of social roles available within a particular community 
of shared Christian practice. The various categories I have required to describe the people 
who took the classes I taught has demonstrated this. But even a seemingly specific social 
role descriptor, like “retired minister,” does not account for the vast differences or even 
the nuanced similarities between Richard and Peter, for example, that I hope has come 
through in these pages.  
In this way there remains a gulf between a particular social position that theory 
can – to varying degrees – pin in place, and the myriad ways that particular individuals 
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might take similar versions of that social position up. The tensions between these various 
theoretical categories and their particular performances has been at the heart of this study. 
In this conclusion I unpack some of these tensions’ textures in order to gain a deeper 
descriptive understanding of the theoretical categories with which we have worked here. 
In so doing, I also seek to re-configure some of Tanner’s ways of using these same 
categories.  
In order to gain this richer understanding, I first outline some of the ways that I 
found everyday Christians to create complexly hybrid roles out of their own loose, 
performative integrations of their various competing and cohering habitus. I then reflect 
on my own hybrid subject-position, created out of my own competing and cohering 
habitus and roles, as both a tool for research and a topic for analysis. Everyday and 
academic theologies do not just compete and cohere as discourses: everyday Christians 
and academic theologians do the activity of bringing about that competition and 
coherence. Unpacking some of the texture of these particular social roles can therefore 
help us understand the processes by which everyday and academic theologies can 
compete and cooperate with each other better. It can help academic theologians consider 
more carefully not only what we want to say to everyday Christians, but also how we 
want to say it. 
These various complex, hybrid social roles matter for understanding the 
relationship between everyday and academic theologies because they reveal how difficult 
it can be to disentangle the two forms of discourse from each other. In outlining the 
hybridity of the everyday and academic social roles performed by the people who took 
the classes I taught, I also reveal some of limitations to the particular way I brought 
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Tanner’s model to life. As we will see, the nature of my self-implicated ethnographic 
method – teaching doctrinally based courses – inadvertently tended to exclude the 
participation of people who did not have post-secondary education or who had 
intellectual disabilities. 
This focus on the people who produce and who are constituted by everyday and 
academic theologies next turns our attention to how conversations that pursue wisdom are 
nevertheless marked by complex systems of power and emotion. This reveals how 
difficult it is for academic theologians to engage Christian social practices not only 
ethically, but also without any personal discomfort. And that personal discomfort matters 
for shaping what types of conversations we are actually able to have in the ecclesial 
milieu, as well as what types of theology are able to be pursued in it and produced out of 
it. The role of space in the construction of theologies further demonstrates how difficult it 
is to disentangle everyday theologies from their concrete locations without occluding 
some of what makes them work.  
The benefits and limitations of my method and my particular academic text 
created out of it are particularly visible in comparison to Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s 
own turn to ethnographic methods. Both are complementary routes toward bringing 
Tanner’s model to life. In this final concluding chapter I recap the ways in which the 
theology created out of reflexive ethnographic methods rather than more traditional forms 
of participant observation is able to have a deeper direct and local impact on practice than 
does Fulkerson’s work, even as it is unable to make such broad normative and 
prescriptive claims as she does. What is gained by using this particular method is 
balanced by what is lost in it, as we will see more fully below. 
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In sum, we see that the processes by which academic theologians are able to 
shape a broad spectrum of Christian social practices directly also entail a willingness to 
be shaped by those practices. This mutual making and remaking of each other is, in the 
end, perhaps the real goal of our interaction: the spiritual discipline of pursing together 
the wisdom of the faith that is already in our bones.  
 
The Potential Hybridity of Everyday Christians 
 I have argued throughout this dissertation that the theologies that rise from 
practices associated with ecclesial, academic and everyday life all overlap and inter-
permeate each other, a point with which Tanner would most certainly agree. Seeing this 
inter-permeation in concrete practice has brought to light some of the ways particularly 
hybrid social roles can be created across the spectrum of theological fluency. As 
everyday and academic theologies compete and cooperate with each other to influence 
Christian social practices in Tanner’s proposal, these hybrid social roles provide 
examples for understanding how complex the fluencies of the academic theologian’s 
conversation partners – or competitors – might be. In the case of my research partners, 
they serve as a reminder that there are many everyday Christians in churches who are 
already doing some of the work of cooperation between the everyday and academic 
within themselves, before the more specialized academic theologian even shows up.    
While none of the people who took the classes I taught located their vocation in 
the institutional academy, a number nevertheless had some level of formal, academic 
theological training and were, therefore, to varying degrees inculcated with some of the 
various habitus associated with such training. Between those who were retired from 
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careers in ministry, and those who had retired from or were still working in Christian 
publishing, the group racked up quite a few years of explicit theological training (a few 
had their Masters of Divinity or Religious Education, one had advanced degree work in 
Sacred Music, and one had a Ph.D. in Theology, all from Southern Baptist institutions). 
Other class members had taken required courses in Theology or Biblical Studies in their 
Christian colleges. And still others had taken Religious Studies and Theology electives 
out of interest in their college study.  
My story about chatting with Peter in his “man-cave” in chapter three offers a 
case in point of one of these hybrid social roles. Peter has no interest in contributing to or 
shaping the life of the theological academy. He deploys the various habitus inculcated 
into him through his M.Div. and formal training in “Christian Counseling” toward the 
performance of his various ministerial roles, as well as toward the further theological 
study he endeavors to do daily in his retirement. In his view, the academy exists primarily 
to support the work of the church. Indeed, as I noted in the third chapter, Peter would 
often question me to make sure that I was not being swayed too far away from a focus on 
ministry by an “ivory tower” mentality. And at times he was disappointed with my 
answers to his questions. 
Peter thus remains an “everyday Christian” in Tanner’s model, but the hybrid 
nature of his social role when it is observed in practice reveals much more complex 
layers of the competing and cohering habitus that shape who he is, how he thinks, and 
how he acts. Peter is a conversation partner who pushes back and disagrees with me, and 
who does so with insights into concrete practice, but also into various Christian 
intellectual traditions that I sometimes lack because of my own academic disciplinary 
 249 
focus. Moreover, in our conversations, when we compete over how to view problems in 
practice, we tend to alternate winning – if such a winner could be declared – not because 
I have not managed to communicate in the language of his everyday theology, as 
Tanner’s schema might suggest, but simply because he has seen an angle on the problem 
that I have not.  
This complex hybridity was also evident in the social roles constituted by non-
theological academic training. Most, if not all, of the other class members were college 
graduates. A few had also completed Masters level and Ph.D. work in fields outside of 
theology. Near everyone then was inculcated with some configuration of the various 
habitus associated with post-secondary education – all of which are related in varying 
ways with certain class, economic, gender, and other habitus that contribute to who we 
are and how we live. As practices and discourses weave into each other, and as academic 
inter-disciplinary work is on the rise, these various forms of specialized discourse further 
complicated the hybridity of the people present in the room, as well to the theologies they 
articulated.  
Take Miriam, for example. Miriam, who has a Ph.D. in Communications, teaches 
at a local undergraduate institution. Her own academic research focuses on power in 
interpersonal relationships and education. Despite not having specifically theological 
academic training, some of the academic skills with which Miriam is inculcated were 
nevertheless relevant and helpful to our conversation. On the night when we studied 
liberation theologies, for example, Miriam’s questions and comments guided the group to 
ponder their own particular cultural locations in relation to those of the theologians we 
were studying. I could intuit that there was an undercurrent to their broader comments, 
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but I could not quite name it. Miriam could, and she brought it to light for all of us in a 
way that moved the conversation along.  
When I asked Miriam about how her own academic work shaped her insights in 
my follow up interview, she began her response, “Yeah, I remember that: I remember 
thinking about the standpoint epistemology I teach my students…” Not only did Miriam 
bring this content and skill to our conversation, but she also participated in the type of 
translation of it (i.e., she talked about how our “culture shapes us,” and not about 
“standpoint epistemology” in the conversation) that I consistently needed to do with my 
specialized theological knowledge and skills. The complexity of Miriam’s role within our 
conversational pursuit of wisdom and the ways in which multiple trajectories of practice 
contribute to it reveals just how complex are the forms of theological discourse that could 
be plotted along Tanner’s theological continuum. Like Peter, she also reveals the striking 
possibilities within everyday theological discourse for speaking back to, correcting and 
guiding the intellectual pursuits of both everyday and academic theological discourses as 
well. 
The specialized resources – theological and other – that everyday Christians bring 
to bear on their everyday theological reflections are diverse, as Tanner consistently notes. 
And in that, their contributions to theological conversations have the potential to be 
equally complex. Tanner’s theological continuum positions academic theologians as able 
to deploy specialized theological knowledge that can help solve the crises that erupt in 
Christian social practices. As everyday and academic theologies compete over how to do 
this, people like Peter and Miriam – as well as numerous others who took the classes I 
taught – embody particular forms of hybridity that might make them also well-equipped, 
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but differently so, and perhaps even better equipped for this task of crisis-management 
than is the academic theologian. Potential allies or, even, particularly well-armed foes, 
such characters indicate that the textures of conversation around an academic 
theologian’s position within a Christian community are myriad and, often, more difficult 
to negotiate than we expect. 
But this focus on the hybridity of everyday Christians also reveals a particular 
limit to my attempts to perform Tanner’s method. FBC is already a middle- to upper-
middle class church, filled primarily with wealthy, educated professionals. The way I 
designed the courses I taught tended to draw members who were theologically educated, 
in particular, but also highly educated in a more general sense as well. These levels of 
education thus also coincided with a particular class habitus that shaped the style of our 
conversations. Furthermore, as highly intellectually driven classes, they also tended to 
draw out church members who enjoy and are proficient with the practices of intellectual 
debate. The nature of my data therefore unfolds into reflections on these highly educated, 
intellectual hybrid social roles almost by necessity. The framework of my study thus 
tended to exclude those who are not educated professionals, and those whose intellectual 
capacities are diminished in some way. 
There are, however, two cases that might function as minority reports despite my 
failures in this regard. We had one class member who was not educated at the college 
level. He was a recent convert to Baptist religion, having just completed a local area 
mission program that helped homeless men with substance abuse issues get clean and 
transition into the mission’s subsidized housing program. We had another class member, 
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who I mentioned in chapter three, who exhibited signs of dementia and, therefore, 
struggled with some of the typical practices of intellectual debate.  
Both men attended class sporadically. Despite my efforts to extend numerous 
explicit invitations for them to attend more often, and to participate fully in the 
conversation, the ways I designed and taught the courses nevertheless may have 
inadvertently discouraged and even excluded their participation. If so, that was my 
failure, not theirs. Reviewing transcripts after both courses were finished, I came across a 
number of insights that they brought to our conversations which, for various reasons 
related to my own shortcomings, I was unable to integrate into the ongoing course of the 
discussion. Not until I read and re-read these transcripts later, did I begin to see the 
threads the two men were pulling together in ways I was not able to recognize in the 
moment.  
Therefore, because of my method’s design, I now lack the data to support my 
claim that these two men also brought embodied wisdom into our conversations; that is, 
they brought various, diverse habitus that contributed to the internal diversity of our 
community. I also lack enough data to support my claim that their embodied wisdom 
both enlivened the pursuit we all engaged together and challenged my own thinking, 
though with hindsight, I can see that it did. In this section, I have endeavored to 
demonstrate how my method complicates Tanner’s view of everyday Christians, 
revealing the hybrid nature many embody. The path to demonstrating this claim has, 
however, limited my ability throughout the dissertation to reveal how everyday Christians 
who lack the educational expertise and intellectual capacities that were de facto 
 253 
normative for these classes might also contribute to a conversation between everyday and 
academic theologies. 
 
The Hybridity of Academic Theologians as a Tool 
Like everyday Christians, academic theologians are also inculcated with various 
competing and cohering habitus and roles that give rise to the forms of theological 
discourse we speak. My interests here relate particularly to our institutional hybridity, 
however. Drawing on my specialized ministerial and academic knowledge and skills, 
both inculcated in me by my belonging to the distinct social spheres of church and 
academy, I guided conversations that enabled everyday and academic theologies to hear 
and speak to each other. By highlighting the ways in which an academic theologian’s 
hybrid roles can be performed in a loose integration for the purpose of ecclesial service, I 
endeavored to outline how the integration of everyday theologies with academic 
theologies can also lead to productive tensions, or forms of competition as Tanner puts it, 
as well as fruitful cooperation.  
These forms of competition and cooperation became most evident in my 
expansion of Tanner’s metaphor of the academic theologian as a bricoleur into the 
academic theologian as a performance artist. And by performing theology in this 
communal way, our conversation was able to bring to light – to varying degrees – aspects 
of our different forms of embodied wisdom shaped by the distinct institutional spheres of 
church and academy.  
To affect this process, my own hybridity as an academic theologian shaped by 
both these spheres was crucial. My participation in the ecclesial sphere, even in a fraught 
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and complex way, gave me access not only to teach the classes, but also to foster the trust 
and vulnerability between all of us that was necessary for them to work (to the varying 
degrees that they did work). Being implicated in the ecclesial sphere, I was also 
inculcated with the instincts necessary for responding appropriately (when I managed to 
do so) to the flow of that particular teaching context, and for attempting corrections when 
I had not managed to do so. Deeply implicated as a member, the group seemed also more 
willing to forgive me, and forgive me quickly, throughout all my failings.  
Such a subject position, of course, differs starkly from that occupied by Fulkerson 
in her own methods of participant observation. While I lose some of the objective 
distance on my field of study that she has on hers (evidenced, in particular, by the types 
of emotional responses I exhibit throughout my study), I also gain an “insider” status, as 
outlined above, that gives me access both to embodied “insider” information and, more 
significantly, to shape the practices that I am studying. I have a little more freedom to 
experiment with those practices, to see what happens when particular variables within 
them are changed, for example. As I have already argued, the ethics of such 
experimentation are complex, another way in which my methods contrast Fulkerson’s. 
But as I have also argued, membership within the community also binds me to its own 
ethics, further complicating my own academic stance, as I will detail more fully below. 
In addition to my participation in the ecclesial sphere, my participation in the 
academic theological sphere, also at times fraught and complex, provided me most 
simply with the knowledge of what to teach and how to teach it (again, to varying 
degrees of success and failure). But it also provided me with skills of theological 
reasoning, for pulling apart and tinkering, to borrow Tanner’s language, with the 
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everyday theologies of the classroom. In my better moments, I was able to abstract from 
particular comments, situate them quickly within a broader theological and cultural 
framework, and then find ways to guide the conversation towards bringing the pieces 
back together, all before the class members then pulled apart and tinkered with those 
theologies again. Each round of tinkering took us deeper into the ways we were pursuing 
wisdom together: wisdom that was, by the very nature of its ongoing formation, a deep, 
complex integration of our everyday and academic theologies. 
Highlighting the particular institutional hybridity of the academic theologian in 
this way thus helps us understand both her agency and the agency of the everyday 
Christians. In so doing, I have also sought to nuance Tanner’s view of the “competition” 
that takes place between everyday and academic theologies by revealing the ways both 
everyday and academic theologians come ready to compete with each other for the 
purpose of productive, fruitful conversation. The particular strategy I employed here – 
teaching adult education classes – is only one strategy that the academic theologian can 
use to foster conversation across theological fluencies. More work therefore needs to be 
done to uncover and establish alternative strategies and tactics for making everyday and 
academic theologies communicable across the different spheres in which they are created. 
 
The Hybridity of the Academic Theologian as a Topic 
In addition to studying the ways in which I deployed the hybridity of my 
ministerial and academic roles as a research tool, this dissertation has also maintained an 
undercurrent of studying that hybridity as a topic. Agreeing with Tanner’s claim that 
academic theologians should pay attention to “how people without specialized theological 
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training go about trying to live in accord with their Christian commitments,” I have 
endeavored to demonstrate throughout that we would also benefit from paying attention 
to how people with specialized theological training do the same.192 Attempts to live in the 
complexity of with these dual commitments, as I noted particularly in the introduction to 
this dissertation, are complex. They entail moments of real decision over whether or not 
to stay with Christianity in general and, in my case, with conservative churches in 
particular. And they come with certain responsibilities and privileges that are always 
marked by personal joys and struggles.193   
On the one hand, we have seen multiple instances of how my ecclesial and 
academic skills and dispositions compete with each other; take my fears over which 
liberations theologies to teach in the ecclesial environment and how to teach them, for 
example. But on the other hand, in addition to competition we have also seen loose, of 
course still tense, performative integrations of these same skills and dispositions. 
Consider, for example the ways in which I managed to guide – with moments of halting, 
for sure – the discussion about Beatrice of Nazareth toward a conversation in which a 
more expansive view of salvation was discussed. 
In general, my academic training leaves me less fluent with and, certainly, less 
comfortable with everyday theological discourse than I once was. My academic practices 
of historicizing, questioning and critiquing the language of my faith destabilizes the 
                                                 
192 Tanner, “Shifts in Theology,” 42. Italics, mine 
193 My ambivalence about these privileges, particularly with regards to my own 
ordination, is perhaps most clearly exemplified in the tension I experience between the 
pleasure of subverting what I perceive to be erroneous, even sinful, SBC policies of 
barring women from ordination, and the pain of belonging to a tradition that was formed 
over being on the wrong side of the debate about slavery, and belonging to a particular 
congregation that I know would not have ordained me had I self-identified to them as 
gay, lesbian or bi-sexual, for example. 
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immediacy of authority that language once held for me. And as we saw in my narrations 
of our conversations, this destabilizing, at times, led me to make incorrect snap-
judgments of the members of the classes I taught: either judgments that they were closed-
minded or judgments that they were incapable of handling a particularly complex or 
controversial idea. These judgments would almost always turn out to be wrong-headed on 
my part. And I found that conversation with my research partners helped me to regain 
some understanding of everyday theologies’ contours in a way that forestalled such snap-
judgments long enough for me to hear more fully what the class members’ were saying. 
At the same time, this destabilizing distance academic theology gave me on my 
own everyday faith practices and language helped me to understand that faith more 
deeply and practice it more fully. For example, I found that our classroom conversations 
helped me re-learn how to deploy Biblical language to make a particular theological point 
in ways similar – if not as fluently and comfortably – as the rest of the class members. 
And I came to do so in a way that rang true to me in light of my academic training and 
made sense to other everyday Christians. The academic theological discourses that 
created a sense of distance between Christian social practices and their immediate ability 
to shape me is the same discourse that enables me to re-engage those practices and re-
embody them anew in my own ongoing pursuit of wisdom as a loose, performative 
integration of my various competing and cohering habitus and roles.  
Tanner’s model acknowledges the disruptions academic theology can make to 
everyday theology as the two compete (and ideally cooperate) to shape Christian social 
practices. But the way I have framed the academic theologian’s particular form of 
institutional hybridity here reveals how everyday and academic theologies can also 
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compete within the ways that the academic theologian herself speaks her own various 
forms of theological fluency. It is possible for this competition and cooperation to be 
performed within an ecclesial community, in ways that are committed to that community. 
And when that happens, there is the potential for the academic theologian’s own loose 
performative integration of her competing roles to guide an intentional pursuit of wisdom 
in that community. Finally, when wisdom is pursued in this way, everyday and academic 
theologies can become loosely integrated also to work on the problems that arise from 
Christian practice together.  
 
Power in Practices of Conversation 
The process of drawing these connections between social roles, discourses and 
habitus in the context of a particular practice has also revealed some of the interpersonal 
dimensions of the interaction between everyday and academic theologies. These 
interpersonal dimensions are particularly important in this project because they reveal 
some of the differences between Fulkerson’s style of participant observation and the 
reflexive ethnography I am employing here. A deeper integration of the researcher into 
her field of study, such that she is actually a member of it, complicates the types of 
relationships she can have within it. And the fact of these more intimate relationships, by 
extension, paired with my ability to shape the practices that I study, necessitates a more 
careful analysis of the power and emotion dimensions than would a more distancing form 
of participant observation.  
In this section I deal with questions of power in interpersonal interactions in the 
conversational pursuit of wisdom and in the next, I deal with their emotional nature. 
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Because the specialized knowledge and skills on which the academic theologian draws 
create a reflective space between her and the everyday theologies she engages, space is 
also created between her and the speakers of everyday theological discourse. And that 
space makes room for different forms of power to accrue to everyone who participates in 
the conversation. 
This fact was revealed throughout this study’s course, but one particular example 
will suffice: the conversation I narrated in the final chapter about mysticism. When Ann 
asked me if Beatrice was a Christian, my initial instinct, which I resisted, was to map the 
historical theological trajectory that revealed the anachronism of her question. My 
academic knowledge gave me access to understanding aspects of the faith in Ann’s 
bones: aspects of which she was largely unaware. Such knowledge entails power that 
needs to be acknowledged and appropriately handled by the one to whom it accrues.  
My attempt to handle this power entailed first participating in Ann’s language, 
before slowly bringing mine into the conversation. I attempted to give up my language to 
submit momentarily to her discursive regime. But even in trying to exercise my power 
ethically, a surplus power dimension to our relationship remained, one of which Ann 
remained largely unaware. I inhabited Ann’s language out of respect and love for her as 
well as a desire to learn from her. But I also inhabited her language as a rhetorical device 
for introducing my own theological views into the conversation in ways that were 
communicable to the group. My more hidden knowledge thus allowed me to compete in 
our conversational debate with a surplus power that I then needed to choose - even 
instinctually – to integrate into the conversation itself for its flourishing. 
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But of course, as we saw in the fourth chapter, the choice of what to do with our 
power is always, already conditioned by the mode in which it is given to us. And so the 
power dynamic of our class was further complicated by the way in which power in our 
conversation accrued also to Ann and the others. Inhabiting Ann’s discursive regime 
entailed some form of submission to it. Had I launched into a speech on the anachronistic 
use of salvation language to understand medieval Christian practices, thus destabilizing 
the community’s most authoritative language, my own status as a member would have 
been undermined. They might have quickly forgiven me, of course. But in the moment, 
measuring the power that constellated between us, it seemed evident to me that the 
discursive submission needed to be mine if I wanted to keep moving the conversation 
along. 
In fact, my self-silencing in this way reveals the power with which the whole 
community, myself included, imbues the rules of our discourse. Recall Gene’s comments, 
echoed by others, that he was nervous to say certain things in class in case the group 
judged him as “heretic,” or worse, “not really saved.” Clearly I have also inculcated into 
my embodied wisdom a sense of how such a border between Christian and non-Christian 
functions in FBC’s life and, indeed, Baptist life in general, and I desire to remain on the 
“right” side of that border – at least in the group’s view – in order to continue my 
conversation with them. Even as I tried to find ways to undermine the “rules” about 
salvation with which I disagree, then, my ways of doing so remained so slight so as to 
keep them acceptable to the group, that I nevertheless reproduced them through my 
efforts. 
 261 
 It remains the case, therefore, that despite my submission to these rules, I am 
making that submission knowingly because I also know that I need the access it gives me 
if I want to continue to do the forms of education ministry to which I feel called. There is 
never a point in this cycle of the power we give back and forth to each other that we can 
name as balanced and ethical. The intervention of academic theology into everyday 
Christian social practices, even in the modes of ministry and pastoral care, inevitably 
produces such power dynamics. The ways in which these modes of power fluctuate and 
remain impossible to perform with any consistent type of ethic indicates how difficult it 
is to have conversations across theological fluencies.  
 
Emotions in Practices of Conversation 
Highlighting the relationship between various habitus, social roles and discourses 
reveals not only the power structures that shape conversations across various theological 
fluencies, but also the emotional aspects of them.  Speakers of everyday and academic 
theologies disagree over more than the systematic coherence of ideas, or how such ideas 
can shape and reshape practice. As much as this conversation is marked by theological 
differences, it is also marked by aspects of identity, as well as by clashes of a more 
intimate nature. And these clashes give rise to emotional reactions of discomfort or 
embarrassment that can, like unbridgeable theological disagreements, also shut down a 
conversation.  
In chapter two I outlined some of the difficulties I experienced teaching liberation 
theologies, particularly with regards to issues around race. I argued there that the easy 
acceptance by class members of these theologies inadvertently affirmed our particular 
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homogenous culture at FBC. My discussion in the fourth chapter of how atypical 
practices tend to support the flourishing of the wider ecclesial equilibrium further 
clarified this point. And I noted that because of my own racial identity, I felt a certain 
discomfort with pressing the group to engage their particular stances too deeply. On the 
one hand, I noted that some of my discomfort might have been due to my own fears. But 
at the same time, when I did try to lead us into such discussions, I found that conversation 
halted and slowed. A few class members became visibly agitated, fidgeting in their 
chairs, with their voices bearing a tone of frustration. When I asked direct questions, they 
would give short, clipped answers. They might not have been as uncomfortable as I was, 
but they were certainly not at ease.  
Tanner argues that academic theologians require “tact” when making “ad hoc and 
situation-specific adjustments” to everyday theologies.194 This tact is necessary not only 
for helping everyday Christians deal with the crises that erupt in their practice, however, 
or even for helping see crises that should be present but are not. This tact is also 
necessary for negotiating personally and politically loaded situations. And sometimes, 
often in fact, as we saw with my inability to engage issues of race and racism more fully, 
this tact fails. A second example will help clarify my point here. 
In the fifth chapter I narrated the difficulty of talking about sexuality in the 
ecclesial sphere. On the one hand, this was a problem caused by my own embarrassment 
at using sexually specific language to make my theological point of connecting the 
experience of orgasm to the process of mystical ascent. On the other hand, the 
infrequency – if not absolute scarcity – of public conversations about sex at FBC (indeed, 
                                                 
194 Tanner, Theories of Practice, 93. 
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either in a way that I would interpret as positive, or at all) meant that we had no shared 
language for tackling the topic. And on yet another hand, my euphemistic speech caused 
a quick and decisive division between those who had ears to hear, and those who did not. 
Of course, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, it is possible that such 
discomfort was simply due to my own failures. Even so, these stories about my struggles 
in such conversations might also reveal a need for academic theologians to consider more 
carefully the nature of diverse conversations within church life. While I had not 
intentionally set out to engage explicitly issues of race and sexuality in my performance 
of Tanner’s model, I had hoped that such topics would arise organically from our 
theological explorations. The fact that not only did they not arise organically, but that the 
very nature of our conversations and their location tended to exclude this possibility, 
indicates that alongside the intellectual work we are doing on race and sexuality, as well 
as on other topics that remain taboo to talk about in certain church circles, academic 
theologians might benefit from also considering how to make such topics more tactfully 
communicable within the types of conversations particular to ecclesial circles.195  
A key problem here as I see it relates to the fact that ecclesial conversations about 
sexuality are precisely the type that could benefit from the conversational help of 
academic theologians. This might be particularly true in conservative congregations like 
FBC where I encountered in-roads for conversation in more one-on-one, private settings. 
For example, a few of the people I interviewed brought up questions about sexuality. 
Those who did so brought it up particularly with regards to political and religious debates 
around same-sex marriage. They shared hunches that, as one put it, they “just don’t think 
                                                 
195 I interpret Kelly Brown Douglas’, Sexuality and the Black Church: A Womanist 
Perspective (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2004) to offer crucial insight in this direction. 
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homosexuality is really a sin,” opening discussions into theological frameworks I could 
help them construct for undergirding such hunches. In these more private conversations, I 
was able to draw on academic resources around sexuality and theology, but such 
strategies did not feel available to me during larger group formats.  
These stories about the interpersonal, emotional dimensions of theological 
conversation therefore reveal the limits of my particular attempts to bring Tanner’s model 
to life. First, the organic connections I draw between topics of race, sexuality, gender and 
theology, might not be so organic for others. Discussing liberation theologies on the last 
or second from last night of class is, therefore, not a good strategy for incorporating 
liberatory themes into a classroom conversation. While neither Tanner’s model, nor my 
attempts to perform it thematize how to have such conversations in the ecclesial context, 
then, more academic research might be necessary for understanding how to accomplish 
this goal of academic theology. The fact that such topics might best be handled one-on-
one and in smaller groups not only points in the direction of where such research could be 
pursued, but it also underscores how slowly social and theological change is likely to 
happen by the intervention of academic theology into everyday theologies. It also points 
out some of the limits to using ethnography – either participant observation or reflexive 
ethnography – to facilitate conversations between everyday and academic theologies. 
And it highlights once again that the conversational practice of pursuing wisdom in 
community must also be seen as a good in itself. 
 
Situating Conversations in Space 
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In addition to these questions around tact and communication, we can also 
consider how conversations across various theological fluencies do not just hover in the 
air but, rather, they take place in actual spaces, themselves marked by identity, difference 
and moments of pleasure and awkwardness. Fulkerson uses the concept habitus to argue 
that people encultured as “socially informed bod[ies],” both shaped by practices and 
shaping the same practices in which they share, create the (permeable) borders of a 
“place” that can be theologically read.196 Fulkerson’s attention focuses on how the 
practices engaged by congregants in the ecclesial sphere create the place, church, for her 
study. But because her method does not take much account of her own integration within 
her field of study – because she does not already embody a particular “insider” role at 
Good Samaritan Church – she does not engage how she and her informants might carry 
the modes of interacting associated with that shared space into others.  
Alternatively, as I, like my research partners, embody the codes and modes of 
interaction associated with our shared ecclesial space, any departure from the norms of 
that space – either by changing the space, or by physically leaving the space – matters for 
interpreting the “theological place” in which we find ourselves.  Conversation for our 
group happened primarily in a classroom in a church basement. But it also happened, for 
example, in an Indian restaurant with Ann, a “man-cave” with Peter, and a kitchen with 
Maureen and Joe. Each place shifted the tone of conversational style; each revealed the 
variety of ways that theological conversation can be enacted. Each thus opens 
possibilities for further avenues of research. 
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Let us begin with the classroom space. Our group met in one of the larger of the 
rooms dedicated for LCU classes, a room that was clearly multi-purpose. Various 
configurations of tables and chairs were possible. There was a closet containing Bibles 
and hymnals, an old – as far as I could tell – unused, piano, and other various random 
objects in rotation. But it was also neat, clean and functional. It felt like a classroom. 
Classrooms in FBC are typically set up lecture-style with a podium orienting all 
the chairs in one direction, and we found our room this way a few times over both 
semesters. The first few times this happened, I asked class members who were able to 
help me rearrange the tables and chairs so that we could all face each other. After we had 
done this a few times, I would sometimes arrive to find class members already working 
on the rearrangement. In this way, we repeatedly worked together to create less 
hierarchical, more intimate space for our conversations.  
 Our space thus functioned like a transition from the expected norm at FBC, one 
that we often brought about physically as a group. Whenever I offered mini-lectures, I did 
so seated at the table in the midst of the group. The only times I addressed the group 
standing at a position physically outside of them were when I was writing their ideas up 
onto a white board. Thus, by my own pedagogical practices, and the group members’ 
bodily investments in helping me to carry these practices out, we together created a space 
in which my intention, at least, was for everyone to feel equally invited to speak.  
Still, these adjustments were all within the parameters of classroom space, and 
our conversation tended to flow in ways appropriate to them. I gave short lectures and 
asked probing (and sometimes inadvertently halting) questions. People addressed points 
to the group that sometimes gave way to short speeches. They disagreed with each other 
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or built up each other’s ideas by adding to them. When conversations moved quickly, 
people jockeyed to get in. Rarely would someone address another directly. For the most 
part, conversations remained in the style of public speech. No one shared particularly 
private or controversial details. They saved these for the more intimate interviews. 
The spaces for these interviews also shaped the conversations that happened in 
them. Take my interview with Ann, for example. This was not the first time we had met 
at her husband’s hospice bedside. Our history of doing this practice thus reaffirmed the 
intimacy of our relationship from the outset of the conversation. Moving then to a 
restaurant for Ann’s first taste of Indian food had further impact on the shape of our 
conversation. Though I had not intended it to be such, it reaffirmed my role as her young 
teacher by opening her up new ideas and experiences, common for my generation and 
class habitus.  
Conversely, the space kept a desire to probe the wisdom of Ann’s particular set of 
years at the forefront of my questioning. She was other to this space, and I wanted to 
understand her otherness. We fell quickly into long stories that exposed how her 
childhood at the tail end of the Great Depression shaped her theologies of simplicity, how 
her anger at the Religious Right could not be disentangled from the wounds of youth, 
both giving rise to her views on theological freedom, and how her vision of sanctification 
was inextricable from particular ways she had learned to forgive. Even punctuated often 
by our waiter’s playful interjections, our conversation remained intimate. And mouthfuls 
of new tastes and exclamations of spice created space to collect ourselves between lines 
of questioning. 
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 Peter’s “man-cave” offered no such space for regrouping, even though it too 
created a sense of intimacy. As a “man-cave,” it was a particularly gendered space, 
bearing the potential to make me, a woman, quite uncomfortable, something that did not 
seem to occur to him. After a minute of getting past the surprise of bypassing the typical 
interview locations of kitchen and living room, however, I quickly settled in, feeling 
neither the exclusion of being female in a specifically male-defined room nor a particular 
honor at it either. Indeed, it quickly came to feel natural, as it seemed to be the room in 
which Peter himself felt at home. I felt the intimacy associated with Peter’s own personal, 
study space, my attention focusing squarely on the conversation we were going to have. 
And after all these rapid adjustments, I found myself losing track of time.  
Because the room was Peter’s library, primarily a theological library, it 
continually reminded us of our theological tasks at hand. I felt the presence of many 
books draw us into deeper reflection, especially as he pulled them off of shelves to make 
a point, a type of action the various habitus associated with my academic role readily 
recognizes. Indeed, as he narrated his view of the relationship between frontier and 
institutional theologies, he showed me antique books of church meeting minutes and old 
church ledgers that brought his stories to life, making them more present to us.  
The move to domestic and social spaces brought a further shift in interview 
dynamics. The particular status of my project under the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
guidelines disallowed me from serving any food to my “research subjects.” But as anyone 
familiar with Baptist life knows, food is near crucial for socializing. Indeed, as Nancy 
Ammerman has argued, “everywhere, food expresses cultural and religious identities no 
less than does the art and architecture” as it “binds communities together as powerfully as 
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their singing.”197 Moving into spaces where we could eat together shifted us further 
toward more personal conversational styles. Take my conversation about salvation with 
Maureen, for example. The presence of food – that we could talk about, take time to 
munch on, and which generally gave us something to do with our hands – created space 
to recover from awkward moments in conversation, allowing us to regroup. Food – and 
domestic space in general – created spaces for instincts to kick in to respond to situations 
when words were not helping us do so.  
Place matters for theological conversation, whether in large group formats, or 
smaller, more intimate modes of relating. The intellectual move to making an academic 
theology out of an everyday theological interaction between practices and people is 
necessary, but it also loses some of the texture that makes the everyday theology make 
sense. Ideas need to be disentangled from the spaces in which they are created if they are 
to be communicated elsewhere. At the same time, as I have endeavored to show here, 
academic theologians engaging Christian social practice would also do well to consider 
the role of the spaces in which everyday theologies are constructed. Those spaces might 
give us clues to understanding more deeply what is at stake in the claims. 
 
Serving the Church and Academy 
 By describing the gifts and limitations of these interpersonal conversations, I have 
endeavored to show the possibilities and difficulties associated with the tact that Tanner 
suggests academic theologians need to have as they engage everyday theologies in 
                                                 
197 Ammerman, “Congregations: Local, Social, and Religious” in The Oxford Handbook 
of the Sociology of Religion. Ed. Peter B. Clarke (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 569. 
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context. The question becomes, however, what is the relationship between such complex, 
tactful activity, the Christian social practices that the academic theologian wishes to 
impact, and the academic theological products that she also creates? Two clear 
possibilities emerge: either the academic theologian’s ongoing participation in Christian 
social practices effects an organic impact on them (much as Tanner describes academic 
theology rising organically out of these same practices), or the people engaged in the 
everyday practices read the academic theologian’s text and incorporate its insight into 
their daily lives. Both options seem possible and desirable in Tanner’s model, but both 
are also left largely unthemetized.  
I argued in the third chapter that Mary McClintock Fulkerson offers one solution 
to this need for methodological clarity in Tanner’s model through her use of ethnography 
for accessing everyday theologies. And I offered my self-implicated ethnographic project 
as a complement to her more traditional methods of participant observation. Furthermore, 
I argued that the differences between our methods offered different goods to the 
theological process, while also making different sacrifices. My method, I noted, more 
directly shaped the location of its performance than did Fulkerson’s, offering a fuller, 
more directly engaged good to the particular, local congregation of my study. But I also 
noted that in so doing, my text lost its ability to make more general, normative claims that 
could be applicable across ecclesial spheres, claims that are evident in her text. 
The fruits of my method therefore remained context specific. The church – or, 
rather, a church – was served directly in a local context. Practices appropriate to that 
context were developed such that they could give rise to this study. At the same time, this 
study has not only risen from the social practices associated with the ecclesial realm. Its 
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final textual product is also shaped by and desires to shape the perpetuation of academic 
social practices, in particular, teaching and research. Because I served the church of my 
study with my pedagogical academic skills, this text is freed to be written for the 
academy – and not the church – without undermining the possibility of the whole process 
to serve both. The advantage of this method is that I am able to seek to serve both church 
and academy directly. The disadvantage, of course, is that because the service to the 
church happens in such a local, concrete way, it becomes difficult to see how to serve 
more than about forty people at a time. 
Even so, this mode of ecclesial conversation seems appropriate to Tanner’s 
argument that the everyday theologies to which the academic theologian needs access are 
ad hoc and context specific, bound by space and time and, even, as we have seen here, 
bound to the personal lives of the people who create them. Perhaps it is only or, at least, 
primarily through direct access to these practices that the academic theologian is able to 
shape them, even as her so doing might happen at what feels like a painfully slow pace. 
Much as a division of labor has characterized the pursuit of wisdom outlined in this text, 
the academic theologian herself participates in her own labor divide. If she wants to make 
her work relevant to spheres beyond the academy – whether those spheres be ecclesial or 
some other aspect of broader public life – then as Tanner notes the need for academic 
theologians to speak and compete in ways communicable to everyday Christians, those 
ways will require our continual careful reflection on the multiple particularly located 
practices we do in addition to writing academic texts.  
Indeed, such direct influence – the building up of presence through ecclesial 
practices as well as public practices of writing op-ed pieces, speaking at public events, 
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blogging and participation in other media, for example – might be the only way that the 
academic theologian is able to direct attention from outside the academy toward the texts 
she does produce inside it. The growing edges of my method developed here, then, of 
self-implicated ethnography, relates precisely to this particular form of presence. I 
performed this method in a church, but it could be just as fruitfully performed in an 
alternative Christian community like those I mentioned in the first chapter, a non-profit 
organization, some aspect of a political process, or any other set of everyday practices to 
which the theologian feels drawn.198  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 This dissertation has proposed that a particular self-implicated mode of 
ethnography offers one method by which everyday and academic theologies can hear and 
speak to each other more fully in practice. The first three chapters of this dissertation 
outlined this self-implicating theological ethnographic method that I used to tackle my 
research questions through practices of theological conversation. Throughout this 
dissertation, I have argued that the theological nature of these conversations can be 
understood as a pursuit of wisdom in which the participants – myself included – each 
performed various, ongoing, loose integrations of the numerous habitus with which we 
were all inculcated. We have been less focused on the knowledge that can be produced 
out of this process, and more focused on the process itself. 
                                                 
198 Indeed, research done from the perspective of involving oneself in some aspect of 
public life is known as action-based research. For more on action-based research, see 
Ernest T. Stringer, Action Research 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2007). For more on the relationship between Action-based research and theology, see 
Helen Cameron et al., Talking About God in Practice: Theological Action Research and 
Practical Theology (SCM Press, 2010). 
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 In this conclusion I have reflected on the particularly interpersonal nature of these 
conversations. I have demonstrated that the characters speaking and listening in these 
conversations performed – in ways that both expanded and limited our insight into 
Tanner’s model – complexly hybrid social roles, particularly with regards to the habitus 
and roles associated with the institutional spheres of church and academy. I have also 
sought to demonstrate that interpersonal theological conversations are marked by power 
and emotion, both of which are shaped by the spaces in which the conversations happen. 
Finally, I have endeavored to show how whatever the particular ethnographic practice is 
that is used to open up Tanner’s model matters for the way theologies will be pursued and 
produced. Ethnography and academic theology do not just pair neatly with each other. 
Their integration needs to be theorized in ways that can be authorized by the disciplinary 
principles of each. I have thus marked out avenues for further research from this project 
related particularly to ongoing questions about how everyday and academic theologies 
might continue to work together on shaping the Christian practices from which they both 
arise. 
 In closing, I return to our classroom. It is the final night of the two courses, in the 
final minutes of class, and the group begins to ask questions about how my dissertation is 
coming along. They know they will be in it, and they want to know how they come 
across. I share a few stories about the writing process, and Maureen asks me, “do things 
get contentious at Vanderbilt?” “What do people think about your project?” Her 
implication is disbelief that people at Vanderbilt would care about what a group of church 
people have to say: that people at Vanderbilt would care what she has to say.  
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I tell Maureen that people have actually been really supportive; it might just be 
my misperception, I say, but I think they like hearing what our class has been doing 
together. In fact, I tell the whole group, “a few of my colleagues have gotten a real kick 
out of the image of me floundering, trying to teach Kant to you guys.” They laugh. 
“Yeah, you really did struggle there,” someone comments. I hang my head, admitting to 
them once again that perhaps I had taken on too much. 
As the laughter dies down, Joe, often a quiet guy, takes the final words of our 
time together: “We need a historic plaque put up in this room,” he smiles. “What would it 
say?” I ask with curiosity narrowing my gaze on him playfully. I think he might be 
referring to something with the names of our classes and their dates, but I am wondering 
why he is smirking so mischievously. Gesturing towards the back wall, he grins and 
marks out each word with punctuated emphasis, “She. Tried!” Everyone starts laughing 
again as Maureen swats her husband for his cheekiness. I shake my head, and smiling, 
gather my papers together and begin to prepare to hug everyone good night. 
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(APPENDIX A) 
 
TOPICS IN THEOLOGY: JESUS CHRIST AND SALVATION 
Taught by Natalie Wigg-Stevenson 
 
In this course, we’ll think together about two of the central doctrines of Christian 
theology: the doctrine of Jesus Christ (Christology) and the doctrine of salvation 
(Soteriology).  We’ll look at what different Christians throughout time have believed 
about Jesus (who he was, what he did, how he was both human and divine, how he is still 
present to us today, etc.), and how they connected those beliefs to the workings of 
salvation (what we are saved from, to, and for; how Jesus makes that salvation complete; 
what it means to say we are justified by faith; the role of the cross and resurrection; etc.).  
We will pay particular attention to how Christians connected their beliefs to the ways in 
which they worshipped God, as well as to how Christian beliefs throughout history relate 
to our own beliefs and practices of worship. 
 
2/14 What do we believe? How are our beliefs derived from Scripture? 
What do we as Baptists and as individuals believe about Jesus Christ: his person, 
work, humanity, divinity, time on earth, ongoing presence, return, etc…?  And 
how do we relate our beliefs about Jesus Christ to our understanding of salvation, 
our practices of worship and our practices in everyday life?  What are we saved 
from, to and for, and what are the implications for the Christian life?  What 
Scriptures inform our views?  What Scriptures are we overlooking when we form 
our Biblical views?    
 
2/21 I am working Room In The Inn199 – we can discuss whether or not to have a make  
up class 
  
2/28 Theological views in the Bible and the Early Church 
How was Jesus Christ both human and divine?  How do his humanity and divinity 
relate to our salvation?  If God came in the flesh, what does that mean for our own 
bodily lives? 
  Figures: Jesus and Paul, Justin Martyr, Origen, Arius and Athanasius 
 
3/7 Early Church views continued… (1 hour class tonight for First Night)200 
How do the early church controversies set the ‘rule’ or ‘regulations’ for future 
understandings of Jesus Christ and salvation for Christians?  What early church 
issues are we less concerned about now? What role did practices of worship play 
in early church theologies of Jesus Christ and salvation? 
 Figures: Arius and Athanasius, Augustine 
 
3/14 Medieval Theologies and Practices 
                                                 
199 “Room in the Inn” is a ministry for homeless persons in which FBC participates. 
200 “First Night” refers to FBC business meetings. On “First Nights,” the first night of 
each month, LCU classes  dismiss early. 
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How did atonement theologies develop in the Medieval period?  How did 
practices of worship relate to theologies of Jesus Christ and salvation in the 
Medieval period?  Are there any surprising connections between Medieval 
theologies and our own contemporary Baptist beliefs?  How do female Medieval 
Christian mystics approach questions about Jesus Christ differently?  What can 
we learn from their spiritual theologies? 
 Figures: Anselm, Peter Abelard, Beatrice of Nazareth 
 
3/21 I am working Room In The Inn – we can discuss whether or not to have a make  
up class 
 
3/28 Reformation Theologies 
How did Reformation theologies reframe Christian ways of understanding who 
Jesus Christ was, his divinity and humanity, and what his significance was in 
relation to salvation?  What did Reformation theologians believe human beings 
needed to be saved from?  What did the life of salvation look like according to 
Reformation theologians?  What is “justification by faith” and how did it become 
a central topic for understanding salvation in the Reformation?  How did worship 
practices in the Reformation relate to the understanding of Jesus Christ, salvation 
and the life of faith?  
 Figures: Martin Luther, John Calvin 
 
4/4 Easter Sunday – no class 
 
4/11 Views from Modernity – 17th-19th centuries 
How did Enlightenment views of rationality, history, science and truth shape and 
reshape Christian beliefs in miracles, Christ’s resurrection, the existence of God 
and our ability to know/have faith in God?  How was Jesus Christ understood in 
relation to these issues, and how did that impact the Christian view of salvation in 
the 19th century?  How did Jesus’ humanity relate to notions of human 
embodiment, knowledge and the emotions in this time period?  How do our own 
contemporary Baptist beliefs and practices relate to and diverge from these beliefs 
in expected and surprising ways? 
Figures: Rene Descartes & Blaise Pascal, Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
Soren Kierkegaard 
 
4/18 20th Century Interpretations of Jesus Christ, Salvation and the Problem of 
Suffering 
How did theologians in the 20th century pick up, critique, continue and depart 
from the views of Modernity?  How did the tragic events of the 20th century shape 
theologians’ understandings of Jesus Christ and salvation?  How did a renewed 
interest in the problem of suffering impact how theologians understood the 
relationship between Jesus Christ and the triune God to be configured? 
  Figures: Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, Jurgen Moltmann 
 
4/25 Contemporary Theologies – The Role of Context in the Shaping of Theology  
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How have the particular contexts in which theology has been written in the late 
20th century – particularly in North and South America – shaped the ideas 
contained in the theologies?  How have American revolutions in race relations 
and gender relations impacted theology and led theologians to new interpretations 
of Jesus Christ’s person and work in salvation?  How have movements of 
liberation in Latin America contributed to fresh understandings of the same?  
What is the relationship between politics and theology in all these different 
views?  How does our own context shape what we believe and do in ways we 
might not even notice? 
 Figures: James Cone, Gustavo Gutierrez, Darby Kathleen Ray 
 
5/2 A Return to Our Own Context, Beliefs and Practices (1 hour class tonight for 
First Night) 
How have our own views shifted, expanded or been affirmed throughout the 
course of this class?  What new ideas did we find ourselves surprisingly open to?  
What ideas or theologies connect with our own practices of worship and other 
church practices?  How has our faith been impacted by the historic faith of other 
Christians? 
 Figures: Ourselves! 
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(APPENDIX B) 
 
TOPICS IN THEOLOGY: GOD AS TRINITY 
Taught by Natalie Wigg-Stevenson 
 
In this course, we’ll look at one of the key doctrines of the Christian faith: God as Trinity.  
We’ll look at the Biblical basis for this doctrine, as well as its more systematic 
formulation by early Christian theologians.  And then we’ll study how the doctrine has 
changed shape throughout Christian history depending upon the period in which it was 
reconceived.  We will look especially at how different Christian theologians throughout 
history have understood God’s ways of relating to creation, how it is we come to know 
and experience God as Trinity, how God is revealed to us and how God’s acts relate to 
our own actions. We will ask questions about how God is both transcendent to the world, 
and present within it with particular attention to how God as transcendent father relates to 
the historical presence of the crucified Christ and the ongoing presence of the Holy Spirit 
among us. Throughout the course we’ll look at how historical beliefs and practices of the 
Christian faith with regards to the doctrine of God as Trinity relate to our own beliefs and 
practices as 20-21st century Baptists. 
 
9/12 What do we believe? How are our beliefs derived from Scripture? 
What do we as Baptists and as individuals believe about the Trinity – the three 
persons and their relations to each other, God’s relationship to the world, how it is 
we come to have knowledge of God, etc…?  And how do our beliefs about God 
as Trinity relate to our understanding of salvation, our practices of worship and 
our practices in everyday life? What Scriptures inform our views?  What 
Scriptures are we overlooking when we form our Biblical views?    
 
9/19 Theological views in the Bible and the Early Church 
What was the historical & theological process by which early church leader’s 
came to an orthodox view of the Trinity?  What Biblical stories were relevant for 
their formulation?  What were the central debates and problems?  How did the 
relationship between Judaism and Christianity play into the debates in this time?  
What early church issues are we less concerned about now?  What role did the 
practices of worship lay in early church theologies of God as Trinity? 
 Figures: Early church creeds, Arius and Athanasius, Eastern Fathers 
 
9/26 Class is cancelled because I will be out of town  
 
10/3 Transitions: Early Church to the Medieval Period (We’ll dismiss at 5:50pm  
for First Night) 
We will use this week to wrap up whatever material we didn’t manage to get to 
from the first two classes.  We will also look forward to next week by asking what 
is at stake in the shift from the central question of the early church (what is God 
as Trinity?) to a central question of the Medieval period (how do we know God as 
Trinity?). 
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10/10 Medieval Theologies and Practices – How do we know God? 
How do we as 21st century Baptists understand ourselves as coming to know God?  
What is the relationship between knowing God personally and knowing God 
intellectually?  How did Medieval theologians understand that relationship?  What 
spiritual disciplines or practices did they and do we engage to come to know God 
more deeply?  How do you know you know God? 
Figures: St. Anselm (Ontological Argument), Marguerite Porete 
(Mysticism), Thomas Aquinas (The nature of theology) 
 
10/17 Reformation Theologies – Where is God and what is he like?  
If God is three in one, and Jesus suffers on the cross, does that mean the Father 
and the Holy Spirit suffer too?  What would be the problems with that?  What 
would the nature of their suffering be?  What is the character of God?  Is God 
beautiful, terrible, wrathful, forgiving…? 
  Figures: Martin Luther, John Calvin 
 
10/24 Class is cancelled because I will be out of town  
 
10/31 All LCU classes are cancelled 
 
We will find a time to schedule one make-up class from these two cancelled weeks 
??? Theologies of Modernity – How did the rise of scientific rationality shape our  
views of God? 
What are the limits of human knowledge, and how does knowledge of God relate 
to those limits?  How does philosophical thought play a role in the ways 
Christians understand God?  How is God both inside the world and outside it?  
How is God revealed in history?  Where does the Trinity fit in all this? 
 Figures: Immanuel Kant, GWF Hegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher 
 
11/7 Theology in its Historical Context (We’ll dismiss at 5:50pm for First Night) 
We will take some time to finish up the thoughts we didn’t get to from the 
previous few weeks.  In so doing, we’ll ask how the particular historical and 
geographic contexts in which these theologies were formulated impacted the 
shape they took?  We’ll also discuss the historical, cultural shifts that took place 
in the 20th century, and how those impacted the theologies we’ll study next week. 
 
11/14 20th-century Theology – Why does an all-powerful God permit an unjust  
world? 
With the cutting edges of theology located in Germany, how did the Holocaust 
impact the way Christians thought about God?  Where was God in the Holocaust? 
How did the Holocaust impact the relationship between Jews and Christians in 
their image of God?  How did the complicity of Christians with the Nazi 
movement impact our view of God?  What should the Christian relationship to 
political powers be?  How did the cultural revolutions of the 1960s and ‘70s 
impact the ways in which American Christians think about God? 
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 Figures: Elie Wiesel, Karl Barth, Jurgen Moltmann, Elizabeth Johnson 
 
11/21 A Return to Our Own Context, Beliefs and Practices 
How have our own views shifted, expanded or been affirmed throughout the 
course of this class?  What new ideas did we find ourselves surprisingly open to?  
What ideas or theologies connect with our own practices of worship and other 
church practices?  How has our faith been impacted by the historic faith of other 
Christians? 
 Figures: Ourselves! 
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